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This Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) addresses the proposed
action of completing the preparation and operation of the Galileo
spacecraft, including its planned launch on the Space Transportation System
(STS) Shuttle in October 1989, and the alternative of canceling further work
on the mission.
The Tier 1 (program level) EIS (NASA IgBSa) considered the Titan IV launch
vehicle as an alternative booster stage for launch in May 1991 or later.
The May ]9g] Venus launch opportunity is considered a "planetary back-up"
for the Magellan (Venus Radar Mapper) mission, the Galileo mission, and the
Ulysses mission. Plans were underway to enable the use of a Titan IV launch
vehicle for the planetary back-up. However, in November 1988, the U.S. Air
Force, which procures the Titan IV for NASA, notified NASA that it could not
provide a Titan IV vehicle for the May 1991 launch opportunity due to high
priority Department of Defense requirements. Consequently, NASA terminated
all mission planning for the Titan IV planetary back-up.
A minimum of 3 years is required to _misslon-speclfic modifications
to the basic Titan IV launch configur_L-ibn-F-therefore, insufficient time is
available to use a Titan IV vehicle in May 1991. Thus, the Titan IV launch
vehicle is no longer a feasible alternative to the STS/Inertial Upper Stage
(IUS) for the May 1991 launch opportunity.
Since the environmental considerations of a May 1991STS/IUS launch are
essentially the same as for an October ]989 launch, the delay alternative
was eliminated from further consideration.
The only expected environmental effects of the proposed action are
associated with normal launch vehicle operation, and are treated in
published National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) documents on the Shuttle
(NASA 1978) and the Kennedy Space Center (NASA 1979), and in the KSC
Environmental Resources Document (NASA 1986) and the Galileo Tter] EIS
(NASA 1988a).
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The environmental impacts of a normal launch were deemed insufficient to
preclude Shuttle operations. Environmental impacts may also result from
launch or mission accidents that could release plutonium fuel used in the
Galileo power system. Intensive analysis of the possible accidents
associated with the proposed action reveal small health or environmental
risks. There are no environmental impacts in the no-action alternative.
The remote possibility of environmental impacts of the proposed act!on must
be weighed against the large adverse fiscal and programmatic impacts
inherent in the no-action alternative.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The proposed action addressed by thls Final Environmental Impact
Statement (FEIS) Is the completion of preparation and operation of the
Galileo mission, including its planned launch on the Space Transportation
System (STS) Shuttle in October 1989.
PURPOSE AND NEED FOR THE ACTION
The Gallleo mission Is part of the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration's (NASA) Solar System Exploration Program. The Galileo
mission wlll orbit Jupiter, probe the Jovian planetary atmosphere, and study
the four major moons and the planet's extended electromagnetic environment.
Thls mission follows up on the Pioneer and Voyager flyby missions, and
begins the intensive study of the outer solar system.
ALTERNATIVES CONSIDERED
The proposed action is the completion of preparation and operation of
the Galileo mission, including its launch on the Space Shuttle in October
Ig89. The launch configuration, STS/Inertial Upper Stage (IUS), will
require a Venus-Earth-Earth-Gravity-Assist (VEEGA) trajectory, in which a
Venus and two Earth flybys are required to provide sufficient velocity for
the spacecraft to reach Jupiter.
The alternative to the proposed action is no-action; that is, terminate
further commitment of resources to the mission.
The Tier 1 (program level) EIS (NASA 1988a) considered the Titan IV
launch vehicle as an alternative booster stage for launch in May 1991 or
later. The May 1991 Venus launch opportunity is considered a "planetary
back-up" for the Magellan (Venus Radar Mapper) mission, the Galileo mission,
and the Ulysses mission. Plans were underway to enable the use of a Titan
IV launch vehicle for the planetary back-up. However, In November 1988, the
U.S. Air Force, which procures the Titan IV for NASA, notified NASA that it
could not provide a Titan IV vehicle for the May 1991 launch opportunity due
to high priority Department of Defense requirements. Consequently, NASA
terminated all mission planning for the Titan IV planetary back-up.
A minimum of 3 years is required to implement mlsslon-specific
modifications to the basic Titan IV launch configuration; therefore,
insufficient time Is available to use a Titan IV vehicle in May 1991. Thus,
the Titan IV launch vehicle is no longer a feasible alternative to the
STS/IUS for the May 1991 launch opportunity.
Since the environmental considerations of a May 1991STS/IUS launch are
essentially the same as for an October 1989 launch, the delay alternative
was eliminated from further consideration.
ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES
The only expected environmental effects of the proposed action are
associated with normal launch vehicle operation. These effects have been
considered in the previously published EISs on the Space Shuttle Program
III
(NASA 1978) and the Kennedy Space Center (NASA 1979), and in the Final EIS
for the Galileo and Ulysses Missions (NASA lg88a) and the Kennedy Space
Center (KSC) Environmental Resource Document (NASA 1986). The expected
environmental consequences of Shuttle launches have been deemed insufficient
to preclude Shuttle operations.
In the event of (1) an accident or mission abort during launch, or (2)
reentry of the spacecraft from Earth orbit or during an Earth flyby, there
are potential adverse health and environmental effects associated with the
possible release of plutonium-238 from the spacecraft's Radioisotope
Thermoelectric Generators (RTGs) and the Radioisotope Heater Units (RHUs);
The potential effects considered in preparing this EIS include risks of atr
and water quality impacts, local land area contamination by plutonium-238,
adverse health and safety impacts, the disturbance of biotic resources, the
occurrence of adverse impacts on wetland areas or tn areas containing
historical sites, and socto-economtc impacts.
An intensive analysis of the safety and environmental consequences of
launch or mission accidents indicates very small risks to human health or
the environment. The results of the detailed analyses are summarized for
each mission phase using three scenarios: the most probable case, the
maximum credible case, and the expectation case. These cases are defined as
fol I ows: ....
• Ho_ Probable Case: The highest probability accident in a mission
phase leading to a release of plutonium.
• H_ximum Credible Case: The accident in a mission phase that
leads to a release of plutonium with the most severe impact on
human health. _ _ ......
e Expectation Case: The probability weighted sum of all accidents
In a mission phase.
For this FEIS, a value of I_-7 was a_opted as the limiting probability.
This compares with values of 10.2 and 10 "_ generally used to define maximum
credible accidents in analyses of nuclear power plants. The lower figure
was used here because there is a more limited experience base than In power
plant analyses. The expectation case was calculated without regard to the
limiting probability.
Human health effects are presented both wlth and without consideration
of "de mlnlmls." lhe de minlmls concept refers to a dose at and below which
no health effects are expected. In this document, a de minimls dose level
of I mrem/yr was used based on U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC) consideration and documentation for the National
Council on Radiation Protection and Space Measurements. A more complete
discussion of the analysis and of the basis for use of a de mlntmts level is
given in Section 4. Section 4 also presents estimates of areas of plutonium
deposition resulting from accidents.
For the mission as a whole, the most probable accident Is an IUS
failure (Phase 4) during deployment which leads to spacecraft break-up,
reentry of the RTG modules, and impact of the modules on hard rock leading
iv
tm
w
=
7
E_
to a release. The probability of release is 4X10 -4, or I in 2,500. The
collective population dose over a 70-year period would be 4.6 person-rem
(1.3 person-rem above de mtntmts). This has been demonstrated by test and
operational experience that shows that RTGs have survived Earth orbital
reentry heating conditions with no release of plutonium.
The maximum consequence case is an inadvertent reentry during a VEEGA
flyby (mission Phase 5). In this accident, the RTG modules, under reentry
heating, release their graphite impact shells (GISs), which also experience
heating, and then three GISs hit hard_rock and release their plutonium fuel.
The probability of release is 1.1XIO "/, or about 1 in g millton. The
collective population dose is estimated as 51,700 person-rem over a 70-year
period to an affected population of 71,310 persons. As discussed more fully
in Section 4, even in the extremely rare event of this accident, the health
and environmental effects are very small. On average, over the exposed
population, the dose is less than one-fifth of the normal background dose.
The expectation case analysis for each mission phase is used, in
Section 4, to derive an individual risk value for fatality resulting from
possible launch or mission accidents. The largest individual risk is about
gXlO", or slightly more than 1 in 100 million. This figure may be compared
with Census Bureau data on individual risk of fatality by various causes.,
These data show risks varying from 7X10 "J for death from disease to 7X]O'"
for death due to lightning. The risk of the proposed action is two orders
of magnitude lower than any tabulated value.
There are no environmental impacts associated with the no-action
alternative.
There are severe adverse fiscal and programmatic impacts inherent in
the no-action alternative. As of October 1988, $800 million had been
expended on the Galileo mission. No further action would render that
expenditure a sunk cost and entail a larger scientific loss in terms of
human resources and efforts and the scientific knowledge that would result
from the mission. These grave economic and scientific impacts of no-action
must be weighed against the great benefit and small risk associated with the
proposed action.
This mission-specific EIS follows on a program-level EIS (NASA lg88a)
and provides updated and more detailed information to support decision-
making regarding the completion and operation of the Galileo mission.
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w1. PURPOSE AND NEED FOR ACTION
1.I BACKGROUND
The Galileo mission, as part of the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration's (NASA) Solar System Exploration Program, is designed to
study Jupiter, its four major moons, and its extended electromagnetic
environment.
This Final (Tier 2) Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) has been
prepared to provide updated information necessary to support decision-making
associated with implementing the Galileo mission. The proposed action
addressed in this FEIS is the completion of preparation and operation of the
Galileo mission in October !9_89as presently planned, using the Space
Transpor_atlonSystem (STS) Shuttle with an Inertial Upper Stage (IUS) and a
Venus-Earth-Earth-Gravity-Assist (VEEGA) trajectory. This document succeeds
a program level Final EIS (Tier 1) for the Galileo and Ulysses Missions
(NASA Ig88a).
The Galileo mission supports NASA's Solar System ExploTation Program
and its continuing responsibility to engage in the scientiflc exploration of
the solar system using Earth-based observations, spacecraft, laboratory
studies, and theoretical research. The goals of this Program are as
follows:
1)
2)
3)
To further the understanding of the origin and evolution of the
Solar System
To further the understanding of the origin and evolution of life
To further the understanding of Earth by comparative studies of
the other planets.
The Galileo mission has been designed to further these goals.
Solar system explorationgenerally consists of_three_phases:
reconnaissance, exploration, and intensive study. These phases are
characterized by missions as follows: reconnaissance using remote
observations from flyby missions, such as Pioneers IO and 11 (1973, 1974)
and Voyagers I and 2 (1977); exploration generally involving orbiters, such
as Mariner IX and Galileo; and intensive study using landers, such as the
Apollo missions to the Moon and the Viking mission to Mars.
Development of the Galileo mission was initiated in October 1977 as the
first step in the exploration phase studying the outer planets, Jupiter, and
beyond, which had been reconnoitered by the Pioneers and Voyagers.
Implementation of the Galileo mission has been postponed because of the
series of delays and changes in launch configuration (e.g., the Challenger
accident and subsequent cancellation of the Shuttle-Centaur upper stage).
=,
I-1
m1
].2 PURPOSE OF THE PROPOSED ACTION
The scientific objectives of the Galileo mission are to conduct
comprehensive investigations of the Jovian planetary system by maktng
measurements of the planet, its environment, and its satellites. Jupiter is
the largest and most massive planet in the solar system, and is unique _
because it emits more energy than it receives. Together with its moons, the
planet almost comprises a mtnl solar system. Close-up studies of the planet
and its principal satellites wtll greatly extend the knowledge of the Jovian
system and provide insights into the complex and analogous relationships
existing between the Sun and its planetary system.
The Galileo objectives wtll be accomplished through two separate _
mission elements: -
An orbiter will tour and study Jupiter and the Jovian satellites
over a 20-month period.
A detachable atmospheric entry probe will descend through the .....
atmosphere of Jupiter and, during a period of roughly ] hour, wtll
relay scientific measurements of the atmospheric profile to Earth
via the orbiter.
The Galileo mission will study the entire Jovian system and will focus
on three broad scientific objectives: (I) the structure and composition of
Jupiter's atmosphere; (2) the composition and physical state of the four
largest satellites of Jupiter; and (3) the structure, composition, and
dynamics of the Jovian magnetosphere.
Previous missions to Jupiter have made only remote measurements of the
Jovian atmosphere. Scientists believe that Jupiter is composed of the
original matertal from which stars, and most specifically our Sun, are
formed. The atmospheric entry probe should provide data, during a ]-hour
atmospheric descent period, on the Jovian atmospheric composition to a depth
of ]O to 20 times the sea-level pressure on Earth. It is anticipated that
this will include all the major cloud layers of the Jovian atmosphere,
greatly enhancing the present understanding of the Jovian atmosphere and of
planetary atmospheres tn general. It may be possible to acquire knowledge
of the conditions in the solar system at the time of planetary formation.
The abundance of helium and rare gases in the Jovian atmosphere are
important indicators of conditions in the early solar system and of how the
giant planets kept their atmospheres. It is possible that the outer Jovian
atmosphere is representative of the unmodified material that subsequently
formed the Sun, the planets, and other solar system objects. Other
information that will be obtained from the atmospheric entry probe includes
the locatton and characterization of the Jovian clouds, an analysis of how
solar energy ts absorbed and the quantity of energy that is flowing out of
Jupiter's still-cooling interior, a determination of lightning frequency,
and a determination of whether or not small quantities of organic molecules
are being created from methane and an_nonta.
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The 20-month period during which the orbiter will be obtalnlng
information while in orbit around Jupiter will provide new information on
the deep interior of Jupiter through measurements of the Jovian
gravitational field.
The Jovian satellites will be investigated at ranges from 20 to 100
t|mes closer than earlier missions, typically at ranges of 1,000 kilometers
or less. Thts proximity will permit images of 20 meters resolution that are
comparable to the Viking imagery of Mars. Thts increased resolution will
result in new and detailed knowledge of the surfaces of the satellites,
including interesting features such as the active volcanoes of Io, the
innermost of the four Jovian satellites. It should be possible to determine
the composition, temperature, and activity of Io's volcanic plumes and
volcanic flows over the duration of the orbital investigations. In a manner
similar to the investigation of the interior of Jupiter, gravitation data
may determine whether Io has a completely molten core, as some theories
suggest.
The Jovian magnetosphere is the region of space under the dominant
influence of Jupiter's magnetic field. It Is an immense structure that, if
vlslble from Earth, would appear several times larger than the full moon.
The results of brief flyby measurements of four previous spacecraft have
determined that the Jovian magnetosphere is much more complex and dynamlc
than had been anticipated from Earth-based measurements and theoretical
extrapolations from the Earth's magnetosphere. The outer regions of the
Jovian magnetosphere expand and contract by m|lllons of kilometers in
response to solar wind and internal forces. (The solar wind comprises the
magnetic fields, protons (hydrogen nuclei), electrons, and ions of other
elements from the Sun.) The inner regions of the Jovian magnetosphere are
Influenced by Jupiter's rapid spln (one revolution each ]0 hours) and by the
large quantities of sulfur and oxygen atoms emanatlng from Io. Jupiter also
Is a "laboratory" for studying phenomena appllcable to other astrophyslcal
objects and to processes of ionized gases in general. The Galileo mission
wlll explore these phenomena with new and more sophisticated instrumenta-
tion. Furthermore, the investigations of thls dynamlc environment will
extend over nearly 2 years. New regions of the outer magnetosphere will be
explored, as well as repeated penetrations into the inner regions. The
mission will include at least one long orbit into the "magnetotai1," a
distended, cone-shaped region formed as the solar wlnd sweeps the magnetic
field back away from the planet. This mission will provide the results of
measurements that, in detail and specificity, cannot conceivably be made
from Earth or from Earth orbit.
During its Journey to Jupiter, Galileo will perform additional
observations of the planet Venus, the Earth/Moon system, and a flyby with
one or possibly two asteroids. The specific launch date within the Galileo
launch window will determine if flybys with both asteroids Gaspra and Ida
are possible. These additional planetary data collection opportunities
fully exploit the science return possibilities of the Galileo mission.
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].3 NEED FOR THE ACTION
It is vital, at this stage of planetary science, to conduct tn-situ
measurements of the planet Jupiter and its satellites. For example, the
atmospheric probe will return data on the composition, temperature and
pressure of the atmosphere that can be attained by no other means. So, even
though scientists will continue to study Jupiter from Earth orbit and
ground-based telescopes, the in-sttu data from the Galileo mission will
provide otherwise unattainable data toanchor those complementa_
investigations.
The Galileo mission can be launched only during specific periods in any
given decade, depending on the position of the planets and the capability of
available launch vehicles. Presently, the first available launch
opportunity for Galtleo occurs durihgOctober/November |98-9;thenext_
feasible opportunity does not occur until Hay ]99]. The proposed action is
needed to implement the mission at the earliest available opportunity.
1.4 CONTEXT OF DECISION-MAKING
NASA regulations require an EIS for all space missions carrying more
than trace amounts of radiological materials. The EIS process ]s being
completed at this time because of major program changes, such as the mission
redesign and change in upper stage following NASA's cancellation of Centaur
G-Prime development. _ ...... _ _ _'_ _:_ _: '_
This EIS is intended to support decision-making within the NASA Space
Science and Applications Program. Program management and decision authority
for the Galileo program rest with the Associate Administrator for Sbace .......
Science and Applications. The decision here will be between the stated
alternatives: to complete Galileo development with the full intention of
implementing the mission; or, at this time, to cancel further work on the
program.
The launch decision for the Galileo mission will include other
officials and will be made on the basis of additional information such as
range and vehicle readiness, status of prior approvals, and so forth.
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2. ALTERNATIVES, INCLUDING THE PROPOSED ACTION
2.1 ALTERNATIVES CONSIDERED
This Final (Tier 2) Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) considers the
following alternatives:
ProDosed Action: Completion of preparation and operation of the
mission, including its planned launch on the Space Transportation
System/Inertlal Upper Stage (STS/IUS) vehicle in October 1989.
No-Actlon Alternative: Cancellation of any further commitment of
r_ces to the mission.
The Tier I (program level) EIS (NASA 1988a) considered the Titan IV
launch vehlcle=as an alternative booster stage for launch in May 1991 or
later. The May 1991 Venus launch opportunity is considered a "planetary
back-up" for the Magellan (Venus Radar Mapper) mission, the Galileo mission,
and the Ulysses mission. Plans were underway to enable the use of a Titan IV
launch vehlcle for the planetary back-up. However, in November 1988, the
U.S. Air Force, which procures the Titan IV for NASA, notified NASA that it
could not provide a Titan IV vehicle for the May 1991 launch opportunity due
to high priority Department of Defense requirements. Consequently, NASA
terminated all mission planning for the Titan IV planetary back-up.
A minimum of 3 years is required to implement misslon-specific
modifications to the basic Titan IV launch configuration; therefore,
insufficient time is available to use a Titan IVvehicle in May ]991.
the Titan IV launch vehicle is no longer a feasible alternative to the
STS/IUS for the May 1991 launch opportunity.
Thus,
Since the environmental considerations of a May 1991STS/IUS launch are
essentially the same as for an October 1989 launch, the delay alternative was
eliminated from further consideration.
2.2 DESCRIPTION OF THE PROPOSED ACTION TO PROCEED AS PLANNED WITH
COMPLETION OF PREFARATION$ AND OPERATION OF THE GALILEO MISSION,
INCLUDING ITS PLANNED LAUNCH ON THE STS IN OCTOBER 1989
2.2.1 Mission Deslqn
No combination of launch vehtcles presently available to NASA has the
capability to place the Galtleo spacecraft on a direct trajectory from Earth
to Jupiter (NASA 1988a). Therefore, Galileo wtll first fly to Venus and then
return to Earth for the first of t)o Earth flybys. These flybys allow the
spacecraft to use the gravitational fields of Earth and Venus to gain
sufficient velocity to proceed to Jupiter. Figure 2-I illustrates the
Galileo spacecraft's Venus-Earth-Earth-Gravity-Assist (VEEGA) trajectory.
After arriving at Jupiter, the orbiter will fly by the moon Io prior to
orbiting Jupiter. The orbiter will conduct a study of Jupiter's atmosphere
and the characteristics of the space environment surrounding Jupiter. The
atmospheric entry probe, which is to be released prior to the arrival of the
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orbiter at Jupiter, will descend into Jupiter's atmosphere. During the
descent, scientific measurements will be made to determine the structure and
composition of Jupiter's atmosphere. The data will be relayed to Earth by
the orbiter.
2.2.].] Launch Opportunity Considerations
The Galileo mission can be launched only during specific periods
depending on the positions of the planets and the capabilities of the STS/IUS
launch vehicle. Due to programmatic constraints associated with resumption
of Shuttle operations, the first period for the launch of Galileo occurs
during October/November 1989. After 1989, the next feasible launch period
for Galileo occurs in May/June ]gg]. For each day of either the 1989 or 199]
period, the rotational position of the Earth limits the launch from a few
minutes to an hour of each day.
When a mission delay causes a launch opportunity to be missed,
spacecraft trajectories and mission operations must be redesigned and
generally mission budgets must be augmented. The redesign of the mission
operations requires new plans for communications, spacecraft tracking, and
mission operation facilities support. These new plans affect not only the
delayed missions, but also other missions that depend on the resources of
these facilities. Because of the specialized nature of space exploration
missions such as Galileo, trained personnel and the use of supporting
facilities must be retained when missions are delayed between launch
opportunities. These factors all imply large costs associated with delaying
a mission.
Due to the gradual radioactive decay of their plutonium fuel,
Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator (RTG) power levels decline over time.
When delays occur in the launch of an RTG-powered spacecraft, mission plans
must be altered to adjust to the lower level of available spacecraft power.
This can cause mission planners to restrict mission objectives or, in severe
cases, to undertake the expensive refueling of the RTGs.
2.2.1.2 Trajectory (VEEGA)
To gain the velocity required to reach Jupiter, the Galileo spacecraft
will first execute a Venus gravlty-assist flyby and then two Earth gravity-
assist flybys. This trajectory is known as the Venus-Earth-Earth-Gravity-
Assist, or VEEGA, trajectory. The VEEGA trajectory and an Earth avoidance
analysis are addressed in the Tier I FEIS (NASA IgBBa).
The trajectory design and navigation operations are being developed
consistent with an Earth avoidance plan to bias the spacecraft's trajectory
away from Earth between the time of launch and any Earth flyby. During the
majority of Galileo's inner solar system Journey,_the spacecraft will follow
a trajectory that, without any further maneuvers, would miss the Earth by at
least several thousand kilometers. The spacecraft is placed on a trajectory
passing through the required Earth flyby point only 25 days prior to each
passage.
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On the final approach to each Earth flyby, additional operational
requirements are being imposed to further ensure against inadvertent
reentry. Continuous tracking by the Deep Space Network is planned beginning
3S days prior to each flyby. Around-the-clock tracking and monitoring of
the spacecraft provides near-real-time evidence of any spacecraft anomalies.
During the period from the last spacecraft maneuver I0 days out through each
Earth flyby, no commands will be sent to the spacecraft other than those
deemed essential for maintaining vehicle operations, such as solar pointing
for thermal control--the premise behind this requirement being that minimal
spacecraft activity yields a minimum probability of occurrence of unplanned
events. The Galileo Earth avoidance strategies result in a total
probability of inadvertent reentry during both Earth flybys of less than
5XlO". For a detailed VEEGA discussion, see Section 4.
2.2.2 _oacecraft Descrtotton
The Galileo spacecraft Consists of an orbtte_ and an atmospheric entry
probe and weighs approximately 6,000 pounds (see Figures 2-2 and 2-3). The
spacecraft is spin-stabilized, but incorporates a separate section that does
not spin. The "spun" part of the spacecraft spins at about three revolutions
per minute to allow its instruments to "sweep" the sky continuously tO make
their measurements. The spinning part of the spacecraft contains
communication antennas, the spacecraft propulsion and power subsystems, most
of the electronics and communications equipment, and various sctenc_ Y_....
instruments. The non-spinning part of the spacecraft provides a stable
platform for remote-sensing instruments that must be precisely pointed. The
non-spinning part also accommodates the atmospheric entry probe and
supporting electronics.
The spacecraft elements that are relevant to the assessment of potential
environmental impacts are the two RTGs in the power subsystem, the
Radioisotope Heater Units (RHUs) in the temperature control subsystem, and
the propellants in the propulsion subsystem and the attitude control
subsystem.
2.2.2.1 Power/Heat Sources
Radtolsotooe Thermoelectric Generators (RTGs)
An RTG (see Figure 2-4) is a device that converts the heat from the
natural radioactive decay of plutonium-238 (a non-weapons grade of plutonium)
to electricity for spacecraft instruments. RTGs have been used on 22
previous space missions, including some of NASA's most successful ones (e.g.,
Voyager, Pioneer, Viking, and all but the first of the manned Apollo landings
on the Moon). The Galileo spacecraft will have two RTGs, each generating
approximately 284 watts of electrical power.
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The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) safety philosophy for the design of
the RTG requires containment or immobilization of the plqton!um fuel to the
maximum extent possible during all mission phases, including-ground handling,
launch, and unplanned events such as reentry, impact, and post-impact
situations (Bennett 1981). As indicated previously, the dominant form of
plutonium used in RTGs, plutonium-23B (see Tables 2-I and 2-2), is not the
type used in nuclear weapons (i.e., plutonium-23g).
An RTG consists of two major elements: (I) a heat source that contains
the plutonium fuel and (2) a thermoelectric converter that converts heat to
electricity. The heat source, referred to as the General Purpose Heat Source
(GPHS) contains the plutonlum-238 fuel in a stacked column of IB individual
modules. Each module consists of a graphite block that encases two graphite
cylinders (see Figure 2-S). Each cylinder contains two pellets of plutonium-
238 dioxide encased in iridium. In the event that the modules are released
in a launch accident and fall back to Earth, the grapbiteb)ock construction
protects the module from burning:up in the atmOsphere-an_releaslng any
plutonium. The graphite cylinders protect the plutonium pellets from impacts
with the ground or debris. The iridium metal contains the fuel and provides
an additional layer of protection. _.... _: _
LiQht-weiqht Radioisotope Heater Units (RHUs)
Engineers have determined that the Galileo spacecraft could require the
use of up to 131 light-weight RHUs to maintain portions of the orbiter/
atmospheric entry probe temperature within acceptable limits, to minimize
the use of electrical power for thermal control, and to reduce electro_
magnetic interference. Each RHU provides about one Watt of thermal power
derived from the radioactive decay of 2.7 grams of plutonium-23B. The
plutonium (in the form of a plutonium dioxide pellet) of each RHU is
contained within a platinum-rhodium alloy capsule. Similar to the RTGs,
each RHU is encased in a graphite insulator surrounded by a graphite block
to provide protection from atmospheric heating and ground or debris impact
in the event of an accident (see Figure 2-6). The RHUs are designed to be
light-welght units capable of containing the plutonium dioxide fuel in both
normal operations and accidents. The locations of RHUs on the Galileo
spacecraft are shown in Figure2_7. _ _ _ _
The only alternative to the Galileo spacecraft RHUs would be the
addition of another RTG, which would result in an unacceptable weight
increase for the spacecraft.
In the period of time between the issuance of draft EIS and the
issuance of this final EIS, it was learned that the final number of RHUs
installed onboard the_spacecraft would be 120 instead of 131. Since that
reduction is small in terms of the total number of RHUs, especially in terms
of the total amount of radiological material onboard Galileo, and since the
reduction would tend to reduce any possible environmental impact, NASA has
chosen not to modify its analyses. Analysis of 131 instead of the correct
number, 120, should be considered an additional element of conservatism.
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TABLE 2-1. ISOTOPIC COMPOSITION OF RTG FUEL
P1utonIum
Isotope
Weight
Percent Radioactivity Total
at Half-Life (Curies/gram of Curies
Manufacture (Years) plutonium*) (11/89)
236 <10 -6 2.85 532 <1
238 *83.880 87.7 17.1 *'130,050
239 13.490 24,100 0.0621 80.2
240 1.900 6,560 0.227 41.3
241 0.379 14.4 103.2 2,650
242 0.124 376,000 0.00393 <1
Other TRU
isotopes .... 3.3
TOTALS
0.228
100.00 *'132,825
=
The radioisotope fuel is a mixture of plutonium dioxide (PuO_)
containing 83.5 percent (plus or minus I percent) of Pu 238 IDOE 1988a).
Based on values from Table A-I in DOE 1988a, which reflect the isotopic
"content of the F-I, F-3, and F-5 RTGs at time of manufacture In 1982 and
1983. The values in this table differ from those in Table B-I, Vol. Ill
(Book 2) of the FSAR (DOE'lgB§a)-because _those rep_esen_ the 1982
content of the F-! unit only, while these values represent the content
expected at launch (corrected for radiGacttve decay).
TABLE 2-2. ISOTOPIC COMPOSITION OF LWRHU FUEL
L
Weight
Percent Radioactivity Total
Plutonium at Half-Life (Curies/gram of Curies
Isotope Manufacture (Years) plutonium*) (10/89)
236 <10 -6 2.85 532 <1
238 82.47 87.7 17.1 3,990
239 14.8 24,100 0.0621 2.6
240 2.10 6,560 0.227 1.35
241 0.29 14.4 ]03.2 84.8
242 0.14 376,000 0.00393 <1
Other TRU
isotopes 0.20 .... 1.9
TOTALS 100.00 4,801
* Based on values from Table B-2 in DOE 1988f.
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2.2.2.2 RTGand GPHS Design and Performance History
The GPHS, which Is the source of energy for the RTGs on the Galileo
spacecraft, ts the culmination of aimost 25 years of design evolution of heat
source technology. Safety is a principal engineering design goal of the heat
source. The safety-related destgn goals are to: 1) contain or Immobilize
the fuel to the maximum extent posstble under normal and accident
environments, and 2) ensure compatibility with the power generation system.
The following is a brief summary (Bennett 1987) of relevant safety
environments and GPHS response:
Ltautd Prooellant Fires: The GPHSmodules survive the most severe
fires that can result from on-pad events.
Solid ProDell_nt Fires: The GPHS survives fires in contact with
the burning soltd propellant.
e ExDlostons: Bare GPHS modules were shown to survive up to
approximately 1,070 psi overpressures, and modules within an RTG
converter housing were shown to survive approximately 2,200 pst.
I Hlqh-veloctty Fraaments: Test data for bare fuel clads impacted
by flyer plates representative of structures tnvolved tn External
_ _ _.Tank(ET) explosions (i.e., aluminum of thickness of approximately
.... 3.5 mm) were only minimally breached at velocities between 349 and
1,173 m/s (],145 to 3,838 f/s). Further tests representative of
Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) fragments (1/2 tnch thick stainless
steel) show the RTG to survive fragment velocities, with a face-on
impact up to 700 f/s, with no release of fuel; edge-on SRB
fragments breached the RTGs at velocities of gS m/s (312 f/s).
e Reentry: GPHS modules survive Earth-escape-velocity-reentry
ab]ation and thermal stress wtth wide margins.
Earth Impact: GPHS modules were designed to survive impact on
hard surfaces (granite steel concrete) at termtnal velocity;
53 m/s (172 f/s). Test results show no failures of clads against
sand up to 250 m/s (820 f/s), no clad fat]ures against concrete at
ter_ntnal velocity, and small releases against steel or granite at
te_tnal velocity. Clads alone showed small release when
impacting at terminal veloctty on a hard surface.
Ocean Impact: GPHS modules survtve water tmpact and wtll resist
significant fuel release for virtually unlimited periods.
The design features for the GPHS incorporate many safety-related
considerations. The fuel used tn the GPHS design is plutonium-238 dioxide,
high-fired and hot-pressed tnto 62.5 Watt capacity ceramic fuel pellets. In
thts form, plutonium-238 ts virtually insoluble tn ground or sea water should
such exposure occur.
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The primary protective material used to encapsulate the fuel is an alloy
of iridium. Iridium ts a unique noble metal found in deposits of gold and
platinum. It is compatible with the fuel matertal to over 1,SO0°C (2,700UF),
resists oxidation in atr to ],O00°C (],800°F), and melts at 2,447uC
(4,437°F). Each clad also contains a frtt vent designed to release the
heltum generated by the fuel alpha parttcle decay and to prevent t_e release
of plutonium.
The graphttic materials in the GPHS perform several functions. _ The
primary function is to provtde reentry protection for the fueled clads.
This is the Job of the aeroshell. A second major function ts impact
protection. Thts Is accomplished by both the aeroshel] and the impact shell.
The impact shell also serves as a redundant reentry aeroshell. The third
function ts to provide a mounting structure for the clads to survive normal
ground handltng and ]aunch dynamic loads. The material used for the
aeroshe]] and impact shell is called fine weave, pierced fabric (FWPF). FWPF
4s a carbon-carbon composite material woven with high-strength graphite
fibers in three perpendicular directions. Upon impregnation and
graphitization, the material has an extremely high thermal Stress resistance
as required for reentry protection. FWPF has a very fine structure that
results in uniform ablation characteristics leading to high confidence in
ablation margins. This material, used primarily by the Air Force for missile
nose cones, is one of the best available for reentry applications.
The GPHS deliberately was designed to be composed of small, modular
units so that reentry heating and termtnal velocity would be lower than they
were for previous heat sources. A modular heat source tends to minimize the
amount of fuel that can be postulated to be released in a given accident.
For example, for a high-velocity fragment impact resulting from a severe
explosion that penetrates the GPHS, only a Few of the Fueled clads would be
expected to release fuel. This is an improvement over earlier heat source
destgns.
Overall, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has spent 9 years in
engineering, safety, and environmental testing of the GPHS, building on the
experience gained from previous heat source development programs. The test
program results have proven the present design to be the most successful of
any heat source developed for past programs.
There have been three U.S. spacecraft that failed to achieve their
tntended mission included RTGs onboard the spacecraft. Early RTG models
carried relatively much smaller amounts of radioactive material and were
built to burn up at high altitude during accidental reentry. This design
requirement was met tn ]964 during the malfunction of the Navy's Transit-
5BN-3 navigational satellite that carried the SNAP 9A RTG.
Since 1964, RTGs have been designed to contain or Immobilize their
plutonium fuel to the maximum extent possible during all mission phases.
Thts design philosophy has performed flawlessly in two mission failures where
RTGs were present. A SNAP 19B2 RTG landed intact in the Pacific Ocean in Hay
1968 after a Nimbus B weather satellite failed to reach orbit. The fuel was
recovered and used in a later mission. In Aprtl 1970, the Apollo 13 lunar
module reentered the atmosphere and its SNAP 27 RTG, which was Jettisoned,
fell intact tnto the 20,000 feet deep Tonga Trench in the Pacific Ocean.
Heasurements show that there was no release of radioactive material into the
atmosphere.
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2.2.2.3 Spacecraft Propulsion Subsystem
The Galileo spacecraft uses monomethyl hydraztne fuel and nitrogen
tetroxtde oxidizer for tts propulsion subsystem. This propellant combination
is hypergoltc (i.e., the propellants ignite spontaneously upon contact with
each other). The spacecraft's propellant tanks are loaded at the Kennedy
Space Center(KSC) with about 807 pounds of monomethyl hydraztne and 1,290
pounds of nitrogen tetroxtde.
2.2.3 _TS/IUS Launch Vehicle
The STS/IUS launch configuration consists of the STS Shuttle booster
wtth an IUS that ts carried to Earth orbit tn the Shuttle bay. Figure 2-8
Illustrates the configuration of the spacecraft in the Shuttle bay for
launch. The selection of the STS/IUS launch vehtcle was addressed in the
Tier I FEIS (NASA 1988a).
The STS consists_of a ptiote:_¥eusab_e_ve_tcle (the Shuttle) mounted on
a non-reusable External Tank (ET) containing liquid hydrogen and oxygen
propellants and two Solid Rocket Boosters (SRBs). The Shuttle has three main
rocket engines and a cargo bay 60 feet long by 15 feet tn diameter (NASA
1978).
At launch, both SRBs and the Shuttle's rocket engines burn
simultaneously. After approximately 128 seconds into the flight, the spent
SRB casings are jettisoned and subsequently recovered from the ocean. The
ET is jettisoned before the Shuttle goes tnto Earth orbit. The Shuttle's
Orbital Haneuvertng System (OMS) is then used to propel the Shuttle tnto the
desired Earth orbit. Once the IUS wtth its payload ts deployed, the OHS is
used to take the Shuttle out of orbit. The Shuttle ts piloted back to Earth
for an unpowered landing. A more detailed description of the Shuttle can be
found tn Appendix B and the Shuttle EIS (NASA 1978).
Once deployed from the Shuttle, the lUS can propel payloads Into higher
Earth orbits or to Earth-escape velocities needed for planetary missions.
The IUS proposed for use on the Galileo mlsslon Is a two-stage solid rocket
(Boeing 1984). Figure 2-g illustrates the configuration of the Galileo
spacecraft assembled with the IUS.
2.2.4 Ranqe Safety Considerations
The Eastern Space and Mlsslle Center at Patrick Air Force Base Is
responsible for range safety for any NASA/KSC space launch. The goal of
Range Safety is to control and contain the fllght of all vehicles, precluding
the impact of intact vehicles or pieces thereof In a location that could
endanger human 11fe or damage property. Although the risk can never be
completely eliminated, Range Safety attempts to minimize the risks while not
unduly restricting the probabillty of mission success.
Each STS flight vehicle carries a Range Safety Flight Termination System
(FTS). When activated by an electronlc signal sent by the Range Safety
Officer, the FTS activates explosive charges designed to destroy the vehicle.
The STS FTS enables the Range Safety Officer to destroy the SRBs and ET if
the flight trajectory deviates too far from the planned course.
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2.2.5 Mission Conttnqencies
2.2.5.1 Intact Aborts
The STS vehicie has an intact abort capability in the event specific
failures (e.g., engine loss, electrical/auxiliary power failure, etc.) occur
during the early phases of launch. Intact abort is defined as safely
returning the Shuttle crew and cargo to a suitable landing site. Five basic
abort modes exist providing continuous intact abort Capability during ascent
to orbit: Return To Launch Site, Transoceanic Abort Landing, Abort-Once-
Around, Abort-To-Orblt, and Abort-From-Orblt. These intact, safe abort
capabilities enable protection of the crew and the payload after anomalies
and may avoid loss of missions. Therefore, manned systems offer a capability
that does not exist on expendable launch vehicles. The planned intact abort
landing sites for the Galileo mission are as follows.
Type of Abort Site
Return To Launch Site
Transoceanic Abort Landing
Abort-Once-Around
Abort-From-Orbit
Kennedy Space Center
Ben Guerir, Morroco
Alternate -
Moron, Spain
Edwards Air Force Base, CA
Alternates -
White Sands Space Harbour, NM
Kennedy Space Center
Edwards Air Force Base, CA
Alternates ....
White Sands-_pace Harbour, NM
Kennedy Space Center
2.2.5.2 Contingency Aborts
Contingency abort conditions are defined when two Space Shuttle Main
Engines fail prior to single engine Transoceanic Abort Landing capability or
when three engines fail prior to achieving an Abort-Once-Around capability.
These conditions result tn a crew bailout and subsequent ocean impact of the
Shuttle.
There is a posslbillty of performlng a Return To Launch Site abort if
two or three main engines fail within 20 seconds after launch or a
Transoceanic Abort Landing if three engines fail during the last 30 seconds
of powered flight. However, during the remainder of the ascent phase, two or
three maln engine failures result in a contingency abort scenario.
2.2.5.3 On-orbit Spacecraft Aborts
It is also possible to abort the Galileo mission if problems occur after
deployment of the Galileo/IUS from the STS Shuttle and before VEEGA
trajectory insertion. For example, should the IUS fall to insert the
spacecraft into an Earth escape trajectory, the spacecraft will be separated
automatically from the IUS. The estimated lifetime of the spacecraft In low
Earth orbit will be several days. In about 54 percent of the cases where an
IUS failure occurs, the spacecraft will either escape Earth orbit or, using
the spacecraft propulsion system, Will achieve a long-term storage orbit.
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2.3 ELIMINATION OF THE DELAY_ALTERNATIVE
The Tier 1 (program level) EIS (NASA 1988a) considered the Titan IV
launch vehtcle as an alternative booster stage for launch in May 1991 or
later. The May 1991 Venus launch opportunity ts considered a "planetary
back-up" for the Magellan (Venus Radar Mapper) mission, the Galileo mission,
and the Ulysses mission. Plans were underway to enable the use of a Titan IV
launch vehicle for the planetary back-up. However, tn November 1988, the
U.S. Air Force, which procures the Titan IV for NASA, notified NASA that it
could not provide a Titan IV vehicle for the May 1991 launch opportunity due
to high priority Department of Defense requirements. Consequently, NASA
terminated all mission planning for the Titan IV planetary back-up.
A minimum of 3 years ts required to implement mission-specific
modifications to the basic Titan IV launch configuration; therefore,
insufficient time is available to use a Titan IV vehicle in May 1991.
the Titan IV launch vehicle ts no longer a feasible alternative to the
STS/IUS for the May 1991 launch opportunity.
Thus,
Since the environmental considerations of a May 1991STS/IUS launch are
essentially the same as for an October 1989 launch, the delay alternative was
eliminated from further consideration.
2.4 DESCRIPTION OF THE NO-ACTION ALTERNATIVE
The no-action alternative would result in the termination of the further
commitment of resources to the mission. If NASA did not proceed with the
Galileo mission, the goals of the NASA Solar System Exploration Program
(i.e., the potential scientific returns of this mission) would not be
attained.
2.5 COMPARISONOF ALTERNATIVES
The factors pertinent to a comparison of the "Proposed Action" with the
"No-Action" alternative have been separated into those related to normal
missions and to accidents. The comparison ts summarized in Table 2-3.
2.5.1 Environmental Impacts Qf the Mission
2.5.1.1 Environmental Impacts from Normal Mission
None of the alternatives including the proposed action are expected to
result In any significant envlronmental impacts to the physical environment.
The proposed action wlll resqlt Inllmited short-term air, water quality, and
biological impacts In the immediate vicinity of the launch site. These
impacts have been previously addressed in other National Environmental Policy
Act (NEPA) documents (NASA 1985a, NASA 1986, NASA 1988a, USAF 1986, USAF
Ig88b) and are assoclated with the routine launch operations of the STS and
Titan IV launch vehicles. The impacts were determined by NASA to be
Insufflclent to preclude Shuttle operations. The following subsections
briefly summarize the impacts described tn Section 4.
Proposed Action
Short-term air quality degradation at the launch site and downwind of
the launch will occur from the HCI and aluminum oxide emissions from the
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TABLE 2-3 $*U_RY COMPARISON' OF ALTERNATIVES
I
J PROGRANWATIC CONSIDERATIONS
I
I
SAFETY & EWVLRONWENTAL |NPACT
Expected (Nor_l Launch)
• Land Use
• Air QuaLity
• Sonic Boom
• HydroLogy and Water QuaLity
• BioLogicaL Systems
Endangered end Threatened
species
• Socioeconoetc Factors
PROPOSED ACTION
STS/IUS
IN 1989
No slgnlficsht adverse
impacts on non-Launch
reLated Land uses.
Short-term d, st,dot|on
of air quality within
tsuhch cloud end near-
field (about 1,600 feet
from Launch pad).
No significant adverse
Impacts outside the near-
field env]ronnmnt.
No significant adverse
impacts.
No significant adverse
Long-tern impacts.
Short-tern increase in
the acidity of nearby
water Impoundments.
Short-term vegetation
damage contributes to
Long-tern decrease in
species richness in
near-fieLd over time
with Shuttle operations.
FiSh kiLLs in near-by
mosquito control
impoundments expected
with each ShuttLe
Launch.
NO significant adverse
effects outside the
near-fieLd.
No significant adverse
effects.
No significant adverse
effects. Short-tern
econcmtc effects from
tourism.
NO ACTION
No Effect
No Effect
No Effect
No Effect
No Effect
No Effect
No Effect
II
i
m
mm
]
L--.
"1
!
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SUHHARY COHPARISON OF ALTERNATIVES (Continued)
PROPOSED ACTION
PROGRANNATIC COMS|DERATIOMS
STS/IUS
IN 1989
-_--u_*_o******._aw_wle*****wew_e.. *wueolowo_e_uomeeomolealmt.
Expected (BaLance of Nlsslon) No significant adverse
Potential Accidents:
everett ProbabiLity of Pu-238
ReLease to Biosphere for Nisulon
Quantity of Pu-238 ReLeased to
Biosphere In the Event of an
Accident during Nission
Launch Vicinity Accident Causing
ReLease
- Expectation
Naxin_Jm CredibLe
VEEGA Accident Causing ReLease
Expectation
Naximum CredibLe
Lifetime Incremental PopuLation
Dose In the Event of • Niasion
Accident-TotaL; (above de mlntmis)
Launch Vicinity Accident Causing
ReLease
- Expectation
- Naximum CredibLe
VEEGA Accident Causing ReLease
- Expectation
• Maximum CredibLe
incremental Cancer FataLities among
Exposed Popu|at|on In the Event of
• Nile]on Accident (above
de mtntmls)
Launch Vic(nIty Accident Causing
ReLease
- Expectetlon
- Naxlmw_m CredibLe
VEEGA Accident Causing ReLease
Expectation
Nsxtmum CredibLe
effects.
_Io-4
894 Curies at 3X10 "4
1,860 Curies et lXlO "4
i2,900 Curies at SXlO "7
11,568 Curies at lX10 "7
821 person-roB at 4X10 "4
(7 person-tea)
4,890 person-tea at IX10 "4
(3,710 person-tea)
1,120 person-Pea at 5X10 "7
(647 person-re=)
151,700 person-tea et lX10 "7
(50,600 person-tea)
0.001 at &Xl0 "4
0.7 et lX10 "4
0.1 at 5X!_ "7
9 at lx10
NO ACTION
No Effect
None
Mane
None
MoRe
None
Mane
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TABLE 2-3. SUMMARY COMPARISON OF ALTERNATIVES (Continued)
PROPOSED ACTION
FROGRANNATIC CONSIDERATIONS NO ACTION
STS/IUS
IN 1989
Inland Ares Requiring Assessment
end Possible CLeanup in Event of
an Accident
Launch Vicinity Accident Causing
Release
- Expectation
- Naxtu Credible
VEEGA Accident Causing Release
- Expectation
- Noxtu Credible
SCIENCE RETURN
Jupiter Arrival Dote
Nisston Norgfns:
- Power
- Propellant
VEEGA Asteroid Opportunitlei- - -
COST
TOTAL ESTINATED COST
LAUNCH OPPORTUNITY
Vehicle Availability
Launch Period
- First Possible Launch Date
- Length
Daily Launch Window
OTHER CONSIDERATIONS
Supporting Facility Avottob|Ltty
Personnel Availability
15 km2
9 km2
December 7, 1995
Adequate
Adequate
Oespre & Ida
S1.04 Billion
None
None
None
N/A
N/A
None
Sunk Cost of S800 WILL.
I
Firm Commitment
October 8, 1989
47 Dsys
5-50 Ntnutes
N/A
N/A
W/A
N/A
N/A
Firm Cc,mmttment
Project Teem !n PLace
Not Required
None
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solid rocket booster engines. The greatest effect wt11 be in the "near
field" (i.e., within about go0 feet of the launch pad). Additional
deposition will occur outside this area in lower concentrations, with most
deposition expected to occur over the ocean.
Short'term tmpact$ on natural vegetation and biota could be acute near
the launch pad tf the launch occurs during precipitation. This damage would
be confined to vegetation and biota near the launch pad. Acidification of
mosquito impoundments near the launch pad also may occur. These impacts are
stmtlar to those observed during the past 10 years and are on KSC land. At
the ttme of launch, birds are expected to be startled by the noise, but no
long-term consequences are expected. No adverse impacts on endangered
species are expected (based on experience with Shuttle launches to date).
Beneficial tmpacts on the local economy wt11 result from the influx of
tourists w_c come to view the launch. Additional benefits wtll result from
the science returns as discussed in Subsection 2.5.2.
=
No-Action Alternative
The "No-Action" alternative, while not creating any direct environmental
impacts, could limit the scientific base for future technological advances.
On the other hand, successful completion of the mission under the "Proposed
Action" would result in new scientific knowledge that could lead to techno-
logical advances that could have significant long-term positive benefits.
2.5.1.2 Possible Environmental Impacts of Mission Accidents
For the proposed action, there is a s11ght chance of adverse Impacts.
Analysis indicates that the chance of any plutonlum-releaslng accident
occurring Is small (NASA ]g88a, and Section 4 of thls EIS).
The DOE has conducted an extensive program of safety verification,
testing, and analysis to determine the chances and consequences of releaslng
plutonlum-238 from the Galileo spacecraft's RTGs and RHUs in the event of an
accident. The goal of the DOE program is to ensure the integrity of RTGs,
predict their response to a broad range of accident conditions, and estimate
the environmental Impact, if any, of an accident. The results of these
analyses are presented in Section 4 and Appendix B of thls document and are
briefly summarized in Table 2-3.
For the mission as a whole, the most probable accident Is an IUS
fallure (Phase 4) during deployment which leads to spacecraft break-up,
reentry of the RTG modules, and impact of the modules on hard rock leadlng
to a release. The probablllty of release Is 4XI0", or ] In 2,500. The
collectlve population dose over a 70-year period would be 4.6 person-rem
(1.3 person-rem above de mlnlmls). Thls has been demonstrated by test and
operatlonal experience that shows RTGs have survived Earth orbital reentry
heating conditions with no release of plutonlum.
The maximum consequence case ts an inadvertent reentry during a VEEGA
flyby (mission Phase 5). In thts accident, the RTG modules, under reentry
heating, release their graphite impact shells (GISs), which also experience
heating, and then three GISs htt hard rock and release their plutonium fuel.
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The probability of release is 1.1xlO"7, or about 1 in g mtllion. The
collective population dose is estimated as 51,700 person-rem over a 70-year
period to an affected population of 7],310 persons. As discussed more fully
in Section 4, even in the extremely rare event of thts accident, the health
and environmental effects are very small. On average, over the exposed
population, the dose ts less than one-fifth of the normal background dose.
=
The expectation case analysis for each mtsston phase is used, tn Section
4, to derive an Individual risk value for fataltty resulting from possible
launch or mission accidents. The largest Individual risk ts about gX]O "_, or
slightly more than ! in ]00 mtllton. Thts figure may be compared with Census
Bureau data on Individual rts_ of fataltty by vartous causes. _These data
show risks varying from 7X]O "_ for death from disease to 7X]O "I for death due
to lightning. The rtsk of the proposed action is two orders of magnitude
lower than any tabulated value.
NQ-A_tton Alternattv¢
There are no adverse health or environmental impacts from the no-action
alternative. _ .... _.........
2.5.2 Scooe and Ttmtnq of Misston Science Returns
In comparing the alternatives it is clear that there are no significant
health or environmental impacts outside the immediate vicinity of the launch
pad associated with a normal mission. There are, however, major adverse
fiscal and programmatic impacts attendant with the no-action alternative.
The Proposed Action would accomplish most of NASA's scientific
objectives for the Galileo mission's study of Jupiter. The Proposed Action
would result in the earliest collection of mission scientific data;
additlonally, it would afford NASA the opportunity for close observation of
two asteroids.
The "No-Action" alternative by definition would result in not obtaining
any science data and therefore would effectively prevent the Nation from
achieving its solar system exploration program objectives as they relate to
advanced studies of Jupiter and Its satellltes.
2.5.3 Launch Preparation and ODeratlon Costs (Mission Only)
The Proposed Action, with an estimated cost to completion of
approxlmately $I billion, represents the minimum cost alternative to NASA for
meeting the objectives of the Galileo mission.
The No-Actlon alternative would represent the least cost alternative
for NASA but would render useless the $800 million current investment.
Implementation of this alternative would also incur additional costs for
decommissioning facilitles dedicated for the Galileo mission and for
disassembllng and/or storing the Galileo spacecraft.
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L2.5.4 Launch Schedules and LaunchVehtc]e Availability
Consistent wtth the Proposed Act|on, the Galt]eo mtsston has been
manifested for f11ght onboard the STS tn October/November 1989. There are no
plans wtthtn the extsting launch mantfest to launch Galileo on board the STS
tn 1991; however, tf NASA decided not to launch Galileo tn ]989, an STS/IUS
launch could 11kely be made available.
2.5.5 Factllty and Personnel Availability
To matntatn the Proposed Actton, the necessary sctent|fic and
engineering personnel are tn place to Implement the Galtleo mtssion tn 1989.
NASA's Deep Space Network ts prepared to meet the project's tracktng and data
relay requ|rements. The Federal Republlc of Germany has agreed to provtde
spacecraft tracktng support for the 1989 mission's science experiments that
are planned during the Venus, Earth, and asteroid flyby phases of the
mtsston.
Se]ectton of the No-Action alternative would result in releasing a
Shuttle launch commitment (and an 1US upper stage booster) tn October/
November 1989 for either a NASA or Department of Defense mtsston. Existtng
engineers would be available to work on other NASA projects. Host signifi-
cant]y, the scientific Investigations of scores of scientists who have
prepared 10 years to conduct experiments as part of the Ga111eo mtsston
would be terminated.
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3. AFFECTED ENVIRONMENT
i
This section addresses those elements of the human environment that could
potentially be affected by the proposed and alternative actions addressed
within this document. The section is divided into three major parts
addressing: (]) the region in which the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) and Cape
Canaveral Air Force Station (CCAFS) launch areas are located, (2) the local
area encompassing the STS and Titan IV launch sites, and (3) the "global
commons" or the global environment. A brief discussion of plutonium levels in
the environment is included in the third subsection to provide the reader with
a perspective regarding the types, sources, and levels of environmental
plutonium on a broad scale.
3.1 REGIONAL OVERVIEW
For the purpose of this document, the region is defined as the six county
area (Brevard, Volusia, Seminole, Lake, Orange, Osceola counties) which
encompasses KSC and CCAFS, as shown in Figure 3-1.
3.1.] Land Use
About 8 percent (328,000 acres) of the total region (4.1 million acres)
is urbanized (ECFRPC 1987), with the largest concentrations of people
occurring in three metropolitan areas: (I) Orlando in Orange County, with
expansions into the Lake Mary and Sanford areas of Seminole County to the
north; and into the Kissimmee and St. Cloud areas of Osceola County to the
south; (2) the coastal area of Volusia County, including Daytona Beach, Port
Orange, Ormond Beach and New Smyrna Beach; and (3) along the Indian Lagoon and
coastal area of Brevard County, specifically the cities of Titusville,
Melbourne and Palm Bay. Approximately 85 percent of the region's population
lives in developed urban areas.
The majority of the region is considered rural, which includes
agricultural lands and associated trade and services areas, conservation and
recreation lands, as well as undeveloped areas. Agricultural activities
include citrus groves, winter vegetable farms, pastureland and livestock,
foliage nurseries, sod farms, and dairy land. Citrus farming has been harmed
in recent years by canker outbreaks and freezes, and the majority of groves in
Lake, Seminole, Volusia anc_ Orange counties remain vacant and unused (ECFRPC
1987). With over 5,000 far, nurseries and ranches in the region, about 35
percent (I.4 million acres) of the regional area is devoted to agriculture.
Conservation and recreation lands account for almost 25 percent of the
total acreage in the region, or slightly over ! million acres (ECFRPC
Undated). About 866,600 acres are land resources, and about 156,000 acres are
water areas. The region also contains about 5,400 acres of saltwater beaches
and about 48 acres of archaeological and historic sites.
i
-- 3-I
ORIGINAL PAGE IS
OF POOR QUALITY
\
$
Source: NASA 1979
!
w
!
FIGURE 3-I. LOCATION OF REGIONAL AREA OF INTEREST
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mA numberof areas within the region have special status land use
designations. These include a portion of the Ocala National Forest, the
Canaveral National Seashore adjacent to KSC, one State preserve, seven State
wJldltfe management areas;and two nattonal wildlife refuges including the
Herritt Island National Wildlife Refuge at KSC. The locations of these and
other such areas can be found in Appendix C-5.
3.].2 Meteoroloqy and Air Oualttv
The cltmate of the region is subtropical with two definite seasons:
long, warm, humid summers and short, mtld, dry winters. Rainfall amounts vary
both seasonally and from one year to the next. Average ratnfall is 51 inches;
the monthiy high occurs in July and the low usually 'in Aprtl. These
fluctu)tiOns result in frequent, though usually not severe, episodes of
flooding and drough_Z Temperalurets more constant than precipitation with
prolonged cold spells and heat waves being rare. Troptcal storms, tropical
depressions, and hurricanes, all of which can produce large amounts of
rainfall and high winds, occasionally strike the region. The last hurricane
to strike the region was David in September 1981, which paralleled the coast
(ECFRPC 1987).
There are I4 air monitoring sites in the region,'7 are for total
suspended particulates, 2 each for sulfur dioxide, carbon monoxide and ozone,
and 1 for nitrogen dioxide. Lead is not monitored anywhere tn the region.
Host of the monitoring sites are located in the Orlando urban area; there are
no air quality monitoring sites in Lake or Osceola Counties.
Air quality is generally good. Orange County is the only county in the
region that has been designated a non-attainment area (in this case, for
ozone). Data from the period IgB4-1986 indicate that ozone standards were
being met (State of F1orlda 1987). Orange County isexpected to be re-
designated an ozone "maintenance" area (ECFRPC 1987).
3,].3 Hvdroloqv ahd Water Oualltv
The region not only borders the Atlantic Ocean, but contains
approximately 2,300 lakes, 2 major estuaries, and about 700 miles of streams
and rivers.
Almost all (89 percent) of the fresh water used in the region is drawn
from groundwater supplies, principally the artesian Flortdan Aquifer. Some
small users Withdraw water from the nonarteslan surficlal aquifers that
overlie the Floridan Aquifer. The Fioridan Aquifer covers 82,000 square miles
and is 2,000 feet thick in some areas. In portions of the region, such as the
coastal zone and an area bordering the St. Johns River, the Floridan Aquifer
is too saline for potable water use (ECFRPC 1987). Wells tapping the
surfictal, unconfined aquifer are largely used for non-potable or individual
domest!c uses, although this sourcets also used for some municipal public
supply systems (e.g., the cities of Mims and Titusvtlle, about ]S miles
northwest of the KSC/CCAFS launch sttes; and Palm Bay, about 40 miles south of
the KSC/CCAFS launch sites, in Brevard County). (See Appendix C-2 for
locations of Brevard County potable water sources.) Lake Washington, in
Brevard County, about 32 mtles south of the KSC/CCAFS launch sites, is the
only surface water used as a potable water supply in the region, supplying the
City of Melbourne (ECFRPC 1987).
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Groundwater reserves are recharged by the percolation of rainwater.
The region contains some effective recharge areas for the Flortdan Aquifer
(Figure 3-2). These areas are located primarily in the upland portions of
Lake, Orange, Seminole, Osceola, and Volusta Counties and are composed of
very porous, sandy soils. Rainfall quickly percolates through the soils
tnto the aquifers below. In the most effective recharge areas,
approximately IS inches of rainfall enter the Flortdan Aquifer each year--
almost 30 percent of the total rainfall.
The major surface water resources in the region are the upper St. Johns
River basin, the Indian River Lagoon system, the Banana River and a portion
of the Kisstmmee River along the western border of Osceola County. The St.
Johns River, from its headwaters in the marshes at the southern end of
Brevard County to the northernmost part of Lake Washington, is classified by
the State as Class I water (potable water supply), and as noted earlier,
serves as the source of potable water for the City of Melbourne and much of
the surrounding population in that area. The remainder of the St. Johns
within the region is Class III water (recreation and fish and wildlife
propagation).
The Kisstmmee River (and its system of lakes) is a major contributor of
flow into Lake Okeechobee to the south of the region, and is the major
drainage for Osceola County and a portion of eastern Orange County. The
river system is characterized by a series of control structures and
channeled connections between the lakes for the purposes of flood water
level control and navigation (FSU 1984).
Waters with special status within the region include the:
e Weiklva River; a federally designated Wild and Scenic River, which
forms the border between northwestern Seminole County and eastern
Lake County
• Mosquito Lagoon portion of the Indian River Lagoon which is a State
of Florida Aquatic Preserve
Southern portion of the Banana River from the southern end of CCAFS
south and the Indian River Lagoon between Malabar and Sebastian
Inlet, also designated as Aquatic Preserves
m Portions of the Banana River and Mosquito Lagoon, as well as the
northern portion of the Indian River within the confines of KSC
designated by the State as Outstanding Florida Waters, along with
the Weiktva River, the Butler chain of lakes, and the Clermont chain
of lakes.
In total, the region contains 4 aquatic preserves, 24 bodies of surface
water designated as Outstanding Florida Waters, and I Area of Critical State
Concern - the Green Swamp. The locations of these areas can befound in
Appendix C-5.
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FIGURE 3-2.
Source: FSU 1984
GENERALIZED RAP OF POTENTIAL GROUND WATER RECHARGE AREAS IN
EASTERN CENTRAL FLORIDA
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3.].4 Geoloay and Soils
The region is underlain by a series of limestone formations with a total
thickness of several thousand feet. The lower formations (the Avon Park and
Ocala group) constitute the Floridan Aquifer. Overlying these formations are
beds of sandy clay, shells and clays of the Hawthorn formation which form the
principal confining beds for the F1oridan Aquifer. Overlying the Hawthorn
formation are Upper Miocene, Pleiocene, and recent deposits which form
secondary semi-conflned aquifers and the surficial aquifer.
3.1.5 Bioloaical Resources
As noted in Sections 3.1.1 and 3.1.3, the region has a large number of
terrestrial and aquatic conservation and special designation areas (e.g.,
wildlife management areas and aquatic preserves), which serve as wildlife
habitat, and comprise about 25 percent (about I million acres) of the total
land and water acreage within the region (about4_] million acres).
Figure 3-3 provides an overview of land cover types found throughout the
six county region, with a county-by-county breakdown providedin Table 3-1.
Freshwater and coastal wetlands comprise about 23 percent of the total area of
the six county region, followed by xeric grassland (21 percent), scrub and
bush (17 percent), water (12 percent) and hardwood/pine forest (11 percent)
being the dominant cover types in the region.
A total of 141 species of freshwater, esturine and marine fish have been
documented within the northern portions of the Indian River Lagoon near KSC
(ECFRPC 1988). Of these, 65 species are considered commercial fish and 85 are
sport fish and/or are fished commercially. One species known to inhabit the
river, the rainwater killifish (uiL___EJ_!_gjIZ£A),while not on the Federal or
State threatened and endangered lists, has been listed by the Florida
Committee on Rare and Endangered Plants and Animals as "imperiled statewide"
(S?), and by the Florida Natural Areas Inventory as a "species of special
concern."
The St. Johns River supports both fresh and saltwater fishing (DOE
198ga). Sport fish include largemouth bass, bluegill, black crappie, bowfin,
gar, bullhead, bream and catfish. The St. Johns River basin is heavily
fished, as indicated by an estimated 50,000 man-hours of fishing effort in
1983 in Lake Washington and Lake Harney alone.
As noted in Section 3.1.6.2, commercial fishing is an important economic
asset to the region. Brevard County and Volusia County ranked fifth and sixth
respectively, among the 12 east coast Florida counties in terms of 1987
finfish landings. Brevard ranked first in invertebrate landings (crab, clams,
oysters, etc.) and first in shrimp landings, with Volusia fifth in both
categories.
Important terrestrial species in the region include migratory and native
waterfowl (ringneck, pintail, and bald pate ducks, for example), as well as
turkey, squirrel, white-tailed deer and wild hogs. Black bear also are known
in the region. The St. Johns River basin is an important waterfowl hunting
area. The seven State wildlife management areas in the region (see Appendix
C-5) are hunted for small game, turkey, hogs, or deer.
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3.].5.1 Endangered Species
,The Federal government's llst, prepared by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service (USFWS), currently recognizes 19 endangered or threatened species in
this region. Another S5 species are "under review" for possible listing, of
which 35 are plants. The State of Florida list includes 47 species considered
endangered or threatened. The Florida Committee on Rare and Endangered Plants
and Animals, a group consisting largely of research biologists, gives
endangered or threatened status to S5 species. The Florida Natural Areas
Inventory, run by the Nature Conservancy under contract to the Florida
Department of Natural Resources, includes 62 species in its top two most
endangered categories. Roughly half of all the endangered and threatened
species identified by these lists occur in wetlands, principally estuarine
environments; the other half depend on upland habitats (ECFRPC ]gB7).
3.].6 Socioeconomic Environment
The socioeconomic environment of the six counties that could be affected
by the launch includes fast growing communities and urban areas that have
_adopted long-range plans reflecting the rapid influx of development in the
_regional area.
3.1.6.1 Population
The existence of three separate metropolitan areas is reflected in the
designation of three Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) within the region
by the U.S. Bureau of the Census (ECFRPC ]987). These MSAs are the Orlando
MSA (Orange, Osceola and Seminole Counties), the Daytona Beach MSA (Volusia
County), and the Melbourne-Titusville-Palm Bay MSA (Brevard County). The
population in Lake County, though growing faster than the State average, is
split between many small-to-medium-sized municipalities and rural areas.
Growth Rate
The regional population is growing at a rate faster than the State--
during 1960 the region contained 12.8 percent of the state population; in
]970 and in ]g80 the growth rate flattened out and the region contained 13.6
percent and ]3.7 percent of the State population, respectively. In June of
1980 the disproportional growth of the region resumed. The 1980 regional
population was ],336,646, a 45 percent increase from the 1970 census. The
estimated growth from 1980 to 1986 was a 33.6 percent increase (an addition
448,898 persons). Current estimates (1987) are that the growth rate is
higher in recent years than at the beginning of the decade, and that between
1986 and ]987 the population increased 4.6 percent (77,711 people), placing
]4.6 percent of Florida's population in the region. This trend is projected
to continue through 199]. The 1987-]gg1 growth is expected to be almost 20
percent, or approximately 337,000 people (ECFRPC Undated).
All counties are expected toshow increases in population. In the early
IggOs, it is anticipated that 2,000,000 people wlll be living in the region.
By the year 2000, official estimates show the region will have about 2,300,000
residents, 40 percent more than in 1985 (ECFRPC 1987).
Orange County is expected to remain the most populated county, growing
to 673,200 in ]gg], followed by Brevard (428,200), Volusia (373,400), Seminole
(302,100), Lake (153,000), and Osceola (115,200). Osceola is projected to have
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the fastest population growth rate over the )g87 to 1991 time frame with an
increase of 3g.5 percent. Seminole is projected tO ha_e a 25.2 percent
increase, followed by Brevard (Ig.9 percent), Lake (17.6 percent), Volusia (17.1
percent) and Orange is expected to show the slowest growth rate (16.5 percent).
This projected population growth is summarized in Table 3-2 (ECFRPC Undated).
3.1.6.2 Economics
The region's economic base is tourism and manufacturing. Tourism related
jobs, although difficult to define, include most Jobs in amusement parks,
hotels, motels, and campgrounds as well as many jobs in retail trade and various
types of services. Manufacturing jobs, while probably outnumbered by tourism
Jobs, may provide more monetary benefits to the region because of higher average
wages and a larger multiplier effect (as jobs are added to the economy in one
sector, needs are created which lead to an expansion of employment in other
sectors) (ECFRPC 1987).
Economic Base
Tourism in the region now attracts more than 20,000,000 visitors annually.
The two Walt Disney World theme parks and Sea World, near Orlando, along with
KSC are four of the five most popular tourist attractions in the state (ECFRPC
]987).
Manufacturing employs approximately 100,000 people regionwide. Orange and
Brevard counties account for about 70 percent of this employment. Retail and
wholesale trade provide jobs for more than half (58.9 percent in 1984) of the
regions' employed persons. Other economic sectors that provide significant
employment in the region include: construction (7.5 percent), transportation,
communication and utilities (5.6 percent), finance, insurance, and real estate
(5.9 percent), and agriculture (2.7 percent).
Commercial fisheries of the two regional counties bordering the ocean
(Brevard and Volusia) landed a total of 23,608,458 pounds of finfish,
invertebrates (clams, crabs, lobsters, octopus, oysters, scallops, squid,
etc.), and shrimp in 1987 (FSU 1984). Brevard and Volusia ranked fifth and
sixth, respectively, among the 12 east coast counties of Florida in total
1987 finfish landings. Brevard led east coast counties in invertebrate
landings with about 16 million pounds. Volusia County ranked fifth with
about 0.4 million pounds. Brevard also ranked first on the east coast with
].6 million pounds of shrimp; Volusia was fifth with about 0.3 million
pounds.
The region's agricultural activities include citrus groves, winter vegetable
farms, pastureland, foliage nurseries, sod, livestock, and dairy production
(ECFRPC 1987). In the central region, 30 percent of the land is forested and
supports silviculture, including harvesting of southern yellow pine, cypress,
sweetgum, maple and bay trees. Large cattle ranches occupy almost all of the
rural land in Osceola county (ECFRPC 1987). Agricultural employment declined in
19B6 to 2.2 percent of the region's employment base (ECFRPC Undated).
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TABLE 3-2. PROJECTED POPULATION GROWTH,
(1986-1991)
EAST CENTRAL FLORIDA REGION
Popul ati on Change 1986-1991
Area 1986" 1991 Number Percent
Brevard 357,000 428,200
Lake .............!30,100 153,000
Orange 577,900 673,200
Osceola 82,600 115,200
Seminole 241,300 302,100
Volusia 319,000 373,400
71,200 19.9
22,900 17.6
95,300 16.5
32,600 39.5
60,800 25.2
54,400 17.1
TOTAL
* BEBR, April
1,707,800 2,045,100 337,300 19.8
(average)
1986 estimate (rounded to nearest lO0).
Source: ECFRPC Undated
L
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ReqiQnal Emplovment
About 49 percent of the residents tn the region are employed, ranging from
56 percent in Orange County to 33 percent in Lake County with 55 percent in
Seminole, 49 percent in Osceola, 45 percent in Brevard, and 41 percent in
Volusla. The region's labor force and employment has risen each year since the
mid-]970s, and employment is expected to continue to increase through 1991 to a
total of ].08 million civilian Jobs by ]gg! from 0.83 million in 1986. The
region's unemployment rate in 1986 was 5.] percent (ECFRPC Undated).
Realonal IncOme J
Income in the region has been increasing faster than inflation. The
]985 to ]986 average annual wage rose 3,7 percent (aBout two times faster
than the inflation rate of ].g percent). The 1986 average wage over all
sectors was $]7,604. Per capita income in the region has risen steadily
since 1979 from $7,799 to $12,273 in 1984. The highest income was in Orange
County ($12,90]), followed by Brevard ($12,235) and Osceola ($11,026)_ The
regional per capita income for 1987 to ]9g] is projected to increase at a
rate somewhat greater than inflation, perhaps surpassing the national
average tn 1991 (ECFRPC Undated).
3.1.6.3 Transportation
The reglon;S:_alrports, for the_most part, stiii_areL_ableto accommodate
increasing numbers of passengers. Orlando International Airport, already the
43rd busiest airport in the world in number of passengers, is an exception. The
Greater Orlando Airport Authority has recently announced plans to double its
capacity to 24,000,000 passengers annually. Two other major airports are
Daytona Beach Regional and Melbourne Regional (ECFRPC Ig87).
The region's road network includes five major limited access highways:
Interstate 4, Interstate g5, Florida's Turnpike, the Spessard L. Holland East-
West Expressway, and the Martin L. Andersen Beeline Expressway. In addition,
numerous Federal, State, and county roads are located in the region (ECFRPC
1987).
The remainder of the region's transportation network is varied. Rail
service for freight is available in all counties, but passenger service is
limited. Ports at Cape Canaveral and Sanford provide access for water-borne
shipping and cruises. Mass transit or paratransit is currently operating in all
counties of the region except for Osceola (ECFRPC ]987).
3.1.6.4 Public and Emergency Services
Nearly 90 percent of the people in the region rely upon public supplies of
potable water, while the remainder use private wells. Problems with saltwater
intrusion into ground water is already evident, especially in coastal Brevard
County (ECFRPC Ig87).
Health care within the region is available at 28 general hospitals, three
psychiatric hospitals, and two specialized hospitals. Over 6,600 beds are
provided in the general hospitals. Doctors, dentists, and other heath care
professionals, as well as nursing homes are located throughout the region
w
w
!
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(ECFRPC ]g87). (See Appendix C-3 for locations of Brevard County emergency
services.)
3.].6.5 H|storlcal/Cultural Resources
There are 45 sites within the region that are listed in the National
Registry of Historic Places, 2 in the National Registry of Historic Landmarks,
and one area (Klsslmmee River Prairie) that is a potential addition to the
National Registry of Natural Landmarks.
3.2 LOCAL ENVIRONMENT
The local environment is defined as the Cape Canaveral Air Force Station
(CCAFS) and the Kennedy Space center (KSC). The following brief descriptions
use the Air Force Environmental Assessment for the Complementary Expendable
Launch Vehicle (later renamed theTitan IV) at CCAFS (USAF 1986), the 1988
supplement to that document addressing an increase in the number of Titan IV
launches from CCAFS (USAF lgBBb), and the KSC Environmental Resources Document
(NASA 1986) as primary sources for data and figures.
The KSC/CCAFS area is located on the east coast of Florida, in Brevard
County near the City of Cocoa Beach, approximately ]5 miles north of Patrick Air
Force Base (PAFB), about 30 miles south of Daytona Beach and 40 miles due east
of Orlando (see Figure 3-4). The local area is part of the Gulf-Atlantic
coastal flats and occupies Cape Canaveral and the north end of Merrltt Island,
both of which are barrier islands.
3.2.] Land Use
KSC (Figure 3-5) occupies almost 140,000 acres, 5 percent of which is
developed land (6,558 acres) and the rest (133,444 acres) is undeveloped.
Nearly 40 percent of KSC consists of open water areas, such as portions of
Indian River, the Banana River, Mosquito Lagoon and all of Banana Creek.
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) maintains
operational control over about 4.7 percent of KSC (6,507 acres). This area
comprises the functional area that is dedicated to NASA operations. About 62
percent of this operational area is currentlydeveloped as facility sites,
roads, lawns, and maintained rlght-of-ways. The undeveloped operational areas
are dedicated as safety zones around existing facilities or held in reserve for
planned and future expansion. For areas not directly utilized for NASA
operations, land planning and management responsibilities have been delegated to
the National Park Service (Cape Canaveral National Seashore within K_C) and the
United States Fish and Wildllfe Service (Cape Canaveral National S÷_hore
outside KSC, and the 75,400 acre Merrltt Island National Wildlife Refuge).
These agencies exercise management control over agricultural, recreational, and
various environmental management programs at KSC.
CCAFS occupies approximately ]5,800 acres (a 25 square mile area) of the
barrier island that contains Cape Canaveral (USAF 1986). Approximately 3,800
acres or 25 percent of the Station is developed and consists of launch complexes
and support facilities (see Figure 3-6). The remaining 75 percent (about 12,000
acres) consists of unimproved land. The Titan IV Launch Complex 41 is located
at the northernmost section of CCAFS, occupying 28.4 acres of land. This
complex was previously used along with Launch Complex 40 for test flights of the
Titan !II A, III C, and Centaur Vehicles in the early ]g6Os.
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3.2.2 HQ1;eoroloav and Air Oualitv
Like the region, the climate of KSC and CCAFS is subtropical with summers
that are hot and humid, and winters that are short and mild. flean temperatures
range from the low 60s in the winter months to the low 80s in the summer months.
Precipitation is moderately heavy with an average annual rainfall of 45.2
inches. Hail falls occasionally during thunderstorms, but hailstones are
usually small and seldom cause much damage. Snow is rare. Historical
climatological data can be found in Appendix C-1.
In general, the winds in September through November occur predominantly
from the east to northeast (see Figure 3-7). Winds from December through
February Occur from the north to northwest, shifting to the southeast from
flarch through flay, and then to the south from June through August. It
should be noted that the radiologtcal impact assessments found in Section 4
and Appendix B, use launch window-specific wind roses and meteorological
conditions. While those specific wind roses are consistent with the
seasonal conditions illustrated here, they do vary slightly for the specific
launch window, and can be found in Appendix C-1. Sea breeze and land breeze
phenomena occur commonly during the day due to unequal solar heating of the
air over land and over ocean. Land breeze occurs at night when air over
land has cooled to a lower temperature than that over the sea. Temperature
inversions occur infrequently (approximately 2 percent of the time).
Tornadoes may occur but are rare. The U.S. Air Force (USAF 1986) cited a
study wfiich concluded that the probability of a tornado hitting a point within
the Cape Canaveral area in any given year ts 0.00074, with a return frequency of
approximately once every ],300 years.
Tropical depressions and hurricanes occur throughout the wet season in
Florida. While the possibility for winds to reach hurricane force (74 miles per
hour or greater) in any given year in Brevard County is approximately 1 in 20
(USAF 1986), only 24 hurricanes have passed within 115 miles of KSC and CCAFS
since 1887 (NASA 1986). Hurricane David (September 1981) was the last hurricane
to affect the area.
Air quality at KSC/CCAFS is considered good, primarily because of the
distance of the launch sites from major sources of pollution. There are no
Class I or nonattatnment areas (for ozone, NOy, SO_, lead, CO, and particulates)
within about 60 miles of KSC/CCAFS, except Oringe County to the west, which is a
nonattatnment area for ozone (USAF 1986).
The ambient air quality at KSC is Influenced by NASA operations, land
management practices, vehicle traffic, and emission sources outside of KSC (NASA
]g86). Daily air quality conditions are most Influenced by vehicle traffic,
utilltles fuel combustion, standard refurbishment and malntenance operations,
and incinerator operations. Air quality at KSC is also |nfluenced by emissions
from two reglonal power plants which are located within a ]0 mlle radius of KSC.
Space launches, training fires, and fuel load reductlon burns Influence alr
quallty as episodic events.
Ambient air quality at KSC Is monitored by two Permanent Air Monitoring
System (PAHS) stations (NASA 1986). PAHS A is located at the Environmental
Health Facility Site, about 5 miles south of launch Complex 3g, and PAHS B is
located east of Kennedy Parkway and north of Banana Creek, about 4 miles west of
Launch Complex 39.
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A summary of air quality parameters collected from the PAMS A facility in
1985 is provided in Ta)le 3-3. The primary standard for NO2 was exceeded in
January. The 109 ug/m of NO) was 221 percent greater than the highest level
recorded in the State during Ihe year. KSC 24-hour maximum levels for SO)
during 1984 and 1985 were also among the highest along the east coast of -
Florida. NO) And SO2 levels and prevailing westerly winds indicate that power
plants to th_ west oT KSC are the primary source of these emissions (NASA 1986).
Although never exceeding established standards, ozone is the most
consistently "high" criteria pollutant at KSC (NASA ]986).
3.2.3 HvdrQlQav and Water Oualitv
3.2.3.1 Surface Waters
Major inland water bodies in the CCAFS and KSC area are the Indian River,
Banana River, and Mosquito Lagoon (Figure 3-8). These water bodies are shallow
lagoons, except for the portions maintained as part of the Intercoastal
Waterway, between Jacksonville to the north and Miami to the south. The Indian
and Banana Rivers joln at Port Canaveral and form a combined area of ]50,000
acres in Brevard County, wlth an average depth of 6 feet. This area receives
drainage from 540,000 acres of surrounding area (USAF 19B6).
The surface water shorelines at KSC are dominated by mosquito control
impoundments. The water levels in these impoundments are raised and lowered
seasonally as a control technique to reduce mosquito populations. These
impoundments are typically fringed by mangrove or salt marsh communities. The
shallow submerged bottoms range from unvegetated sand shell bottoms to meadows
of seagrasses. "-
The Banana River and Indian River were historically connected by Banana
Creek. This connection was severed in 1964 wlth the construction of the
Launch Complex 39 crawlerway. Navigation locks within Port Canaveral
virtually eliminate any significant oceanic influence on the Banana River.
Public navigation on the Banana River is prohibited north of NASA Parkway
East.
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3.2.3.2 Surface Water Quality
In compliance with the Clean Water Act, the state of Florida has classified
the surrounding surface waters, according to five classifications based on their
potential use and value.
All of the Mosquito Lagoon area within KSC boundaries and the northern-most
segment of the Indian River are designated as Class II waters (Sheilfish
Propagation and Harvesting) (see Figure 3-9). Class II waters establish
stringent limitations onbacteriological and fluoride pollution. The discharge
of treated wastewater effluent is prohibited, and dredge and fill projects are
regulated to protect the area from significant damage. The remainder of surface
waters surrounding KSC are designated as Class Ill (Body Contact Recreation and
Fish and Wildlife Propagation) waters (Figure 3-g). _
Banana Creek water quality (Class Ill) is in{luenced by non-point source
runoff from the Shuttle Landing Facility, the Vertical Assembly Building area,
Kennedy Parkway, and undeveloped areas of the Merritt Island National Wildlife
Reserve. Banana Creek has experienced fish kills In the summer when high
temperature and extensive cloud cover reduce the dissolved oxygen levels in the
shallow waters of the Creek.
There are about 21,422 acres of mosquito control impoundments in 75 cells
at KSC. These impoundments dominate the shoreline of KSC. Water levels are
managed by the USFWS for mosquito control purposes.
Limited water quality data and the applicable standards for the Indian
River, Banana Creek, the Banana River, and Mosquito Lagoon are provided in Table
3-4. These data indicate that with the exception of the mosquito control
impoundments north of Pad 3g-B, the State of Florida standards are not exceeded.
The surface waters adjacent to the Merritt Island National Wildlife Refuge
have been designated as Outstanding Florida Waters (OFWs) (see Figure 3-]0).
The OFW designation supersedes other surface water classifications, and water
quality standards are based on ambient water quality conditions or the
designated surface water standard, whichever is higher. This level of
protection prohibits any activity that would reduce water quality below the
existing levels. The entire Mosquito Lagoon has been designated by the State of
Florida as an Aquatic Preserve (see Figure 3-11).
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TABLE3-4.
WaterBody Salinity(ppt)
SURFACEW_TERQUALITYAT KS_
Dissolved
pH Oxygen Nitrogen Phosphorous
Turbidity
(JlU)
IndianRiver 30.2
(Titusville- north)
(FIIRClassII)
8.2 6.9 0.03 0.06 3.64
IndianRiver
(Titusville-south
toNASAPar_ West)
(FDERClassIll)
IndianRiver
(NASAPark_yWest
south to Bennett
Cause,,_)
(FDERClass Ill)
28.4 8.1 6.9 0.04 0.06 3.75
27.8 8.1 7.2 (JL06 0.05 S.O
Mosqulto(at KSC)
(FDERClass If)
BananaCreek
(FDERClassIll)
3] .8
]].4
8.2 6.9 0.03 O.OB 4.9
8.2 9.8 0.003 0.38 7.5
MosquitoControl
I_ts
(north of Launch
co,plex39)
BananaRiver
(NASACauseway,
northto r_arTitan
IV LaunchCmplex 41)
(FDERClassIII)
9.4 8.8 JJ.J _b.oe 0,3]
25.9 8.2 6.9 0.03 0.05
14.8
4.3
FDERClass II chlorides 6.5-8.5 5.0 _n (See 0.0001 29 NTU
Standards 10%above (1 unit 4.0Min. noteA) (elemental) above
variation) (See _ckgro_md
(marine) notec)
Class III chlorides 6.5-8.5 (fresh) 5.0 I_1n. (See 0.0001 29
Standards 10_above 6.5-8.5 (marine)(fresh) note13) (elemental) above
(l unit 4.0 Min. (m_ne) __
(mrlne) variation) (reline) (SeenoteD) |
neasurm_ts are in__
A. No alterationso as to causeinbalancein rmturalpopulation.
B. No alterationso as to causeinbalancein naturalpopulation.
C. TotalP - no alterationso as to causeimbalancein naturalpopulation.
D. TotalP - no alterationso as to causeinbalancein naturalpopulation.
1
Source:NASA]986.
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The Florida Department of Natural Resources (FDNR) in its capacity to
manage marine fisheries has established water classifications that regulate the
harvesting of shellfish. Shellfishmay be harvested from "approved" or
"conditionally approved" areas only, with "conditionally approved" areas closed
to harvesting for 72 hours after rainfalls which exceed predetermined amounts.
Prohibited and unclassified areas can not be harvested," Shellfish harvesting
classification of the waters surrounding KSC/CCAFS are illustrated in
Figure 3-12.
Launch Complex 41 at the Cape Canaveral Air Force Station (CCAFS) is
bordered by the Banana River Aquatic Preserve to the west and the Atlantic Ocean
to the east. The Banana River is classified by the State of Florida as a Class
III water for body contact recreation, and the propagation and maintenance of
diverse fish and wildlife. Surface runoff from Launch Complex 41 flows toward
the Banana River. Basic water quality data for the Banana River can be found in
Table 3-4.
3.2.3.3 Ground Waters
Three geohydrologic units underlie KSC and the CCAFS. In descending order,
these units are: a Surficial Aquifer, Secondary Semi-Confined Aquifers (found
in the confining layer underlying the Surficial Aquifer), and the Floridan
Aquifer.
Surficial Aauifer
The Surficial Aquifer (an unconfined hydrogeologic unit) is contiguous with
the land surface and is recharged by rainfall along the coastal ridges and
dunes, with little recharge occurring in the low swampy areas. The recharge
area at KSC/CCAFS for the Surficial Aquifer is shown in Figure 3-]3.
In general, water in the Surficial Aquifer near the groundwater divide of
the island has potential gradients that tend to carry some of the water
vertically downward to the deepest part of the Surficial Aquifer and potentially
to the upper units of the Secondary Semi-Confined aquifers (NASA 1986). East
and west of this zone, water In the Surficlal Aquifer has vertical and
horizontal flow components. Farther toward the coastline, circulation becomes
shallower until, at some point, flow is essentially horizontal to the water
table (Figure 3-]4). Major discharge points for the Surficial Aquifer are the
estuary lagoons, shallow seepage occurring to troughs and swales, and
evapotranspiratton. Inland fresh surface waters are primarily derived from
surflcial groundwater.
Secondary Seml-Conflned AQuifers and the Floridan Aouifer
Groundwaters under artesian and semi-confined conditions, the Flortdan and
Secondary Aquifers, have upward flow potentials. Because of the thickness and
the relatively impermeable nature of the confining units, however, it is thought
that no significant inter-aquifer leakage is occurring from the Floridan Aquifer
naturally. The general horizontal direction of flow in the Flortdan Aquifer is
northerly and northwesterly. The great elevation differential between the
Flortdan Aquifer recharge areas (e.g., Polk and Orange Counties) and discharge
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areas along the Atlantic Coast'provtdes the potential for the flowing artesian
pressure experienced at KSC. Recharge to the Secondary Aquifers is dependent on
leakage through the surrounding lower pemeabiltty beds.
3.2.3.4 Quality of Groundwater
Water from the Florldan Aquifer at KSC and CCAFS is highly mineralized
(principally chlorldes)!nd is not used as a potable water source.
Florida groun_wate_ crlterla h(ve been established as four classes:
Class G-I through G-IV, with Class G-I being the most restrictive. The
majority of the State's groundwaters are classified as G-II (potable water
use), and for all practical purposes, there are no G-I or G-IV
classifications in Florida.
Overall, water in the surflclal unconfined aquifer at CCAFS is of good
quality and meets State of Florida Class groundwater quality standards for
potable water use with the exception of chloride, iron, and total dissolved
solids. The elevated concentrations of these parameters are due to the
influence of adjacent saline surface waters. No potable water wells are located
at Launch Complex 41 or in its vicinity. At KSC, high chloride concentrations
occur on the north, east, and west frlnges due to intrusion from surrounding
saline water bodies. Thus, water quality improves towards the north-south axis
of KSC because this iswhere prime areas of freshwater recharge occur and where
potentlometric (water table) heads have prevented seawater intrusion.
Preliminary data for the Secondary Semi-Confined Aquifer show that some of
these aquifers may be marginal water sources; however, it appears that they are
not capable of sustaining large scale development.
3.2.3.5 Offshore Environment
The Atlantic Ocean offshore environment at KSC/CCAFS can be described
according to its bottom topography and characteristics of ocean circulation in
the area.
Out todepths of about 60 feet, sandy shoals dominate the underwater
topography. The bottom continues seaward at about the same slope out to about
34 miles where the bank slopes down to depths of 2,400 to 3,000 feet to the
Blake Plateau. The Blake Plateau extends out to about 230 miles from the shore
at KSC/CCAFS. Figure 3-15 shows the bathymetry of the offshore areas. Figure
3-16 illustrates the general ocean bottom for a lO0-degree azimuth for 0 to 115
miles from KSC/CCAFS (USAEC ]975).
Studies of watermovements in the area indicate a shoreward direction of
the current for the enttre depth, Surface to bottom, in the region out to depths
of 60 feet (18 nautical miles) at speeds of several miles per day. Wind-driven
currents generally determine the current flow at the surface. In the region out
to the sloping bank, the flow is slightly to the north tending to move eastward
when the winds blow to the south. Water over the Blake Plateau flows to the
north most of the time and is known as the Florida current of the Gulf Stream
(USAEC 1975).
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3.2.4 Geoloav and Soil#
KSC/CCAFS is located on a barrier island composed of relict beach ridges.
This island parallels the shorellne separating the Atlantic Ocean from the
Indian River, Indian River Lagoon, and Banana River. The area Is underlain by
11mestone formations a few thousand feet thick. The formatlons, from oldest to
youngest, respectively are: the Avon Park and the Ocala; overlylng the artesian
Florldan Aquifer are the confining beds of the Hawthorn Formation; the confining
beds are overlaln by Plelstocene and Recent Age unconsolldated deposits.
Solls in the area of KSC/CCAFS have been mapped by the U.S. Department of
Agrlculture Soil Conservation Service (SCS). Five major soll associations have
been ident|fled by the SCS. (The locations of the major solis assoclations can
be found In NASA 1986.) The solls In the immediate vicinity of launch Complex
3g at KSC consist of poorly drained, nearly level sallne to brackish soils. The
pvfnclpal solls association at launch Complex 4] are moderately to excessively
drained, sandy soils on level or moderately sloplng topography.
3.2.5 Bioloqtcal Resources
3.2.5.1 Tervestrlal Biota
Vegetation communities and related wildllfe habitatS=_re representative of
barrier island resources of the region (Figure 3-]7). Major natural communities
Include beach, coastal strand and dunes, coastal scrub, and wetlands. Coastal
hammocks and plne flatwoods found on KSC to the northwest increase the
ecologlcal diversity and rlchness oFt he a-tea. About go percent of the total
KSC land area (about 73,300 acres) Is undeveloped, and falls into these
community types. About 77 percent (about ]2,000 acres) of CCAFS is undisturbed
or has reverted back to natural ConcHttons. _
HaJor Plant Communities and Related Habitat :=_
Th-e principal communities in the vicinity of Launch Complex 39 at KSC and
41 at CCAFS are beach, coastal strand and dune, coastal scrub, and wetlands.
Beaches of KSC and CCAFS are largely unvegetated, but provide significant
wildlife resources. The tidal zone supports a high number of marine -_
invertebrates, as well as small fish that are food for many shore birds.
Several species of gulls, terns, sandpipers, and other birds use beaches of the
Cape Canaveral area. In addition, research indicates that these beaches are
very important to nesting sea turtles (see Section 3.2.5.3).
Coastal strand and dune communities are marked by extremes In temperature
and prolonged periods of drought. Vegetation on the dunes are dominated by sea
oats; Other grasses, such as slender cordgrass and beach grass, also occur.
Shrubs such as beach berry and marsh elder, occur In the dune community along
with herbs, such as beach sunflower and camphonveed. The strand occurs between
the coastal scrub community and the salt spray zone of the dune system. Growth
characteristics of strand vegetation produces a low profile that is maintained
by nearly constant winds. Plants that can tolerate strand conditions are saw
palmetto, wax myrtle, tough buckthorn, cabbage palm, partridge pea, prickly
pear, and various grasses.
i
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Coastal scrub is the largest natural community at CCAFS, covering
approximately 9,400 acres at CCAFS and almost 20,000 acres at KSC. The coastal
scrub association is characterized by xeric tree species, including scrub oak,
live oak and sand live oak, and myrtle oak. The scrub community is a harsh
environment limited by low soil moisture conditions. Herbaceous and shrub
vegetation is sparse and includes wire grass, saw palmetto, tar flower, lantana,
wax myrtle, greenbrlar, prickly pear, gopher apple, and others.
Wetlands within and surrounding the launch area are important wildlife
resources. About 78 percent of KSC, for example, is considered wetland habitat.
Wetland types that are found In the area include freshwater ponds and canals,
brackish impoundments, tidal lagoons, bays, rivers, vegetated marshes, and
mangrove swamps. These wetlands provide resources for a vast assemblage of
marine organisms, waterfowl, and terrestrial wildlife.
Pine flatwoods occur principally in the northwest and central portions of
KSC. Dominant tree species are pines, including slash pine, longleaf, and sand
pine.
Coastal hammocks:are characterized byclosed canopies provided by cabbage
palms, which is the dominant tree species. Additional tree species in hammocks
are red bay, live oak, and strangler fig.
Ruderal vegetation dominates sites disturbed by or created by past human
activity, such as construction and agriculture. Vegetation communities include
Brazilian pepper, Australian pine, wax myrtle and melaleuca. Citrus groves, the
only agricultural community currently occurring within KSC, occupy about 2,500
acres of land, slightly over 3 percent of the total KSC land area. The groves
occur in the northern portion of KSC along Mosquito Lagoon and on the Merritt
Island portion of KSC south of Banana Creek.
Wildl ife
Nearly 60 species of reptiles and amphibians are known to inhabit the area.
Three of the resident species (the American alligator, the eastern indigo snake,
and the Atlantlc salt marsh snake) are federally protected.
KSC and the surrounding coastal areas provide habitat for nearly 300
bird species. Nearly go species are resident breeders while over 200
species overwinter at KSC. The breeding, wintering, and migratory bird
species and their relative occurrence within ]7 habitat types at KSC have
been documented and are found in NASA 1986.
The expansive areas of wetlands provide ideal feeding, roosting and
nesting habitat for nearly two dozen species of wading birds. Man_ of the
wetlands within the Herrttt Island National Wildlife Refuge are managed to
provide wintering habitat for approximately 200,000 waterfowl.
Colonial nesting birds occur within II rookeries at and near KSC/CCAFS,
with 4 rookeries located within 2 miles of Launch Complexes 3g and 41, (see
Appendix C-4). Among the species utilizing these locations are egrets, ibis,
heron, cormorant, and anhingua.
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More than 20 species of mammals are known to inhabit the Merritt Island
land mass. Mammals include mice, voles, raccoons, opossum, rabbit, wild hog,
and aquatic mammals, such as the manatee and bottlenose dolphin.
3.2.5.2 Aquatic Biota
The coastline from Daytona south to Melbourne and extending seaward to a
depth of 100 fathoms ts one of the most productive marine fishery areas along
the southern Atlantic Coast. The inshore waters support an important sea trout
and redftsh sport fishery. The lagoons and rivers support commercial fishery
operations for blue crab and black mullet.
Shellftshing ts an Important component of the commercial and recreational
fishing effort. Brevard County leads the State tn the production of hard clams
(quahogs) and scallops. The comerctal scallop fishery predominates off shore;
it is estimated that 30 to 40 million pounds of calico scallops were harvested
off Cape Canaveral tn 1984. A number of renewable oyster leases are held in the
waters near KSC. The southern quahog ts the most frequently taken species with
large numbers being gathered from the tidal mud flats by both commercial and
recreational fishermen. See Figure 3-12 for shellfish harvesting areas around
KSC/CCAFS.
The lagoon system surrounding KSC provides both recreational ftn and shrimp
fishing. It is estimated that, in 1985, 90,300 recreational fishermen utilized
the fishery resources surrounding KSC. The fish fauna of the Indian River
lagoon system has received considerable attention. The fresh and brackish
waters associated with the KSC area are reported to support ]41 species.
Benthic macrotnvertebrates of the northern Indian and Banana Rtvers can be
classified as estuarlne-martne animals. A total of ]22 species of benthic
macrotnvertebrates have been reported from brackish lagoons surrounding Launch
Complex 39A and the northern Banana River. Although shrimp species of
commercial importance were collected, the northern Indian River is not
considered an important nursery area for these species. Hosqutto Lagoon,
however, ts considered an important shrimp nursery area. Blue crabs were
determined to spawn tn the area also.
3.2.5.3 Endangered and Threatened Species
The USFWS and Florida Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission protect a number
of wildlife species listed as endangered or threatened under the Federal
Endangered Spectes Act of 1_73 (as amended), and under the Florida Endangered
and Threatened Species Act of 1977 (as amended), respectively. A ltst of the
protected species at KSC/CCAFS ts found tn Table 3-5. The Federal list contains
seven species as endangered and three species as threatened. The State of
Florida ltsts two additional species as threatened.
A review of CCAFS endangered or threatened species shows that only three
species (southeastern Kestrel, Florida scrub Jay, eastern indigo snake)
potentially occur in the immediate vicinity of Launch Complex 4]. An additional
three species (woodstork, bald eagle, peregrine falcon) may occasionally occur
tn wetlands located to the east of the complex.
3-37
ITABLE 3-5.
Species
ENDANGEREDAND THREATENEDSPECIES RESIDING OR
SEASONALLYOCCURRINGON KSC/CCAFS AND ADJOINING
WATERS
StatU*
USFWS* FGFWFCT**
I
m
I
I
Caribbean manatees (Trichechus manatus) E
Wood stork (M,ycteriaamerican) E
Bald eagle (Haliaeetus leucocephalusl_ E-
Peregrin falcon (Falco Derearinus) T
Southeastern kestrel (Falco sparverius)
Red-cockaded woodpecker (Picoides borealis) - E
Florida scrub jay (Ahpelocoma _o_rulesens)
Dusky seaside sparrow (Ammospiza mari_i_a) E
ReotiIe
Atlantic green turtle (CheIQnia mvdasl E
Atlantic ridley turtle (Lepidochelvs kempi) E
Atlantic loggerhead turtle (Car_tta caretta) T
Eastern indigo snake (Drymarchgn corals) T
E
E ....
T
E
T _
T
T
E (last known
individual died
in captivity in
1987)
E
E
T
T
m
|
ii
I
I
i
*U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
**Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission
E - Endangered.
T - Threatened.
Source: USAF 1986
ir
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Caribbean manatees, green turtles, rldley turtles, and loggerhead turtles are
known to occur in the Banana River, Mosquito Lagoon, and along Atlantic Ocean
beaches. Of the remaining two species, dusky seaside sparrow is now thought to
be extinct, and the red-cockaded woodpecker is not expected to occur in the
vicinity of Launch Complex 41 due to the absence of suitable habitat.
Ten nesting locations that have been used by the bald eagle have been
located at KSC. A 1985 survey noted that 5 locations were active, with 10
adults producing 7 eaglets. Nesting typically occurs between October and mid-
flay. Eagles are susceptible to disturbance during the mating and rearing cycle
from courtship through about the first 12 weeks of nesting. (See Appendix C-4
for additional detatls of nesting locations.)
With respect to the West Indian Manatee, the following areas at KSC/CCAFS
have been designated as Critical Habitat by the USFWS: the entire inland
section of water known as the Indian River, from its northernmost point
immediately south of the intersection of U.S. Highway I and SR-3; the entire
inland section of water known as the Banana River; and all waterways between the
Indian and Banana Rivers (exclusive of those existing manmade structures or
settlements that are not necessary to the normal needs of the survival of the
specfes). Critical habitat and areas of manatee concentration are delineated in
Appendix C-4.
Osprey, listed by the Convention on International Trade in Endangered
Species of Wild Flora and Fauna were thought to be actively utilizlng a total of
25 nesting sites near KSC. The closest site was a nesting area about 2 miles to
the west of KSC Launch Complex 39 (about 3 miles approximately northwest of
CCAFS Launch Complex 41). (See Appendix C-4 for additional detail.)
3.2.6 Socioeconomtcs
3.2.6.1 Population
The demographics of the local area sites are based upon the workforce
employed at CCAFS and KSC and are influenced by the influx of people and their
distribution prior to and during launches. _ During a launch, approximately 6,000
employees may be onstte. The population may increase during launches of special
interest by more than 100,000 spectators, varying with the time of day and year,
and the weather. These individuals occupy nearby beach areas and line the
public roads in the area. Onstte population at launch time is increased by
about 17,300 visitors and press personnel (Hater 198B). These additional people
(see Appendix C-3 for detail) are distributed among various viewing areas as
follows:
• 2,000 people at the #1VIP Site (Static Test Area)
9,000 people at the #2 VIP Site (east of the Banana
River Causeway drawbridge; total could increase to
]1,000-]3,000 people if #I VIP Site cannot be used)
2,000 press members at the site west of the Banana River
drawbridge
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4,000 people at the Indian River Causeway Site (east of the
drawbridge for I mile)
• 250 people at theO&C Butldt_g ............
• 50 people at the LCC Building.
3.2.6.2 Economy
The economy of the surrounding area is Influenced by the presence of both
CCAFS and KSC, but the area's dependence upon them has lessened tn recent years.
NASA ctvtltan employment in Brevard County accounted for about 1] percent of
county employment in ]987, whereas tn ]967 tt accounted for about 25 percent of
county employment (Brevard County ]988a). KSC contracts, however, provide a
substantial amount of income, totaling about $720 mtlltontn ]987.
3.2.6.3 Transportation
The area ts serviced by Federal, State, and local roads. Primary highways
include Interstate 95, US-], State Route (SR)-A]A, and SR-520. Urban areas on
the beaches and Merrttt Island are ltnked by-cifs_w_s_andb_idges_Ioad access
to KSC ts from SR-3 and the Cape Road from the south, NASA Causeway _SR-405) and
the Beach Road (SR-406) from the west, and Kennedy Parkway from the north.
There are about 2]] mtles of roadway at KSC; 163 mtles paved and 48 miles
unpaved. CCAFS ts linked to the highway system by the South Gate via SR-A]A,
NASA Causeway, and Cape Road.
Rail transportation in the area is provided by Florida East Coast Railway.
A mainline traverses the cities of Titusville, Cocoa, and Melbourne. Launch
Complex 41 is serviced by a branch line from Tttusville through KSC. At KSC,
approximately 40 miles of rail track provide heavy freight transport to KSC.
Melbourne Regional Airport is the closest air transportation facility and
is located 30 miles south of CCAFS. CCAFS contains a skid strip used for
Government aircraft and delivery of launch vehicles. Any atr freight associated
with operation of Launch Complex 4] uses the CCAFS skid strip. Ferrying and
support aircraft serving KSC utiltze the Shuttle Landing Facility.
Port Canaveral ts the nearest navigable seaport and has a total of ],578
feet of dockage available at existing wharf facilities.
3.2.6.4 Public and Emergency Services
A mutual agreement exists between the City of Cape Canaveral, KSC, and the
Range Contractor at CCAFS for reciprocal support in the event of an emergency or
disaster. Two fire stations located tn the Vertical Assembly Building (VAB)
Area and the Industrial Area provide for effective coverage of KSC.
Security operations include access control, personnel identification,
traffic control, law enforcement, investigations, classified material control,
and national resource protection. The Brevard and Volusta County Sheriff's
m
m
!
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departments, the USFWSand the National Park Service supplement KSC security
forces in patrolling non-secure areas of KSC (e.g., Cape Canaveral National
Seashore, Herritt Island National Wildlife Refuge) (NASA ]986).
Hedtcal services are provided at the facilities and by hospitals at Patrick
Air Force Base and in Cocoa, Tttusvtlle, and Helbourne. CCAFS is equipped with
a dispensary under contract to NASA. Medical services are provided to KSC by an
Occupational Health Factltty and an Emrgency Aid Clinic.
No publtc school facilities are present on CCAFS or KSC. All school-age
children of the KSC and CCAFS workforce attend school in the vicinity in which
they ltve.
No recreational facilities are present on CCAFS, except for those
associated with the Trident Submar!ne Wharf, a service club, and a naval
recreation facility. Cultural facilities on station tnclude the Air Force Space
Museum, tow facilities, and Misston Control, all located at the southern portion
of the base. Offbase mtlttary and civilian personnel utilize recreational and
cultural facilities available wtth!n the communities.
KSC has a 238 acre recreational area (Complex gg) located on the Banana
River near the southern ltmit of KSC property (NASA ]979). The Visitor's
Information Center at KSC, located about 6 miles east of U.S. Highway ],
provides exhibits, lectures and audio-vt°sual displays, and bus tours on the
facility for visitors. _
KSC and CCAFS obtain their potable water from the City of Cocoa water
system under a contract that provides for some g million gallons per day.
Approximately half that amount is normally used by the two facilities. The on-
site distribution systems are sized to accommodate the constant high volume flow
required by the launch deluge system. The city's well field in Orange County
has a capacity of 32 million gallons per day (USAF 1986).
Additional details of faci!Itles_in the local area can be found in Appendix
C-2 and C-3.
KSC also enforces procedures, plans and personnel training with respect to
the use and handling of radioactive sources. Comprehensive radiologtcal
contingency plans are being developed to address all launch/landing phase
accidents that could potentially involve the Radioisotope Thermoelectric
Generators (RTGs) and Radioisotope Heater Units (RHUs) aboard the Galileo
spacecraft. These plans conform to the requirements of the Federal Radiologtcal
Emergency Response Plan that is under development and involves the
efforts of numerous government agencies including NASA, DOE, the Department of
Defense, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and the State of Florida. An
overview ofradtologtcal controls and emergency planning at KSC can be found in
Appendix C-6.
3.2.6.5 Htstortc/Archaeologtc Resources
A mapshowing t!he relatiVe iocations Of State listed archaeologtc sites is
provided in Figure 3-18.
_ ._
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FIGURE 3-]8. GENERAL LOCATIONS OF HISTORICAL/ARCHAEOLOGICAL RESOURCES IN
THE VICINITY OF KSC/CCAFS
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A systematic survey of areas in the Merritt Island National Wildlife Refuge
was conducted in 1978 (NASA ]986). No significant cultural resources were found
other than four historic sites: Sugar Mill Ruins, Fort Ann, the Old Haulover
Canal, and the Dummett homestead.
Two locations were assessed in 1981 (NASA 3986). One area covered 6 acres
where Peacock Pocket Road marks the east boundary and SR'402 borders on the
north; the other area was located on the south edge of SR-402 approximately
2,300 feet west of Peacock Pocket Road. No significant archaeological sites
were found on either of the two locations. No significant cultural resources
were found as the result of other surveys, which tncluded a 1982 survey of the
United Space Booster Factltty tract on Merrttt Island and of the Space Shuttle
Soltd Rocket Booster Factltty site.
An archaeological/historical survey of CCAFS was conducted in 1982 (USAF
]986). It was determined that Cape Canaveral had been inhabited for 4,000 to
5,000 years. The survey located 32 prehistoric and historic sites and several
untnvesttgated historic localities. The initial results of the field survey
indicated that many of the archaeological resources had been severely damaged by
construction of roads, launch complexes, powerltnes, drainage ditches, and other
excavation. None of these sites are located in the vicinity of Launch Complex
41.
Most recently, NASA proposed to develop a stte along Banana Creek to
allow VIPs to vtew Shuttle launches. It was determined that this site contained
state listed archaeologtc site BRI70. NASA funded an extensive archaeologic dig
of this site. The tntttal work for this study was completed in August 1988.
3.3 GLOBALCOMMONS
This section provtdes a general overview of the global commons in terms of
overall population distribution and density, general climatological
characteristics, and surface type (i.e., ocean, rock, sotl}, and also provides a
brief discussion of the global atmospheric inventory of plutonium. The
information provided was extracted primarily from the "Overall Safety Manual"
prepared for the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission in 1975 (USAEC 1975). The
"Overall Safety Hanua!"uttlized worldwide population statistics and other
information comptled into 720 cells of equal stze. The cells were derived by
dividing the entire Earth from pole to pole into 20 latttude bands of equal
area. Each latitude band_ss:then segmented into 36 equal size cells for a
total of 720 cells. Given that each of the cells covered an area of the Earth
equal to 273,528 square miles, it has been assumed for the purposes of this
discussion that whlle worldwide population, for example, has certainly changed
since the reference wasprepared, the change is not significant relative to a
given 273,528 square mtle cell.
3.3.1 Population Distribution and Density
Figure 3-19 Illustrates the distribution of the Earth's population across
each of the 20 equal area latitude bands. It should be noted that the
population scale is logarithmic. Figure 3-20 illustrates the land-adjusted
population densities within the latttude bands.
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FIGURE 3-19. TOTAL AND URBAN _ORLD POPULATION BY EQUAL AREA LATITUDE BANDS
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From these exhibits it can be seen that, with the exception of the four
wore southern latitude bands, the total population among the bands varies by
about one order of magnitude. In addition, Figure 3-19 indicates that the
bulk of the population within most of the bands can be found in rural areas.
The greatest population densities (Figure 3-20) occur in a relatively narrow
grouptng of the four northern bands between latitudes ]7 and 44 degrees
north (bands 4 through 7). _
3.3.2_
Worldwide cltmatic types, which range from the perpetual frost of the polar
climates to the dry desert climates, are Illustrated in Figure 3-2].
3.3.3 Surfac_ Types
The distribution of surface types, worldwide, is an important
characteristic in considering the potential consequences of acctdent
scenarios analyzed for the Galileo mission. Table 3-6 provides a breakdown,
by each of the 20 equal area latitude bands noted previously, of the total
land fraction and the total ocean fraction broken down by two ocean depth
categories - surface depth, i.e., 75 meters (246 feet) average depth; and
intermediate depth, i.e., 500 meters (1,640 feet) average depth. The land
fractlon was further subdivided by the fraction consisting of soil cover and
rock cover. For the most densely populated bands (bands 4 through 7), it
can be seen that the land fraction varies from about 34 percent (band 7) to
about 46 percent (band 4), and within those four bands the soil fraction is
dominant (75 percent in band 4 to 92 percent in band 7). It can also be
seen (by subtracting the total land fraction from 1.0) that the bulk of the
Earth's surface is covered by water.
3.3.4 Worldwide Plutonium Levels
Plutonium-238, the primary fuel of the Galileo spacecraft RTGs, already
exists in the environment as a result of atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons
and a ]964 launch accident. The following paragraphs describe the worldwide,
national, and regional levels of plutonium in the environment. This information
is relevant to analyzing the scope of postulated incremental releases of
plutonium into the environment that could result from a Galileo mission
accident.
Over the period 1945 through 1974, above-ground nuclear weapons tests
produced about 440,000 curies of plutonium (EPA 1977, USAEC ]974). About 97
percent (about 430,000 curies) of this plutonium was Pu-239 and Pu-240 which
are essentially identical both chemically and with respect to their
radiologtcal emission energies. The remainder (about ]0,000 curies)
consisted primarily of Pu-238 (about 9,000 curies), as well as Pu-24] and
Pu-242. Consequently, above-ground nuclear testing represents the major
source of the worldwide distribution of plutonium in the environment.
Of the approximately 430,000 curies of Pu-239 produced, about 105,000
curies were deposited at and near the test sites (EPA ]977). The remaining
325,000 curies were injected into the stratosphere (about 6 to 15 miles above
the Earth's surface). The stratospheric inventory returned to Earth as
"fallout." About 25,000 curies were deposited in the northern hemisphere,
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TABLE3-6.
c
SURFACE TYPE DISTRIBUTIONS FOR EACH LATITUDE BAND
Latitude Total Land
Band Fraction
1 0.4739
2 0.5845
3 0.5665
4 o.4seo
5 0.4353
6 0.3980
7 0.3391
8 0.2545
9 0.2444
10 0.2211
11 0.2500
12 0.2199
13 0.2169
14 0.2480
15 0.2231
16 o.1372
17 0.0465
18 0.0223
19 0.0034
20 0.5438
Ocean Surface
Depth Fraction
=o
Ocean Intermediate Land Soil Land Rc,c1:
Depth Fraction . Frac:t_cn Fraction
0.1648 0.1444 0.0" 1.00"
0.1247
O. 0441
0.0349
0.0704 O.O* 1 .O0*
0.0452 0.749* 0.25]*
o.o4_ o,_49_-_ o.251
0.0357
0.0312
0.0290 0.847 0.153
0.0365 .... 0.912 0.088
0.0334 0.924 0.076
0.0300 0.942 0.058
0.0400
0.O4OO
0.0368 0.923 0.077
0.0i97 0.916 0.084
0.0326
0.0387
0.0263 0.956 0.044
0.0299 0.945 0.055
0.0329
0.0128
0.0200 0.915 O.OB5
0.0319 0.911 0.089
0.0088
0.0185
0.0191
0.0172
o.ozss 0.90B o.o92
0.o172 0.e88 o.112
o.o2s6 o.7o4 o.296
0.0427 0.704* 0.296*
0.0036
0.0077
0.0115 0.0" 1.00"
O.OB50 0.0" 1.00"
iim
* Assumed Values
,, |,,,,,, ||
Source: USAEC 1975
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primarily in the mid-latitudes, with about 70,000 curies deposited over the
southern latitudes (EPA 1977). About 5,000 curies remained aloft as of 1974.
Approximately 16,000 curies of fallout settled on the continental United States
(USAEC 1974). Figure 3-22 illustrates the accumulation of Pu-239 fallout in
mtlltcurtes per square kilometer measured at various locations in the United
States. In general, drier areas of the United States had lower accumulations
than wet areas, indicating scavenging of Pu-239 from the atmosphere by rainfall.
Some dry western areas are apparent exceptions to this indicating the
possibility that there are regions where stratospheric debris may preferentially
enter the troposphere to be deposited on the Earth's surface.
Table 3-7 indicates that the Pu-238 inventory from weapons tests (about
9,000 curies) was increased by a space nuclear source, specifically from the
1964 re-entry and burn-up of a SNAP-gA Radtotsotoptc Thermoelectric Generator.
Thts release of plutonium into the atmosphere was consistent with the RTG design
those on the Galileo
philosophy of the time. Subsequent RTGs, Including8-3spacecraft, have been designed to contain the Pu-2 fuel to the maximum extent
possible recognizing that there are mass and configuration requirements relative
to the spacecraft and its mission which must be weighed against the design and
configuration of the power source and its related safety requirements (see
Section 2.2.2.2).
m
TABLE 3-7. MAJOR SOURCES AND APPROXIMATE AMOUNTS OF PLUTONIUM
DISTRIBUTED WORLDWIDE
i
Amount
Sources (Curies)
% Activity by Isotope
Pu-238 Pu-23g Pu-240
!
w
Atmospheric Testing 1945-74
o Deposited near testing sites
o Depositedworld wide
Space Nuclear (Snap-gA, 1964)
Total r
Total global excluding amounts
near to test sites
]10,000 3 58 38
330,000 3 58 39
|7,000
457,000
.... 347,000
]00
L
Source: USAEC 1975
E_
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The addition of ]7,000 curies of Pu-238 from the SNAP-gA brought the total
global inventory of plutonium to about 457,000 curies. Since ]964, essentially
all of SNAP-gA release has been deposited on the Earth's surface (USAEC 1974).
About 25 percent (approximately 4,000 curies) of that release was deposited tn
the northern latitudes, with the remaining 75 percent settling tn the southern
hemisphere.
m
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4. ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES
The principal purpose of this Final (Tier 2) Environmental Impact
Statement (FEIS) is to present information to enable a choice among the
alternative actions presented in Section 2. This section discusses the
potential environmental consequences that could result from the
implementation of each of the alternatives available to the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) as presented in Section 2.
4.1 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE PROPOSED ACTION
4.].I Imoltcatfons of Completion of Preparation pf the Soacecraft
.... The activities associated with completing the preparations to the
spacecraft primarily involve the completion of post-test spacecraft
mechanical assembly, integration tests with the launch vehicle, and final
launch preparation. The impacts associated with final launch preparations
are addressed in the following subsection. There are no environmental
consequences associated with the balance of the activities identified above
(NASA 1988a).
4.1.2 Environmental Consequences of Normal Launch of the STS
The environmental consequences of normal operations and normal launches
are summarized in this subsection and were discussed in detail in previously
published NASA documents, including EISs on the Space Shuttle Program (NASA
]g78) and the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) EIS (NASA ]g7g), the KSC
Environmental Resource Document (NASA 1986), and the Tier i EIS for the
Galileo and Ulysses missions (NASA 1988a), and were found tobe insufficient
to preclude shuttle operations.
Impacts on Land Use
Launch of the Galileo mission aboard the Space Transportation
System/Inertial Upper Stage (STS/IUS) would occur at Launch Complex 39 at
the KSC. The launch complex and the area surrounding it are dedicated space
launch land uses. The only special land uses nearby are Cape Canaveral
National Seashore and Mosquito Lagoon about 2 miles to the north. Mosquito
Lagoon is a designated State of Flortda aquatic preserve and also an
Outstanding Florida Water. Designated land uses in these areas would not be
affected by a launch of the Galileo mission.
Air Oualltv Impacts
A ground cloud will be formed by combustion in the Space Shuttle rocket
engines during launch (NASA 1979, NASA 1986, NASA 1988a). This cloud
consists of the exhaust products from the solid rocket motors and liquid
engines, the products of afterburntng tn the exhaust plume, the air that is
mixed with the exhaust gases, and much of the heat energy that is generated.
These gases have the potential for forming high concentrations of acids
(hydrogen chloride mist - HC1) that can rain on and affect vegetation. This
acid rain can affect the density of vegetation as described in the following
subsection on biological systems.
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The exhaust products contained in the ground cloud (scavenged HC1 gas
and aluminum oxide particulates) are typically dispersed wtthtn a g-mile
zone around the ]aunch site (NASA 1986). Up to 6,615 pounds of chlorides
and 15,43S pounds of particulates are deposited within about 0.3 mtles from
the launch pad (the near-field environment), and can sometimes extend out to
about 0.6 miles depending uPon variables such as wind conditions (NASA
1985c, NASA 1986b). The near-field typically is about 54 acres tn size
outside the perimeter of_the launch comp]ex. Deposition of up to ]00 g/m2
of chlorides and 200 g/m_ of particulates have been collected from the near-
field (NASA 1986). In the far-field (beyond about 0.3 miles), deposition of
chlortde has been measured_at 25 to 5,300 mg/m_ and alumtnum oxide parti-
culates at 0.3 to 108 mg/m_. Launch of the Galtleo mission can be expected
to result tn similar emissions. While particulate emissions within the
ground cloud will temporarily exceed standards (see Table 3-3), the signifi-
cant atr emissions produced by STS launches have not resulted tn significant
detertorat|on in ambient air quality at either of the two Permanent Air
Monitoring Systems (PAMS) stations sites located near the launch pad (see
Subsection 3.2.2). Detailed discussions of air qualtty impacts can be found
in prior NEPA documents (NASA 1978, NASA 1979, NASA 1986, NASA 1988a).
Uooer-Atmosohere Effects
The Space Shuttle exhaust releases water, hydrogen chloride, chlorine,
and aluminum oxide particles into the stratosphere and produces nitric oxide
in the hot plume. The quantity of water released by the Space Shuttle is
small compared to natural sources, and its effect on the ozone density will
be insignificant (Cofer ]987).
t
Outing Shuttle maneuvers above an altitude of 180 kilometers (in the
ionosphere), the exhaust products from the Orbital Maneuvering System will
result in short-term decreases in the concentration on ions and electrons in
the upper portions on the ionosphere (NASA ]978). This effect is localized
and temporary. Effects on radio wave propagation will be insignificant.
During Shuttle reentry, which will occur between a 70- and 90-ktlometer
altitude, some of the heated atmosphere will be converted to nitric oxide,
wfiichionizes in ultraviolet sunlight. The length of the trail could extend
to one-fourth the circumference of the Earth, but the width will be narrow.
The required time for the trail to disappear has been calculated to be less
than ] day, and if wind shears are present, the trail could disappear in
hours. The effects of the ionized trail on radio wave propagation are
expected to be insignificant. The long-term effects of nitric oxide on
the stratosphere also have been studied and have been determined to be
negligible (NASA ]978).
SonlcBoom
Launch of the STS results in three sonic booms with focal zones over
uninhabited ocean waters. The Shuttle also will produce a sonic boom during
reentry. Because of the large range of entry trajectories, the boom may
occur partially over land. Overpressures have been calculated for these
conditions, and trajectories have been tatlored to minimize the effect on
the ground (NASA 1986). These overpressures are not enough to cause damage
or injury but are in the nuisance or annoyance range, according to the
report issued by the Sonic Boom Panel of the International Ctvt] Aviation
Organization tn October 1970.
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llvdroloqy and Water Quality
.... Each STS launch generates_ab6ut 863,oo0 gaiions of deluge and_Washdown
wastewater (NASA 1986). Much of the deluge water ts vaporized and contained
in the ground cloud. Shallow impounded waters near the launch complex
typically experience a sharp but short-term (about 2 hours) depression tn pH
immediately following launch due to the He1 scavenging from the ground
cloud. About 326,000 gallons of washdown water, along with an unknown
quantity of deluge water, are collected tn two concrete tanks connected to
the launch pad flame trench. Thts water ts neutralized to a pH of about 8.5
after the launch and ts landspread over the adjacent pad area. Groundwater
studies have been unable to establish a cause/effect relationship between
launches and periodically detectable quantities of aluminum, cadmium,
chromium, iron, lead, and volattle organic compounds tn the groundwater
(NASA 1986).
Btoloatcal Systems
Information on the impacts of launch eventsto the local environment
has been documented from a 54-acre area outside of the perimeter of Launch
Complex 39A (LC-39A). Described as within the near-field environment, thts
tract has experienced significant changes in vegetative community structure
(NASA ]986). Overall, total vegetative cover in the near-field has been
reduced and unvegetated areas have expanded. As with all STS launches, the
Galileo mission will contribute to the overall reduction tn species richness
that wtll ensue over the longer term with resumption of STS launches at
Launch Complex 39.
Impact analyses indicate that thin-leafed herbaceous species, and
shrubs with succulent leaves, are more sensitive to launch cloud deposits
than are typtcal dune grasses (NASA ]986). Dune community species
exhibiting sensitivity to launch cloud effects tnclude camphorweed
(Heterotheca subaxillaris), tnkberry (Scaevola Dlumtert), beach sunflower
(Helianthus debills), and marsh elder (Iva tmbricata). Dune species
exhibiting resistance to launch cloud effects tnclude sea oats (Untola
Dantculata), beach grass (Pantcum amarum), and slender cordgrass (Searttna
oatens).
Shallow impounded waters tn the v|cinttyof Launch complex3gAhave
experienced fish kills following the launch of the Space Shuttle (NASA
1986). These waters can experience sharp depressions in pH dropping
temporarily to below water quality standards (see Table 3-4) as a result of
launch cloud rainout. Reductions tn pH of four units within 30 minutes of a
launch event are possible. The sudden acidification of surface waters ts
thought to be responsible for the fish kills accompanying launch events.
Species of fish collected from the near-field impact area exhibit symptoms
of severe ionic imbalance and anoxta, resulting from extensive gtll damage
(NASA ]g86). Fish kills have ranged from small (less than ]00 individuals)
to major (greater than ],000 individuals) (NASA ]986). Fish kills have
involved 17 species with individual specimens typically less than 2 inches
in length.
Whtle the impact on the near-field flora and fauna ts measurable
following each launch event, these impacts are localized and are not ltkely
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to extend significantly from the near-field environment (NASA 1986). Far-
field effects (out to about g miles) typically take the form of spotting on
structures and vegetation from HC1 deposition. No mortality of vegetation
or changes in vegetative community structure have been recorded in the far-
field (NASA Ig85c). .........
Endanaered and Threateqed Species
Some protected species, principally colontal nesting btrdssuch as snow
egret, white ibis and yellow-crowned night heron, are known to inhabit at
least the Picnic Island nesting area about 1 mtle to the west of Launch
Complex 39. Of these three species, the snowy egret ts ltsted by the State
of Flortda Game and Freshwater Fish Commission as a "species of spectal
concern'. The ibis and heron are ltsted by the Florida Committee on Rare
and Endangered Plants and Animals as "species of spectal concern". An
osprey nesting stte ts also located tn the Picnic Island area. The osprey
ts ltsted by the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of
Wild Flora and Fauna, which was implemented by the Endangered Species Act of
1973. The nearest bald eagle (Federally endangered) nesting site ts over 5
mtles from the launch complex. Banana Creek, about 1 mtle west of the
launch complex, is listed as crtttcal habitat for the Federally endangered
Florida manatee. (See Appendix C-4 for more detail and figures showing
locations inhabited by these species.) No endangerment of these species
will result from a normal launch.
In addition to the previous concerns, the potential exists for other
listed species such as the roseate spoonbill (State species of special
concern), as well as some listed plants, to occur in the vicinity of the
1 aunch complex.
Birds would be subject to a startle/flight reaction with ignition of
the STS engines and would probably avoid the area and the exhaust cloud, and
thus should not experience any significant adverse impact. Protected plant
species that may exist in the area could be exposed to the ground cloud and
Its high levels of acid mist and particulates. Given that the near-field
area around the launch complex (out to about g30 feet) has been impacted by
previous and future launch activities, it is unlikely that the Galileo
mission would result in any additional impact on listed plants.
Socioeconomic Factors
Launch of the Galileo mission aboard the STS/IUS from KSC should have
no significant adverse effects on the socioeconomic environment surrounding
KSC. In fact, given the Nation's interest tn the Space Program and general
publtc viewing of planned launches from KSC, the launch of the Galtleo
mission should have a short-term beneficial effect on the economy of the
nearby area from the influx of tourists who come to vtew a launch. Such
tourists can number over 100,000 people who add temporarily to traffic and
congestion tn the area at launch times.
RadtattQn Exposure
Exposures of occupational personnel to minor external radiation could
occur during the normal movement and handling of the Radioisotope
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Thermoelectric Generators (RTGs) before launch at KSC. Radiation from the
RTG and Radioisotope Heater Unit (RHU) components has a very short range,
and all such operations occur under strict conditions and supervision.
Therefore, there is no health effect on occupational personnel or the public
from theseacttvtttes ,
4.1.3 Imoltcattons of Balance of Mission
The balance of a normal mission wtll have no significant adverse
impacts on the environment. Recovery of the Jettisoned reusable solid
rocket boosters would introduce some soluble products from the small amount
of re_dual fuelsleTt in the boosters, ....The tmpact would be temporary and
localized to an area immediately adjacent to the boosters.
With completion of its portion of the Galtleo mission, the STS would
return to Earth for a landtng at Edwards Air Force Base tn California. A
normal return would result in a sonic boom during reentry from orbit and
during landing. These sonic booms are not expected to adversely impact the
environment.
The Galtleo spacecraft, once injected into tts Venus-Earth-Earth-
Gravity-Assist (VEEGA) trajectory, would have no impact on the human
environment given a normal trajectory. The Jupiter encounter of the Galileo
spacecraft would also have no impact on the human environment.
4.1.4 Conseouences of Shuttle Launch Accidents
4.1.4.1 Overview of Shuttle Accidents
A¢¢ident Scenario Definition Aob_roach_
The NASA approach to defining potentlal accident scenarios and proba-
bilitles involved several steps. First, potential failures were identified
that could (I) occur In each of the seven major elements of the Shuttle
(STS) system, and (2) present a potential threat to the RTGs. The seven
major STS elements were:
Launch Support Equipment
Payload
Orbiter
External Tank (ET)
Solid Rocket Boosters (SRBs)
Space Shuttle Haln Engines (SSMEs)
Range Safety Destruct System.
The next step involved dividing the mission into six phases, wtth each
of the phases subdivided further, as necessary. Fault trees were developed
for each of these mission phases. Each fault tree encompassed, as
appropriate, all relevant fatlures that could occur in the seven major
Shuttle systems. Ftnally, and because many of the accident scenarios
represented by the fault trees looked similar, representative accident
scenarios were developed for each of the mission phases.
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Given the mapping of system fatlures tnto scenarios, NASA then provided
estimates of failure probabilities for each of the systems as a function of
ttme (NASA ]988c). These estimates were generated based on reviews of system
characteristics, historical failure rate data from similar systems, and
previous safety ana]yses. Because of the wtde uncertainty in applying
historical data, NASA provided estimates with an order of magnitude range
for each system. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), wtth NASA
concurrence, then used the geometric means of each range tn performing tts
safety analysis.
A detailed Galileo Earth Avoidance Study (JPL 1988) of possible
spacecraft and mission failures has determined only three failure types that
represent even a remote threat of Earth impact during Earth-gravity-assist
flybys. They are retro-propulsion module penetration by a mtcrometeorotd, a
small combination of lesser probability spacecraft failures, and multiple
serial failures tn the ground command §ystem. The total probability of
spacecraft reentry and impact is 5XlO-'.
/k¢¢ident Scenario_ and Environment Overview
Accident scenarios and environments (from NASA 1988a) are treated in
Appendix B and summarized in Table 4-1. For purposes of analysis, the
mission was divided tnto mission phases generally related to vehicle
configuration and/or activity.
The applicable intact abort modes, primary ace|dent causes, and
applicable environments are indicated in Table 4-].
The intact abort modes -- Return to Launch Site (RTLS), Transoceanic
Abort Landing (TAL), Abort-Once-Around (AOA), Abort-To-Orbit (ATO), and
Abort-From-Orbit (AFO) -- are explained tn detail in Appendix B-2. The
first four are generally caused by premature shutdown of one or more Space
Shuttle Hain Engines SSMEs. AFO would be a result of ATO or a problem with
the IUS or spacecraft which prevented deployment on orbit. If two or more
SSMEs shut down during parts of the ascent to orbit, a contingency abort
mode leading to crew bailout and ocean ditch of the ShuttlewouldocCur:
Finally, there is a very small probability of multtple Shuttle system
failures leading to a crash during the landing phase.
The primary accident causes for each phase are generally the most
active portion of the system during that phase. For thePropulsive Phases,
tt is generally that system providing the propulsive thrust, the structure
supporting the thrust and being acted on by external loads, and/or the
guidance system. Hultiple redundancies in the Shuttle guidance tend to
decrease the likelihood of guidance failures for the Shuttle.
Environments created by the accidents generally depend on the source of
the accident and the time that it occurs. Time ts important because it may
affect the character of the source or the resulting secondary env|Po_nts.
For example, the Shuttle Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) fragments will achieve
higher velocity tf a case failure occurs near the end of the burn when less
propellant is available to be accelerated along with the case wall. Liquid
propellant explosions are more severe near the ground where the ground
promotes mixing. Early failures can result in ground impacts, while
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failures above the upper atmosphere can result in reentry heating and
subsequent ground or water impact.
The explosion environments can have multtple elements as seen by the
RTGs or RHUs. The sudden release of energy tn air wtll drive a shock wave
that can distort or break up the RTG, depending on tts strength. The same
explosive energy can push fragments of structure tnto the RTG. Finally, the
resulting fire associated with accidents on or near the ground can provide
thermal stresses on the RTG elements.
STS/IUS Conflouration
In the wake of the Challenger accident, NASA canceled development of
the Centaur G-Prime for flight crew safety reasons unrelated to nuclear
launch safety. That rocket was an energetic ltqutd hydrogen/liquid oxygen
upper stage launch vehicle. In its place, NASA will use the solid fueled
IUS tn the Shuttle for launching deep space missions, such as Gal!leo. An
IUS successfully deployed a Tracking Data Relay Satellite tnto Earth orbit
during the successful September 1988 and March ]gsg STS Discovery fltghts.
The STS/IUS configuration poses much less potential environmental rtsk
than the STS/Centaur, whtch was addressed tn the draft EIS of September 1985
(NASA lg85a). The earlier STS/Centaur safety analysts indicated that most
accident environments were dominated by Centaur involvement irrespective of
the initiating cause (e.g., a SRB rupture would generate high-velocity
fragments that would cause a Centaur rupture and explosion). The IUS, a
solid fueled upper stage whose fuel ts more inert, is much less likely than
the Centaur to explode and contribute to accident environments.
It is noteworthy that an IUS upper stage was on board during the
Challenger accident in order to propel a data relay satellite to geosyn-
chronous orbit. Detailed examination of photographic records, telemetry
data, and fragments recovered from the Challenger accident have shown that:
]) no major explosion occurred, rather a rupture of the external propellant
tank, initiated by the effects of the Shutt]e booster Joint failure, was
followed by release and rapid burn of some of the ltquid propellants; 2) the
Shuttle Orbiter subsequently broke up under fltght dynamic and aerodynamic
forces; and 3) the IUS booster came out of the cargo bay relatively intact,
broke up under aerodynamic forces, and fell 50,000 feet to the ocean surface
without violent soltd propellant Ignition. Uncertain photographic evidence
and an Incomplete recovery of the Tracking and Data Relay Sate]ltte did not
permit an assessment of its response sequence.
The tnteragency study group formed to evaluate both the Challenger and
Titan 34 D-g explosions (NASA eta]. ]989) concluded that, had an RTG been
on board, both it and its cladded heat sources would have survived the
Challenger accident with no release of plutonium fuel. Thts is aside from
soltd rocket motor fragments which, in the case of the Challenger accident,
were not a factor .... _ __ _ ._ ....
Safety and Environmental Analy_l_ Processes
The safety and environmental analysis processes are depicted in Figure
4-]. The analyses consist of defining potential accident scenarios and
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resulting environments to which the RTGs/RHUs may be exposed and the proba-
bility distributions of these accidents and environments, and then assessing
the consequences of subjecting the RTGs/RHUs to those environments. The risk
is then a combination of the probabilities of the accidents and their con-
sequences. At this time, there is a Shuttle Data Book (NASA 1988b) that
contains scenarios and environments for the STS/IUS configuration, and a
Safety Analysts Report (DOE 1988a, DOE ]988b, DOE ]989a).
A number of similar documents were developed for the planned 1986
launch of Galtleo and Ulysses using the STS/Centaur. During the tnterval
between the completion (late 1985) of the Final Safety Analysis Report
(FSAR) for the subsequently postponed 1986 launch and the present, work has
been redirected to develop and to improve and refine the accident models and
techniques for analyses applicable to the STS/IUS case as follows.
A new FSAR is required for the STS/IUS because the analysis in the
previous documents was directed at the STS/Centaur. The replacement of the
Centaur with the IUS, and the assessment of the STS 5]L and 34D-9 accident
data, led NASA to develop a revised Data Book of the STS/IUS accident
scenarios and possible environments. Therefore, the results of the earlier
STS/Centaur FSAR are not relevant to the STS/IUS configuration.
4.1.4.2 Non-Radiological Accident Consequences
Unplanned events that might occur during Space Shuttle launch opera-
tions include explosions, fire, the release of toxic gases, crash, or
mission abort. The following discussions are taken from the Shuttle Program
EIS (NASA 1978).
On-Pad Fire or Exoloston
The most serious consequence of an on-pad fire involving the entire
Space Shuttle vehicle will be the release of toxic combustion products from
the SRBs. The large heat release associated with the burning of the main
engine's propellants will assist the cloud of combustion products in rising
to a high altitude. Although the quantity of SRB combustion products
released at ground level will exceed that released at or near ground level
in a normal launch, the additional heat and cloud rise contributed by the
main engine's propellants wtll compensate in terms of ground-level
concentrations of hydrogen chlortde and chlorine.
Explosions on the launch pad might achieve significant blast effects
under spectal circumstances. Such circumstances would be those that lead to
sudden rupture of the External Tank. Immediately prior to launch, all
unprotected personnel are evacuated from the launch pad. Consequently, no
injuries other than to the flight crew are anticipated, even for this worst-
case event.
Ascent Accident =L
Public safety from hazards associated with the launch and early ascent
of the Shuttle is the responsibility of the Range Safety Officer. For early
flight, this is exercised through the capability for ground-commanded flight
termination (vehicle destruct) to prevent impact on land should the vehicle
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depart radically from its nominal flight path. This protection of the
public is provided until the vehicle achieves orbit.
External Tank Jettison
In a normal mission, the External Tank will be Jettisoned to impact in
a preplanned ocean area remote from shipping zones. Additionally, the
impact area will be announced to air transporters and shippers before the
flight. This practice is identical to that used in current spaceflight
activity to protect aircraft and ships from reentry of suborbital rocket
stages. In case of an early mission abort, the External Tank may be
jettisoned into the ocean near the launch site. A portion of the possible
impact area coincides with the launch corridor where warnings are issued to
aircraft and ships before the launch and whlchls under surveillance during
launch operations. Because the External Tank will not contain toxic
materials, the hazard to the environment from impact either in the
preplanned area or elsewhere will be confined to physical effects at the
impact point.
_letttson of i_hQSolid Rocket_Booster
Damage to the environment would be l!m!ted to the physical effects of
the impact, as the SRBs are inert after burnout. In a normal flight or in
an abort, the SRBs will descend to the preplanned ocean area recovery zone
by parachute. The location of the recovery area is announced to aircraft
and ships before launch, and the area Is maintained under surveillance.
If the SRB parachute were to fail, the SRB would still impact within
the preplanned zone. The SRB might be damaged beyond further usefulness or
sink and be lost, but no long-term environmental hazards would result.
Orbiter Landina
Upon successful completion of its mission, the Shuttle orbiter will
return to Earth and land at Edwards Air Force Base (EAFB).
Should the Shuttle crash,_the consequences would be similar to those of
any large aircraft crash, except there would be a probability of fires and
accompanying toxic environment downwind because of hypergoltc propellants
(monomethyl hydraztne and nitrogen tetroxtde).
In conventional aircraft operations, which should closely resemble
Shuttle atmospheric flight operations, the most probable location of a crash
on landing is near or on the runway. The Shuttle will land at the remote
EAFB.
Effect of Unplanned Events on the Marine Environment and Water Oualitv
The potential impact of unplanned Space Shuttle operational events on
the marine environment and water quality are limited to the following: in-
flight failuresthat may result in vehicle hardware and propellant landing
in the ocean, and on-pad accidents and propellant spills that may result in
run-off of propellants to local drainage systems.
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The potential sources of pollutants during unplanned events and the
major pollutants are as follows: ......
pQtential Source
Solid propellants
Liquid propellants
Lubricants, hydraulic
fluid
Major Pollutant
Ammoniumperchlorate (NH4CIO4)
Nono-Nethyl Hydraztne (le_H)
Hydrazine (NTH4)
Nitrogen tetPoxtde (N204)
Hydrocarbons
In-Fltaht Fatlures
Possibilities of polluttonare primarily associated with toxtc_[_i ...._!
materials that may be released to and are solubie in the marine environment.
Rocket propellants are the dominant source of such materials. A secondary
consideration relates to otls and other hydrocarbon materials that may be
essentially immiscible with water but, if released, may float on the surface
o6 the water. The quantities of hydrocarbons used are small. In case of an
in-flight failure in the early stages of flight, the Shuttle would be
expected to separate intact and return to the launch site.
The SRB propellant would continue to burn wtth the same products of
combustion from a normal launch (primarily hydrogen chloride, alumtnum oxide
and carbon monoxide) being dispersed tnto the atr or absorbed into theocean
water. Any unburned solid propellant would slowly disperse.
The impact of the Shuttle's External Tank would release ltqutd hydrogen
and liquid oxygen, which would burn or evaporate raptdly into the
atmosphere. The HHH is contained tn the Shuttle only and would be returned
to the launch site. However, tf the Shuttle were forced to abort to a water
landing, this matertal would enter into the water. These materials are
expected to dilute to nontoxic levels of concentration within the area
affected by the emergency landing (NASA ]978). Small schools of fish could
be affected, but no large-scale or permanent effects on marine ltfe are
expected. The compounds are all chemically active and are not expected to
persist tn the marine environment (NASA 1978).
On-Dad Accidents and Propellant Sotlls
Provisions, such as dikes and catch basins, are in place for containing
on-pad spills and disposing of the sptlled propellant without contaminating
the water environment. On-pad vehtcle failures would normally be expected
to result tn a fire that consumed almost all of the propellants. Any
unconsumed propel]ant would be treated tn the same way as a spt11.
4.1.4.3 Radtologtcal Acctdent Analysis
The use of plutonium-238 dioxide (PuO_) fuel, a radioactive matertal
tn the General Purpose Heat Sources (GPHSs_ -- used tn the two Radioisotope
Thermoelectric Generators (RTGs) and the ]31 light weight Radioisotope
Heater Units (RHUs) on the Galtleo spacecraft -- necessitates evaluation of
the radiologtcal risks to persons tn the launch stte vicinity and the
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general population worldwide resulting from postulated accidents occurring
during the mission. The inventory of PuO2 fuel ts about 132,825 Ci tn each
RTG (265,650 Ct total) and 33.6 Ct tn eacn RHU (about 4,800 Ct total). The
RTGs and RHUs are described in Subsection 2.2.2.1.
Only accidents that could result tn damage to a RTG and possible fuel
release are addressed tn thts section. These accidents are presented tn
Table 4-2 for each of the stx mtsston phases.
The RHUs aboard the Galtleo spacecraft could be subjected to a wide
variety of hosttle envtronments_ A thorough, systematic assessment of the
response of RHUs to these environments shows that fue] release would occur
only tn certain instances.
Some RTG accidents, ltsted tn Table 4-2, could result tn the release of
fuel. Each of these (which could result tn the release of fuel) has a
probability of occurrence and a predicted amount of released fuel (called a
source term). The predicted release ts based on the subsequent (i.e.,
conditional) probability that the accident wt11 lead to a release of
radioactive material.
The distrlbution of accidents and consequences for each mission phase
are characterized by three parametric representations: the most probable
case, the maximum credible case, and the expectation case. These cases are
defined for each mission phase as follows:
e
e
Host Probable CasQ: The single release having the highest
probability.
H_x1mum Case: The maxlmum fuel release that, when coupled wlth
meteorological assumptions, results In the highest populatlon dose
through the ingestion, inh_latlon, and external pathways. A
probability limit of iXlO'" was determined for the maximum
credtble accident. Lower probability events were analyzed by the
DOE tn the development of tts safety analysis report for the
Galtleo mission (DOE ]988a, DOE ]988b, DOE 1989a). However, no
substantial increase tn the overall rts_ was foupd. Further, it
ts recognized that probabilities of 10"_ and 10TM have been used
as safety goals tn evaluations for nuclear power plants. NASA
has, however, adopted )0"" as an added measure of conservatism
because space launches to date present a smaller sample population
than tn other nuclear power programs. Lower probability accidents
evaluated by DOEyield no _ubstanttal increase tn the risk, thus
Justifying adoption of 10 °'.
Exoectattgn Case: The probability ltsted for the expectation case
ts the total probability of all accidents for a plutonium release
for that phase of the mission. The expectation case uses all of
the predicted release and their probabilities (without regard to
the 1x10"" limiting value) for all of the accident scenarios tn a
mission phase to define a probability weighted source tere--the
statistically expected release.
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TABLE4-2. ACCIDENTSBY MISSION PHASE, STS
Phase Description Accident
0
!
2
3
4
5
Prelaunch to Launch
7"
Ascent
Second Stage
On-Orbit
Payload Deploy
Venus-Earth-Earth-
Gravity Assist
Maneuver
Inadvertent Range Safety System destruct
Flre/exploslon
Solid Rocket Booster failure
Range Safety System destruct
Aft compartment explosion
Vehicle breakup
Crash landing
Ocean ditching: :,.
Orbiter failure
External Tank failure
Space Shuttle main engine failure
Payload failure
Range Safety System destruct
Crash Landing
Ocean ditching
Orbiter failure and reentry
IUS Solid Rocket Motor Case burst
IUS Solid Rocket Motor no ignition,
low impulse
IUS Tumbltng from separation or
recontact
IUS mtsaltgned burns due to guidance
failure
IUS erratic burns
High-speed reentry of the spacecraft
[]
|
LR_
[]
q
i
|
|
'ql
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The radiological consequences include:
. The short-term radiation dose that results from the initial
exposure by inhalation of the radioactive cloud. _ The doses are 70
year dose commitments resulting from the long-term retention of
the material in the body.
2. The long-term radiation dose which would result from continuous
exposure to materials deposited tn the environment over an
extended period following release. Host of the long-term dose
commitment would occur over the first two years after an accident
(DOE 1989a). This is because the availability of ground deposited
radioactive particles to the inhalation pathway through
resuspenston from the soil decreases dramatically after the first
two years. (Inhalattonof resuspended particles ts the dominant
long-term exposure pathway.) Long-term doses include those
outside Kennedy Space Center boundaries and worldwide populations
due to Inhalation of resuspended material and Ingestion of
contaminated food products and water over a 70-year period. In
addition, ],rig-term doses to onsite Kennedy Space Center workers
due to Inhalation of resuspended material ts calculated for onsite
workers for a period of 35 years based on 40 hours per week.
3. Estimates of land and surface water areas contamination. This
contamination results from deposition of PuO2 from a plume or
cloud created by an explosion Or _ire, or from surface impact of
unvaporized reentering PuO_ particles. It should be noted that
the estimates presented here In the EIS are for illustrative
purposes and are not Intended to reflect a definitive statement
with respect to specific areas at KSC or its environs that would
be contaminated. Should an accident occur, a site-specific
screening level would be established based upon cleanup to levels
as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA).
This information ts presented in the following terms for each case.
. Numbers of persons estimated to be subject to 9rearer than
specified levels of both short-term doses and ]ong-term doses,
based on the launch area population data and worldwide population
density data.
Doses appear In terms of person-rems. A person-rem ts a unit of
collective dose from a given source of radiation exposure. As
used here, the number of person-rems ts the sum of all individua]
lifetime (70-year) doses in a gtven population from exposure to a
_ re!ease of plutonium-238 from a mission phase accident. For
_ _ximple_as the released material ts carr|ed away from the point
of release, tt ts dispersed and Its concentration decreases, but
the area and population exposed generally increases, as Illus-
trated in Subsection 4.i_4,4. Health Impacts are assessed
probabtltsttcally based on population dose.
2e Total short-term and long-term population doses. In presenting
population doses, the concept of "de minimis" has been used,
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meaning a dose level below regulatory concern and from which no
health effects are expected. De minimlsi as a Concept in
determining the risk from exposure to ionizing radiation, remains
a controversial topic within the regulatory as well as in the
scientific community. The Council on Environmental Quality has
been following the issue for some time; however, it presently
offers no guidance on either the approach to de minimis or the
levels of "de minimls risk." The White House Office of Science
and Technology Poltcy established a Committee on Interagency
Radiation Policy Coordination in 1982 which considered the
establishment of a level of risk Or radiation dose below which
agencies would not have to regulate or otherwise control for the
purpose of radiation protection (i.e., a "de mlnimis'). The
Committee has not formally addressed this topic as yet. While the
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) appears to be moving
toward proposing a "below regulatory concern" (de minimis) level
for Indlvldual dose, it has not yet supported the concept for
collective doses. The National Council on Radiation Protection
and Space Measurement in ]987 established a "Negligible Individual
Risk Level" of I in 10 million annual risk, which corresponds to a
dose rate of ] mrem/yr (NCRPSM 1987). For the purpose of this
document, the de minimis dose was taken to be ! mrem/yr and 50
mrem total dose commitment. Tota! population doses are reported
both with and without de minimis.
The maximum short-term and long-term doses to individuals.
Tables 4-3 and 4-4 present the results of the accident modeling for the
most probable accident in each mission Phase and the most severe "credible"
accident for each mission Phase. For these presentations, accidents with
probabilities less than about ! in 10 million were considered beyond the
range normally considered credible and not l|sted, in the detailed accident
analyses presented in Appendix B and the FSAR, all accident s_quences and
scenarios with probabilities as low as ] in ]0 million (IXIO") were
considered. Analyses of lower probability events prepared by DOE for the
Galileo mission FSAR (DOE ]g88a, DOE 1988b, DOE ]g8ga) did not yield any
substantial increase in overall risk. All accidents, irrespective of
probability, were used to develop the expectation case from which overall
risk was derived.
The releases for both the most probable and maximum cases illustrate
that the RTGs and RHUs survive mission accidents very well and contain
essentially all of the radioactive materials as des|gne_ _ The releases are
only a very small fraction of the available plutonium. The only accidents
identified in which more than 0.01 percent of the plutonium could be
released were the near launch pad accidents, where both large quantities of
fuel and propellant were available in conjunction with hard surfaces for the
Graphite Impact Shells (GISs) to impact, and the extremely low probability
inadvertent reentry in the VEEGA maneuver, in which essentially all of the
plutonium in a GIS is assumed to be released if the impact shell hits hard
m
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rock. The reentry characteristics of this accident are such that flight
paths of the GISs are essentially independent, implying that the probability
of more than a few hitting rock and releasing plutonium is extraordinarily
low.
A summary of the results of the radiologtcal consequence analysis are
presented in Tables 4-S and 4-6. More detailed results are presented in
Appendix B-4. Consequences are expressed in terms of collective dose to the
affected population and amount of land contaminated above the screening
level proposed by the EPA. The population dose estimates are 70-year doses.
The most probable, maximum, and expectation cases present a
representative range of accidents and consequences. The most probable case
has the highest probability, but the consequences could vary from those
indicated in Table 4-5 because it is representative of only one set of the
variables--quantity of release, locatton of release, parttcle size
distribution, probability of occurrence, and meteorological conditions. A
change of any one of these variables, except the probability of occurrence,
could result in a different set of consequences. The maximum, presenting
the most severe human health impact, is utilized to give an upper ltmtt and
is developed primarily for emergency planning assistance. The expectation
case represents a probabilisttc combination of all accident scenarios
resulting in a release in a phase utilizing 42 sequences of meteorological
conditions for the launch period. These two cases together for each Phase
present a range of the type and magnitude of occurrences that could take
place for each mission Phase. The impacts of the various uncertainties in
the accident modeltng and analysis are presented in Subsection 4.1.4.7.
The consequences presented in Tables 4-S and 4-6 indicate that the
collective popu]ation doses to those affected by the accidents is quite
smaii, ranging from 0 (for wind blowing offshore) to 391 (for nomtnal
meteorological conditions) person-rem for the Host Probable Case or to 4,890
person-rem for the Haxtmum Case in Phase 1. In mission Phase 5, the maximum
case has a population dose of 51,700 person-rem. The analysis for mission
Phase 5 uses an exposed population of 71,310, assuming a uniform area
population distribution. Over a 70-year period, the Maximum Case dose on
the average over the exposed population in mission Phase 5 equates to less
than 20 percent of the average background level of 150 mrem/yr. Note that
the maximum case uses meteorological conditions that would maximize the dose
to persons. The consequence calculations include the onsite, launch day
population of workers and visitors to KSC.
Tables 4-5 and 4-6_also include estimates of the area of material
deposition at 0.2 uCi/m z or greater. At that level, EPA recommends
monitoring; below that level, monitoring is not recommended. NASA's actual
monitoring plans will be based on reai-ttme estimates of the amount and
location of the release and updated atmospheric analyses of the advectton of
the released material. As discussed in Appendix B, cleanup wtll be based
upon a number of factors, including the amount, particle sizes, and
concentration of the deposition and the normal use of the area in question.
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TABLE 4-5. SUMMARYOF RADIOLOGICALCONSEQUENCESMOST PROBABLECASES, STS
Popotat Ion Dose,
Plrlorl- Pall
Area (Squmre KiLometers) with
Deposition AlCove
0.2 uCi in"
Ntssion IteLeese Above HeaLth Dry InLand
Phial Prdbabi t lay Total De Ninimll Effects Lend Swamp Meter Ocean
0 5x10 "7 35.4 0 0 12.5 1.63 4.6 0
1 3x10 "4 391 0.003 0 43.3 15.9 25.7 0
2 2x10 "6 0.2 0.03 0 0 0 0 0
3 6x10 "6 4.6 1.3 0 .059 0 .001 0
4 4x10"4 4.6 1.3 0 .039 0 ._I 0
5 lx10 "7 1,010 581 O. 1 13.2 0 .296 0
+ " hoe1'9s9...... _ _ ...... : 7 " : ......... Pr' ' " Source: a
TABLE 4-6. SUMMARY OF RADIOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES, MAXIMUM CASES, STS
PopuLation Dose,
Person- rim
Area (Square KiLometers) with
DeposltlonA_ove
0.2 uCi/m"
Ntsston ReLease Above HeaLth Dry Intwtl
Phase ProbabiLity TotaL De Mtntltl Effects Lind Swamp Mater Oceln
0 5x10 "7 133 0 0 4.13 .128 2.64 .OZ_
1 lx10 "4 ...... + +4'890 3,710 0.? 2.03 .6M 2.53 .18
2 7.x10"6 7.3 0.9 0 0 0 0 0
3 lx10 "7 200 51 0 .12 0 .003 0
4 7x10 "6 200 51 0 .12 0 .003 0
5 lx10 "7 51,700 50,600 9.4 8.91 0 .ZO 0
Source: DOE 19891
The tables of raliotogicaL consequences Ihoutd be real al folio+m: first colum_ Lists mission
phase, see page 4-15 for descriptions; second column Lilts the total probability for the release in
that phase; third column Lilts the co_[ectFve ||fetTme--{|.e., 70*year) exl:_iurl o_r t_e peop==[e:_+:+
tee|dent where the atmosphere carries the material; fourth ¢olug_ Lists the Lifetime exposure de
mtntmis; fifth column gives the statistical incremental health effect of that exposure; Last four
colum_l List areas over which the material depolttl. Thul, tn Phase 5 far the eextu case: the
probab|Lity of the release is one |n ten miLLion; if • release occurs, then there could be a mxlu
70-year exposure of 51,700 person-ram to a population of 71,310 people (50,600 id)ove de minimil);
lad there MouLd be In Increment of 9.4 clncer fatllltlel complred to • normtty expected amount of
mbout 14,000 in m population of 71,310 people.
|
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4.1.4.4 Impacts of Radiologtcal Accidents to Individuals
Individual members of the KSC workforce, launch-day visitors, and
members of the general population of Florida and of the world could, under
some accident conditions, receive small radiologlcal impacts. The degree of
the impact wouldbe highly dependent on the nature and point in the flight
path of the accident, the characteristics of the material released, and the
specific meteorological conditions prevailing. The individual doses
presented throughout this document are expressed in 70-year (i.e., lifetime)
dose and are the sum of two components: the initial dose due to inhalation
• of very small (generally less than I0 microns) particles during initial
cloud passage, and the long-term dose resulting from continuous exposure to
material deposited in the environment over an extended period following the
:- release.
Figures 4-2 through 4-4 present plots of the individual dose (abscissa)
versus the number of people receiving doses greater than the Indicated
levels (ordinate). In general, the models calculate exposure versus area
and then estimate the population within the area.
Figures 4-2 through 4-4 indicate that dose levels from possible launch
_ accidents wtll be very low. For instance, for mission Phases 0 and 1, in
the most probable release case, which uses an average meteorology, no
_ individual would receive more than the de mtntmis dose. In Phases 2 through
i_ 5, the number of persons receiving greater than de mintmis doses would be
approximately 1, 10, 10, and 1,500, respectively. Note that mission Phases
3 and 4 ave grouped as one value in the figures.
The inadvertent _eentry accident during the VEEGA operation, although
extremely unlikely, has the potential for higher releases and hence higher
theoretical consequences than any of the accidents identified for Phases 0
to 4. As discussed in the Tier I EIS {NASA Ig88a) and in the Earth
Avoidance Analysis (JP_ 1988), the overall probability of an inadvertent
VEEGA reentry is 5XIO-'. This low probability results from the
traJectory's bias away from Earth, and from the fact that there are few
accldents that could occur in Just the right way to put the spacecraft on an
Earth-impacting path without the ability to do subsequent maneuvers away
from the Earth. Consequences were calculated assuming worldwide average
population density on land and average meteorological conditions for the
most probable case, and the maximum latitude band population density {gO.l
T persons/kmc) and meteorological conditions that maximized radlologlcal
consequences for the maximum case. Under the most probable assumptions,
less than l,SO0 persons would receive more than a de mlnlmls lifetime dose,
with as many as I00 receiving Irem and about 4recelvlng less than a 40 rem
lifetime dose. Under the maximum case conditions, as many as 70,000 (71,310
by modeling calculations) could receive more than a de m!nlmis dose, about
20 could receive up to I00 rem lifetime dose, and about 3 could receive up
to 270 rem. The few receiving the higher doses would have to be very close
to the impact area and Inwnediatelydownwind. In practice, mitigation
measures, such as those discussed in the next subsection, would likely
reduce the long-term impacts to those residing In the contaminated areas.
f_
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The radiologtca] consequence summary for the expectation case presented
tn Table 4-7 indicates that when probability ts factored into the
calculation of the consequences and expected number of people exposed, the
results are very stmtlar to the most probable case. (It should be noted
that the population dose est;mates assume aTO-year exposure period.) This
is because, for Phases 2 to 5, the higher consequences are the result of
more GPHS modules or GISs hitting rock. While the total consequences are
additive with each additional hit, the reentry characteristics and fltght
paths of the GlSs are essentially independent, implying the probability that
more than a few hitting rock and releasing plutonium is extraordinarily low.
Therefore, the probabiltty weighted consequences (and risk) for accidents in
Phases 2 through 5 are dominated by the most probable accidents. For Phase
1, the expectation case ts higher than the most probable case because
several Phase 1 accidents were identified that could lead to about the same
amount of matertal being released.
Table 4-8 presents a summary of the risk from each HissJon Phase. The
excess health effects (or excess cancer fatalities), assuming the accidents
for each Phase occur, are quite small and |ndistingutshab]e From health
effects due to natural background radiation. In the Phase 5 or VEEGA
accident, about 0.1 incremental fatalities would be expected among the 1,460
people that statistically might be expected to receive more than a de
mintm|s lifetime dose. Among all the people exposed to any radiation,
including below de mtntm|s levels, the total expectation dose (from
Table 4-7) is 1,130 person-rem, equivalent to about 0.2 health effects
(Incremental fatalities) among the exposed population.
When the probability of the accidents Is factored Into the analysis,
the rlsk to the exposed Individuals can be calculated. The average
Indlvldual risk In the Table equals the probabillty times health effects
consequences, divided by the population affected. This rlsk Is quite low.
The rlsk to members of the general population Is actually quite a bit lower
than the rlsk presented In the Table because different sets of people could
be affected, depending on impact areas and meteorological conditions. These
risks can be compared to the approximate individual risks of early
fatalities by other causes faced by the public presented in Table 4-g.
Table 4-8 implies that the most severe rlsk is due to Phase I accidents,
with a maximum individual rlsk of excess fatality of about 4 in I billion,
much less than the ordinary risks faced (Table 4-g). A Phase ] accident Is
expected to have greatest impact on-site at KSC and Cape Canaveral Air Force
Station (CCAFS.)
4.1.4.5 Impacts and Mitlgation of Land Deposition
Thls section presents the envlronmental consequences of anlaccldent in
which plutonium dioxide (Pu07) Is exposed to the environment. The impact
analysis Is divided into two-major categories: I) the potentla1|mpacts of
the most probable and maximum case accidents durlng Phases 0 and I; and 2)
the potential impacts of the most probable and maximum case accidents during
Phases 2, 3, 4, and 5. The first category are those accidents which could
affect KSC and v!cinlty and can be represented by a specific mathematical
mode]. The second category of accidents are those which could affect
unspecified areas of the world and cannot be preclsely modeled.
4-25
J
_o _
0"0
-rW
0.
m,_'-
0 _
E
_. _. o. o. o. o
_ _ c_ o o _
o. o o. o. o.
0 0 0 0 0 0
o
2 2 2 2 2 2
4-26
E
i 0
0 E "0
|
i
i5
3
<_
U_
v
Z
o _. o. o
0 4O
t_ • • ° • _
I ! I ! I I
0 0 0 0 0 0
X X X X X X
s-u G)
_- c 0 0
u _-
_ O"
U
v'_l_,,,. G_
o -_
0 (1) _ u
Li=), 0 _¢-
COO .¢J ._- n3
I'--'>( GI c..- e-
Li_ F=.= ",-- 0
• 0 =i_ -,--
4 -27
TABLE 4-9. INDIVIDUAL RISK OF FATALITY BY VARIOUS CAUSESa
Accident Type
Number of ..... Approximate
Accidents Individual Rlskc
for 1983
Motor Vehicle
Fal I s
Drowni ng
Fires and Flames
Pol son
Water Transport
Air Travel
Manufacturing
RaiIway
Electrocutlon
_Lightning
Tornadoes
Hurricanes
All Other Accidents
A11 Accidents
Diseases
44,452 2 x 10"4
12,024 5 x 10-5
5,254 2 x 10"5
5,028 2 x 10-5
4,633 2 x 10-5
1,316 5 x 10-6
1,312 5 x 10"6
1,200 5 x 10-6
1,073 4 x 10-6
872 4 x 10-6
160 7 x 10-7
114b 5 x 10-7
46b 2 x 10 -7
9,311 4 x 10-5
77,484 3 x 10"4
1,631,741 7 x 10-3
Notes:
a.
b.
C.
Based on 1983 U.S. population.
1946 to 1984 average.
Fatalities/Total Population.
Source: USBC 1986
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Results are presented for immediate impacts and long-term impacts.
Immediate impacts are those that result from the deposition of PuO 2 on
various environmental media. Long-term Impacts are those that result from
leaving PuO 2 In the envlronment. They include impacts to natural
envlronment), agrlcultural resources, man-used resources, and water bodies,
along wlth possible mitigation measures and the impacts of mitigation. The
economic cost estimates associated wlth the impact analyses are also
presented.
It should be emphasized that the following discussion Is for
111ustrative purposes and Is not intended to reflect a definitive statement
regardlng areas that would be contaminated In the event of an accident
Involvlng a release of plutonium. In the unlikely event such an accident
occurred, the amount of contamination and the specific affected areas would
be determined and appropriate actions taken In accordance wlth the
Comprehenslve Envlronmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act.
Actions would include evaluation of alternatlves In accordance with the
Natlonal Contingency Plan and development of appropriate cleanup levels In a
publicly available decision document.
A_S_ssment of Impacts to Kennedy Space Center and Viclnltv
This section presents the envlronmental consequences of Phase O,
Prelaunch/Launch and Phase I, First Stage Ascent most probable and maximum
case accidents. The areas affected by the accidents are primarily on KSC
property. The land areas of Inltial surface deposition from the most
probable, maximum, and expectation accidents In Phases 0 and 1 are presented
In Table B-I0 of Appendix B. Host of the radioactive material (about g4.5
percent) will remain within I0 km of the accident location and hence,
primarily Impact KSC property.
Surface contamination resul_Ing from.the Phase 0 most probable case
produces a total area of 18.7 kmc whlch w111 receive deposltlon above 0.2
uCl/m . T_e phase I most probable accident produces a zotal oeposltlon area
of 84.g kmc above the 0.2 uCi/m c screening level. The potential range of
decontamination measures for the slx land cover types (i.e., natural
vegetation, urban, agrlcultural, wetlands, inland water, and ocean) Is shown
In Table B-Ig. Ocean impacts do not occur for either the Phase 0 or Phase 1
most probable accident scenarios.
The _hase 0 maximum case produces a total surface area deposltlon above
0.2 uC_/m L of 6.g kmL. The Phase 1 maxlmum case produces an area of
5.4 km . In Phase O, dry land receives the greatest amount of contami-
nation, while In Phase 1, Inland water receives the greatest contamlnatlon.
Again, as noted earlier, the areal extent of land contamination for the
maximum case is smaller because the model utlllzes conditions which maximize
populatlon dose. Hence, the smaller contaminated area Is In the maximum
case, but with higher dose.
Tbe Phases 0 and I expectation cases produce total areas of 57.4 an_
155 kmz, respectlvely, above the depositlon screening level of 0.2 uCl/m c.
In both cases, natural vegetation is the land cover receiving the greatest
contamination.
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In all cases, g4.5 percent of released radioactive material is
contained in particles greater than 44 microns and will be deposited within
I0 km of the accident/Impact site. Atmospheric dispersion may scatter
smaller particles beyond ]0 km. Particles ]0 microns and smaller could
travel 50 ion or more; concentrations would be expected to be extremely low,
as shown by the small number of health effects.
Immediate Conseauences
The deposition of plutonium dioxide from the representative accidents
does not physically alter land covers unless a particle produces enough heat
to start a fire. However, the Pu02 can affect the human use of these land
covers and could result in a change in land cover.
Contaminated areas were analyzed to determine current land cover use
and how Pu02 would react to various environmental conditions. This analysts
was used to draw the following conclusions on immediate consequences.
There is no initial impact on soil chemistry. Most PuO_ deposited on
water bodies is not expected to react chemically with the waler column;
therefore, no immediate consequences are expected in these waters. No
significant consequences to flora and fauna are expected from surface
deposition and skin contact with PuO 2 (Section B.6.I, Appendix B).
Lonq-Term Conseouences
Plutonium dioxide deposited on the sot1 will interact with inorganic
and organic ltgands forming soluble or insoluble products. It is expected
that over 95 percent of the Pu0_ will remain in the top S cm (2 in) of
surface soil for at least 10 to-20 years. Mitigation required for other
reasons may result in significant soil impacts (Section B.6.1, Appendix B).
Natural areas receiving deposition above the 0.2 uCi/m 2 screening level
within 32 km_(20 mi) of L_unch Complex 39 (Phases 0, l) could range from 1.5
km (0.58 mt _) to 73.7 .km (28 mt ) (see App_ndtx B, Xable B-20). _Wetland
ar_as receiving deposition range from .]3 Ion_ (.05 mi _) to 28.5 km_ (]l
mi_). No significant consequences to flora are expected. Minor
consequences are possible through ingestion by terrestrial and aquatic fauna
and inhalation by terrestrial fauna (Section B.6.], Appendix B).
Only small amounts of PuO_ wtll be available in the water columns. The
amounts available are not considered to have significant impacts to the
aquatic fauna that may ingest dissolved or suspended PuO2. Btoaccumulatton
of Pu02 by benthic organisms and aquatic vegetation may occur. There ts a
potential for the PuO2 to travel up the food chain; however, bioaccumulatton
of plutonium decreases with higher trophtc levels (Subsection B.6.2.3,
Appendix B).
Mitigation of the impacts to flora and fauna in natural areas could be
accomplished through a combination of monitoring and remedial action based
on monitoring. The amount of Pu02 resuspended in the air in natural areas
determines if PuO2 concentrations-would pose inhalation health hazards to
man. If levels are determined to pose inhalation health hazards, then
access to the area could be restricted until monitoring indicates that PuO2
concentrations will no longer pose a potential inhalation health hazard.
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Agrlcultural areas constitute about S percent Of the land cover types
within 32 km (20 ml) of Launch Complex 3g and Include citrus groves and
pastures. Agricultural areas_contaminated by accidents during Pha_es 0 and
l range from 0.2 km_ (0.08 mlz) In the maxlmum case to S km_ (2 ml_) In the
expectation case. Mitigation at pasture areas could Include destruction of
affected crops, scraplng or plowlng under the contaminated upper soll layer,
or restrictions on use of the pasture. Appropriate mitigation wlll be
determined by the levels of contamlnatlon, type of cover, and other factors
as appropriate to each specific case.
If citrus exposed to deposition is consumed, it poses a potential
health effect to man. Contaminated citrus fruit surfaces are not readily
washable with water. In contrast with the fruit, plutonium was readily
washed away from leaf surfaces (Subsection B.6.2.3, Appendix B).
Mitigation of contaminated citrus fruit could include collection and
disposal of the contaminated fruit according to Federal and State
regulations. To prevent future contamination of citrus crops and protect
the safety of workers, the trees could be washed down to remove Pu0) from
the leaves and soil added around the trees. Future citrus crops co01d be
monitored for Pu0) contamination before sold on the market (Subsection
B.6.2.3, Appendix-B).
Surface contamination levels may impact the recharge areas of the
surflclal aquifer. The surflclal aquifer serves as the potable water source
for the cities of Titusville, Mims, and Palm Bay. In addition, many wells
on private land use the surflclal aquifer as a source of water. Pu0) could
contaminate this aquifer, but analysis of groundwater flow and sedlm_nt
leaching indicate it is unlikely, especially for any contamination to reach
the wellheads of municipal water supplies. It is highly unlikely that any
contamination on the KSC will reach offslte wells. Transport through the
underlying aquatard to the lower Floridan aquifer is considered very
unlikely (Subsection B.6.2.3, Appendix B).
Mitigation could include monitoring of contamination profiles of the
soil in aquifer recharge areas to determine if the PuO) is migratory to the
water table. If the monitoring shows a high probabillfy of migration, areas
may be scraped to below the contamination depth and the spoil disposed of
properly. Private wells in the area of deposition could be monitored and
alternative water supplies could be developed if water supplies are
impacted.
The areas of land cover used by man (e.g., buildings, roads, ornamental
vegetation, and grass areas) that are contaminated could be monitored to
determine the decontamination or mitigation action necessary. Mitigation
actions could prevent the immediate return of the population to their homes
and workplaces. Cleanup actions could last from several days to several
months. Historical and archaeological resources, both known and unknown,
could receive deposition. KSC facilities that have historical significance,
and are not damaged in the blast, could also receive deposition. Presently
unknown archaeological sites could be affected by the cleanup actions under-
taken in those areas. Plutonium dioxide also has a long-ter_ affect on
future investigation at any archaeological slte (Subsection B.6.2.3,
Appendix B).
4-31
Plutonium dioxide ts generally considered highly Insoluble, therefore,
tt is not expected to react chemically with the water column. As a result,
the 15 pCi/l water quality standard applicable to all Florida waters (NASA
1986) Is not expected to be exceeded for the waters surrounding Merritt
Island. Some of the waters surrounding Merritt Island are considered
Outstanding Florida Waters. Waters with thls classification are subject to
water quality standards based upon either existing water quality or the
designated surface water standard, whichever is higher. This level of
protection is intended to prohibit land and/or water use activities that
would degrade the water quality of the resource so designated.
Mitigation of PuO_tmpacts could tnclude &onttoring small and shallow
water bodies close to fiuman activity, and draining and removing sediment if
a threat to man ts identified. Larger bodies of ponded water could be moni-
tored and skimmed to remove surfictal film, if necessary. Additional
monitoring to determine the need for water and/or sediment removal could be
required. Recreational water activities could be restricted in larger water
bodies until monitoring results indicate it tssafe for them to be resumed.
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The bounding economic cost of each representative case accident for
Phases 0 and 1 are presented tn Appendix B (Subsection B.6.2.3). In all
cases, the minimum cost would be the monitoring program. Thts program is
estimated to cost $1 million tn the first year, $500,000 tn the second year,
$250,000 tn the third year, and $100,000 per year after the third (Appendix
B, Table B-18). These numbers may be somewhat less for Phase 0 and somewhat
more for Phase ] since the areas contaminated in the Phase ] accidents are
greater (Subsection B.6.2.3, Appendix B).
The majOrity of contamination resulting from Phase 0 most probable,
maximum, and expectation case accidents Is confined to the KSC site. The
economic impacts from these accidents will therefore be confined to KSC
facilities and operations. Cleanup, as a mitigation measure, applies to
areas contaminated at 25 mrem/yr or above. For the purposes of estimating
cleanup costs for Phase 0 and Phase 1, the areas exceeding a dose rate of 25
mrem/yr at "Year 2" as developed by FSAR modeling (DOE I98ga) were utilized
(see Appendix B, Sections B.5.3 and B.6.2.3). This Is consistent with draft
EPA guidance for nuclear incidents (EPA 1988) for the period I to 50 years
post-incident when cleanup activities would commence. The first year
following the incident would be devoted largely to monitoring, remedial
action planning and, as needed, population relocation. Phase 0 modeling
yielded no areas contaminated at this level at "Year 2" (DOE 198ga), thus
cleanup costs are noted as zero. These estimates and the 25 mrem/yr dose
levels are merely indicative. Actual monitoring at the time, as well as
cleanup standards agreed upon among the concerned authorities, wlll
establish the actual areas of cleanup.
The Phase 1 maximum case has the highest level of impacts on the KSC
and vicinity. Table B-2] tn Appendix B provides a breakdown of the economic
cost associated wtth the Phase ] cases. The costs for the most probable and
expectation cases are zero because the model showed no areas contaminated at
the cleanup level at "Year 2" (DOE 1989a). The maximumcase has total
estimated costs ranging between $0.2 m111Ion to $36 million.
The maximum cost of $36 million is primarily for the cleanup of urban
lands ($22 million). Since the majority of the deposition Is estimated to
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.occur on KSC property, the_a6tuai-costsprobablyw6uld be toward the low end
of the cost range. Secondary costs for Urban uses on the KSC probably will
not be five times the cleanup costs. All agriculture on the KSC is citrus
production on leased land and the urban areas are Industrial areas. Impacts
to wetlands and natural areas on the KSC could be Isolated by controlling
access rather thanremOvalandrestoration. Ocean cieanup costs would be
limited to search and removal of large particles. This ts also estimated to
be at the lower end of the cost range.
!
L-
E
It should benoted that the cleanup costs estimated for the purposes of
this EIS are based upon cleanup to a level of 25 mrem/yr. The 25 mrem/yr
level was selected as a reasonable level for illustrative purposes in the
EIS on the basis of adoption of this level by Federal agencies for the
protection of radiation workers, and the public, from releases associated
with the land disposal of radioactive wastes (10 CFR 61.41) from
radionuclide em(sslons from DOE facilitles (40 CFR 61.92) and as associated
with the management and disposal of spent nuclear fuel, hlgh-level waste, and
transuranic waste (40 CFR 191.15). In addition, the 25 mrem/yr level is
one-fourth of the I00 mrem/yr continuous exposure level recommended by the
National Council on Radiation Protection and Space Measurement (NCRPSM 1987,
p. 44) as an "acceptable risk" for latent cancer mortality risk to
individual members of the public over their lifetime. Actual cleanup levels
will depend upon a number of factors, such as the location and use of the
specific area contaminated, potential threat to the public, evaluation of
the specific exposure pathways, and the specific particle size distribution
of the contamination. As stated earlier, cleanup actions would be taken in
accordance with the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
L|abilityAct through whlchcleanup levels and actions will be developed in
a publicly available decision document.
@....
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: Assessment of Global Impacts .......
_ This section presents the environmental consequences of Phases 2, 3, 4
and 5. Since the exact location of areas of deposition cannot be
determined, locatton-specificlmpactsare not described. A general
discussion of the impacts and possible mitigation measures are presented.
L_
L
.... Global impactsvary f÷6m-on-e-module impacting land for the most
probable accidents in Phases 2, 3, and 4, and one, two, and two modules
impacting land In the maximum case for Phases 2, 3 and 4, respectively.
Phase 5, three GISs could impact for the most probable and maximum cases
(Section B.4.2, Appendix B).
For
A reentry accident during Phases 3, 4 and 5 would Involve spacecraft
failure and breakup. Atmospheric reentry speed and spacecraft breakup rate
will likely result tn PuOz modules or GISs being released at different
locations during reentry. These independent release points will result in
impact areas that may be separated by many thousands of kilometers. Except
for Phase 5, the areas involved are less th_n 1 km_ (0.36 m_). For Phase
5, each impact area would average 4 to 5 kmL (1.4 to 1.8 mt_). Cleanup
costs were not estimated for Phase =2 through Phase 5 accidentsdue to the
uncertainties involved in defining the specific types of land cover
involved. I tshould be 6o_ed thatthe Federal government would, however,
respond to such accidents with the technical assistance and support needed
to cleanup and remedtate the affected areas and populations.
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Deposition from the Phase 2, 3 and 4 cases does not exceed the cleanup
level at "Year 2". For Phases 2, 3 and 4, the vast bulk of deposition that
exceeds the screening levels occurs on dry land.
The deposition that exceeds the screening level for Phase 5 accidents
occurs on dry land and inland water_ The landareas impacted vary from 8.9
ka,t for the maximum case to 14.7 Icm_ for the expectation case. The areas
which could exceed the cleanup level at "Year 2" (DOE ]989a) consist of 0.64
kant in the most probable and expectation cases, and zero tn the maximum
case.
4.1.4.6 Additional Mitigation Measures for Accidents ....
Emeraencv ResDonse Planntnq
For missions involving space nuclear power, comprehensive radiologtcal
contingency plans must and will be developed to address all launch/landing
phase accidents involving the RTGs and RHUs. These plans are developed
through the combined efforts of various government agencies, including NASA,
DOE, the Department of Defense, the EPA, and the State of Florida, and
are formulated to conform to the Federal Radiologtcal Emergency Response
Plan (FRERP) (NASA ]985b). These plans are being updated for the Galileo
missions based on the results of the new FSAR. Development and
implementation of these plans wtll ensure the availability of appropriate
response personnel, equipment, facilities, and procedures in the event of a
launch accident. Before the plans are finalized, they will be extensively
reviewed by Federal, state and local authorities. NASA has scheduled
completion of the planning for late Spring ]g8g. It would be premature at
this time to quote detailed or quantitative materials from the draft plans.
The primary objectives during the early phases of an accident are to
determine whether a release of radioactive materials has occurred, to assess
and characterize the extent of the release, to predict the propagation of
the released material, and to formulate/recommend mitigating actions to
safeguard humans and the environment from the consequences of the release.
Another objective is to locate and recover the RTGs. These objectives will
be achieved through the evaluation and analysis of real-time data provided
by mobile fteld monitoring teams and ground air-sampling stations, airborne
monitoring and surveillance aircraft, ground and airborne meteorological
stations, and computerized dispersion modeling.
Follow-on objectives would be to isolate contaminated areas, recover
the fuel materials, and decontaminate and/or recover affected areas,
facilities, equipment, and properties.
Other Methods of Ltmtttnq the Potential Conseouences of Accidents
In addition to post-launch activities, there are other options
available to NASA to mitigate the consequences of prelaunch and launch-
ascent (Phase 0 and I, respectlvely) accidents. For Instance, further
restrlctlons on spectator location and meteorological launch criteria could
further reduce the already low consequences. NASA has studied both types of
restrictlon and has found them to be unnecessary at this time. Host
spectator locations are off of KSC property and are In public areas, making
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further access restrictions difficult without legislation. Spectators at
KSC proper are no closer than 4 miles from the launch pad. In fact, except
for essential launch personnel, no one is allowed within about 4 miles of
the launch pad during Phase O. With initiation of STS fuel loading at the
start of Phase O, a Blast Danger Area is established which extends about
4,500 feet from the launch pad. Only critical launch crews (i.e., the
fllght crew, close-out crew, ice inspection team; about IO people total) are
allowed within this area Just prior to the launch (NASA Ig88). At about 30
minutes before launch, the Launch Impact Limit Llne is established,
extending to about 15,000 feet from the launch pad. A total of about go
people are allowed within that line to support the launch. All personnel
within this area are provided with protective equipment including
communlcatlons and breathing apparatus. At the time of launch, only the
flight crew, the rescue crew, and launch-support personnel are within the
Launch Impact Limit Line. The rescue crew is stationed about 5,000 feet
from the launch pad in an armored vehicle. Thus, the number of people in
close proximity to the launch pad is kept to the absolute minimum during
Phase O. In addition, the extensive analyses and accident modeling
conducted for the Galileo mission by DOE (DOE 1988a, DOE ]988b, DOE 198ga,
DOE 1988d, DOE 1988e), indicate that the collective dose from a pre-launch
Phase 0 accident (see T_bles 4-5, 4-6 and 4-7) would not exceed the "de
mlnlmis" or "below regulatory concern" level of 1 mrem/yr currently under
consideration by both DOE and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (DOE lg88d).
Given the extremely low total probability o_ a release of RTG fuel in a pre-launch Phase 0 accident (total probability 5X10"_, or 5 in 10 million) and
the extremely low dose that would ensue, it is difficult to Justify
additional access restrictions on KSC, much less in offsite areas. Certain
Phase ] accidents also may affect KSC and the vicinity. In general,
mitigation measures will be developed and documented in NASA Federal
radiologtcal emergency response plans for the Galileo mission.
NASA remains open to further consideration of meteorological
constraints on the Galileo launch in order to mitigate or minimize the
effects of a prelaunch, launch, or ascent phase accident. _owever, in view
of the very low doses calculated for the maximum case (see Table 4-6), NASA
does not, at this time, envision further restrictions to already short (as
little as 5 mlnutes) daily launch periods.
In general, in vtew of the low probability of adverse consequences,
further launch constraints have not been imposed.
4.1.4.7 Limitations and Uncertainties of the Accident Analyses
The safety analyses performed in support of the launch of the Galileo
spacecraft with RTGs and RHUs on board are unquestionably some of the most
detailed and elaborate ever performed in support of a spacecraft launch.
Significant effort went into the analyses to ensure that they were both
reasonable and conservative. Even so, there are still uncertainties in the
estimation of the probabilities of releases, the amount of material
released, and the consequences to man and the environment from those
releases. As a part of the safety analysis process, an attempt was made to
identify the degree of confidence with each of the major assumptions, the
limitations of the analyses, and the impacts of these uncertainties and
limitations on the overall probabilities and consequence estimates. This
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uncertainty analysis is included as Appendix H of Vol. II] of the FSAR
(DOE I98ga) and is summarized in Section B.4.2 of Appendix B.
The factors affecting estimates of radtologtcal consequences and
mission risks that were evaluated include the following:
e
e
Accident scenario
- Accident environment
- Acddent probability
Release characterization
- Conditional source term probability
- Source term
- Modifications to the source term and particle stze
distribution because of mechanical, chemical and physical
interaction prior to deposition
-Parttcle stze distribution
- Initial cloud dimensions
Vertical source term distribution
- Release location
Meteorological conditions
- Atmospheric stability
- Wind speed and direction
-Mtxtng height
Sea-breeze rectrculatton
Fumigation
- Space and time variation
e Exposure pathway parameters
Population distribution
- Resuspenston factor
. Deposition velocity
Vegetable ingestion
- Protective action
e Radiation dose and health effects
Internal dose factors
Health effects estimator.
Estimates were made of the uncertainty of each of these factors and
then combined to determine the overall uncertainty associated with the
various types of radtologtcal consequences and mission phase risks.
Table 4-]0 presents the overall mean uncertainty factors and the associated
ranges for both the consequences and mission risks. The uncertainty
analysis implies, for example, that the best estimate for the mean total
population dose for the expectation case ts actually about 23 percent of the
value quoted earlier tn Table 4-7. Referring to Table 4-7, the population
dose for Phase 1 was 82] person-teN. The best estimates mean total
population dose utilizing the uncertainty factor from Table 4-10 then
becomes 0.23 X 821 - ]88.8 person-rem, or 23 percent of 82] person-rem. The
5 percent to 95 percent uncertainty range for that mean total population
dose best estimate varies from 0.67 percent to 790 percent (i.e., the 0.0067
to 7.90 range noted in Table 4-]0), of the value quoted earlier (821 person-
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(TABLE 4-10. OVERALL UNCERTAINTY ANALYSIS RESULTS
Result Type
Overall Uncertainty Factor
Mean Range b
w
I
L
e Radtological consequences a
- Short-term population dose
- Long-term population dose
- Total population dose
- Health effects
, Surface contamination area
Mtssion phase rtsk b
Phase 1
- Short-term population dose
- Long-term population dose
- Total population dose
- Health effects
- Surface contamination area
Phases O. 2-5
- Short-term population dose
- Long-term population dose
- Total population dose
- Health effects
- Surface contamination area mean
0.25 0.013 - 4.6
0.22 0.0042 - 1.4
0.23 0.0067 - 7.9
0.23 0.0063 - 8.5
0.75 0.051 - 5.2
0.42 0.061 - 2.9
0.37 0.024 - 5.7
0.39 0.035 - 4.3
0.39 0.032 - 4.8
1.3 0.22 - 7.8
0.25 0.055 - 1.1
0.22 0.019 - 2.5
0.23 0.029 - 1.8
0.23 0.026 - 2.0
1.75 0.20 - 2.9
Source: DOE 1989a
L
_r
_z
a. The mean uncertainty factor for radiological consequences multiplies the
expectation case results (Table 4-7) to yield a best estimate mean of
the expectation case results. The original expectation case result
should also be multiplied by the uncertainty factor range to yield a
best estimate of the 5- and 95-percentile values of the range of
radiological consequences that feed into the best estimate for the
expectation case results.
b. The mean uncertainty factor for mission phase risk multiplies the
mission phase risk results (Table 4-8) to yield a best estimate mean of
mission phase risk (defined as total probability times expectation case
_ results) The original mission phase risk results should also be
multiplied by the uncertainty factor range to yield a best estimate of
the 5- and 95-percentile values of the best estimate for the mission
phase risk.
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rem). For Phase 1 mission risk, the uncertainty range is larger with the
mean total population dose from Table 4-10 being 3g percent of the
estimation case estimate, and the range varying from 3.5 percent to 430
percent of that estimate. In terms of mission risk for Phase 0 and Phases 2
through 5, the mean total population dose is 23 percent of the estimation
case estimate, and the range varying from 2.9 percent to 180 percent of that
estimate.
These uncertainty estimates imply that the overall mission rtsk is
sttll low even when the gs percentile uncertainty estimates are Included.
Table 4-10 implies that at the 95 percent confidence level, the overall
consequence and risk estimates presented in these sections are unlikely to
be low by much more than a factor of I0.
In addition to the uncertainty analysis conducted in the FSAR, there
are ongoing analyses being conducted by the NASA/DOEproject and NASA/
DOE internal review groups that could broaden (or narrow) the uncertainty
range of accident consequences. The currently known areas of further
analyses include: (1) probability of various accident scenarios, (2) SRB
fragment velocities, (3) fragment structural interactions, (4) RTG impact
response models, (5) RTG response to VEEGAreentry, and (6) radtologtcal
transport models. It is impossible to quantify the results of these further
assessments, a priori, but tt ts likely that there will be some change to
the uncertainty results in the Final EIS.
4.2 NO-ACTION ALTERNATIVE
There are no environmental impacts associated wlth the No-Actlon
alternative; however, there are major economic, programmatic, and geo-
political consequences of such a cancellation. Through FY Ig88 (i.e.,
through September 30, 1987), NASA will have expended approximately $800
million on the Galileo program. Cancellation would mean the abandonment of
that investment and a loss of the anticipated scientific gains.
Currently, the United States has a clear lead in the exploration of the
outer planets. Programmatically, there are currently no back-up missions
that could achieve Galileo's scientific goals within this century, as there
are no other approved U.S. missions to the outer planets. Thus, the United
States would forego detailed scientific knowledge of the unique environments
of Jupiter.
Galileo was started in 1977 and many scientists, engineers, and
technicians have devoted a large share of their professional lives working
on this project. From a human perspective, it would be unfortunate to cancel
the program when there ts no clear evidence of adverse environmental impacts
that would Justify such a cancellation.
4.3 SUMMARY OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES
The proposed action Is the completion of preparations and operation of
the Galileo mission, including its launch on the STS/IUS in October 198g.
The alternatlve to the proposed action is no-action; that is, to terminate
further commitment of resources to the mission. The only expected
m
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environmental consequences are associated with a normal launch. These
impacts have been treated elsewhere tn NASA NEPAdocumentation and have been
deemed to be Insufficient to preclude Shuttle operations.
In the event of an accident during launch and deployment, or
inadvertent reentry during Earth flyby, there are potential adverse health
and environmental effects associated with the posstble release of plutonium
from RTGs and PJtUs. An intensive analysis of the proposed action indicated
that health and environmental risks stemming from such accidents are small
compared to the risks from natural events. The Individual risk of cancer
fatality ts estimated asno greater than about ! tn 108,000,000.
4.4 ADVERSE ENVIRONMENTALEFFECTS THAT CANNOTBE AVOIDED
During the normal launch, hydrogen chlortde wtll be produced by the
soltd rocket boosters. Thts wtll ltkely produce short-term acidification of
the mosquito control ponds near the launch pad and deposition on nearby
vegetation. The airborne concentrations of alumtnum oxide particulates
within the launch cloud wtll exceed air quality standards (see Table 3-3)
for a short period, but wtll be below levels of exposure considered
hazardous by the National Academy of Sciences. No significant deterioration
tn ambient atr quality has been recorded at the two PAHS monitoring stations
located 3 and 5 miles from Launch Complex 39, however. The deposition could
result tn some vegetation damage near the launch pad, and posstble ftsh
ktlls tn onstte ponds near the launch pad. Launch of the Galileo mission
will contribute to long-term changes in species richness in the near-field
environment that will be experienced with the resumption of STS launches at
Launch Complex 39.
In the event of an accident, tt ts posstble that some areas could be
contaminated by plutonium. The probability of this occurring ts predicted
to be less than 1 in 10 mtllton. If such an accident did occur,
decontamination of ]and, vegetation, and buildings could be required, and
costs would be incurred.
4.5 RELATIONSHIP BETWEENSHORT-TEPJ4USESOF MAN'S ENVIRONMENTAND THE
MAINTENANCEAND ENHANCEMENTOF LONG-TERMPRODUCTIVITY
4.5.1 Short-TermUses
The affected environment, for the short term, tncludes the KSC and
surrounding areas. The short-term uses of the area tnclude NASA operations,
a fish and wildltfe refuge, citrus groves, residential communities, and
recreational areas. Theproposed action will be conducted tn accordance
with past and ongoing NASA procedures for operations at the launch stte.
4.5.2 Lonq-Term Productivity
The KSC region will continue to support citrus groves and wildlife
habitat, as well as human activities. The proposed action should have no
long-term effect on such uses. Successful completion of the project,
however, may have an Impact on the future of the space program and the
continued economic stability of Merrttt Island and the surrounding areas.
Both the human and biotic ecosystems are expected to maintain their
harmonious productivity.
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A potentially large benefit to be gained from successful completion of
this project ts a better understanding of Earth through exploratfon and
study of the environments of other planets.
4.6 IRREVERSIBLE AND IRRETRIEVABLE COMMITMENT OF RESOURCES
4.6.1 Iridium
A total of 270 troy ounces of iridium are contained tn the two Galileo
RTGs. Thts amount represents approximately 0.0001 percent of the discovered
reserves of thts metal tn the world. Based on a cost of $600 per troy
ounce, the 1982 market price of iridium (DOI 1982), approximately $162,000
worth of iridium would be Irreversibly committed to the Galileo and Ulysses
missions.
Essentially all platinum-group metals, including iridium, are recycled
tn domestic use, resulting tn a small percentage loss. Consequently, the
total supply available does not appreciably decrease wtth time, as ts the
case with less precious materials that are not aggressively recycled. The
United States maintains a strategic stockpile of trtdtum and, at the end of
1973, had an inventory of 17,000 troy ounces (NASA 1985b). Although the
amount of iridium lost tn the successful implementation of the missions
would represent about 1.6 percent of the current U.S. stockpile, thts amount
could eastly be replaced from the world supply through current sources.
4.6.2 Plutonium-238
Each RTG contains approximately 17.8 pounds of plutonium-238 tn the
form of plutonium dioxide. Successful Implementation of the Galileo mission
therefore would result tn the loss of approximately 35.6 pounds of
plutontum-238.
The element plutonium is produced tn nuclear reactors on an as needed
basis by DOE. ThereFore, although the launching of the RTGs represents a
commitment of plutonium-238 resources that will never be recovered, addi-
tional plutonium-238 can be manufactured tn nuclear reactors.
4.6.3 OCher Materials
The total quantities of other materials tn the payloads that would be
irreversibly and irretrievably committed to the Galileo missions are
relatively minor. These materials consist primarily of steel, aluminum,
titanium, iron, molybdenum, plastic, glass, nickel, chromium, lead, zinc,
and copper, as well as small quantities of silver, mercury, gold, and
platinum.
mm
1
m
"1
m
From
t|
!
qF
4-40
m
wL_
L_
u
+!!
m
E
w
5. CONTRIBUTORS TO THE EIS
This Envlronmental Impact Statement (EIS) was prepared by Code EL of
the Office of Space Science and Applications of the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration (NASA). The organizations and individuals listed below
contributed inputs for use by NASA Code EL in the preparation of this
document. Table 5-I summarizes, for each contributor, the sectlonsof the
EIS for which inputs were prepared.
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Na_lonal Aeronautics and Space Administration
Dudley McConnel 1, Ph.D. Deputy Director for Advanced Program
Studies, Code EL
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Member, Technical Staff
Kennedy Space Center
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Alfred Mowery, Ph.D.
Director, Office of Speclal Applications
Safety Program Manager
Science AnollcatlQns InternBtlon_l Corporation
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Douglas Outlaw, Ph.D.
Barry Nichols
Dennis Ford, Ph.D.
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Senior Environmental Analyst
NUS Project Manager
Senior Executive Consultant
Senior Executive Consultant
Environmental Scientist
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6. AGENCIES AND INDIVIDUALS CONSULTED
This ftnal Environmental Impact_Statement(EIS)_was made available
for review and comment by Federal, state, and local agencies and the publtc,
as applicable. The 45-day comment period closed on February 21, 1989. All
information received was considered during the preparation of this Final
EIS. Responses to comments received are presented in Appendix D. Comments
were solicited or received from the following:
Federal Agencies:
Council on Environmental Quality
Federal Emergency Management Agency
National Academy of Sciences
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Management and Budget
U.S. Department of the Air Force
U.S. Department of Commerce
U.S. Department of Defense
U.S. Department of Energy
U.S. Department of Health and Human Servlces-Centers for Disease Control
U.S. Department of the Interior
U.S. Department of State
U.S. Department of Transportation
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
State Agencies:
Florida Department of Environmental Regulation
East Central Florida Regional Planning Council
Intergovernmental Coordination--Offlce of the Governor of
California
State of Florida, Office of the Governor
State of New Mexico
Local Agencies:
Brevard County: Board of Commissioners
Economic Development Council
Planning and Zoning Department
Canaveral Port Authority
Cape Canaveral, Clty of
Cocoa, City of
Titusvtlle, City of
Organizations:
Air Pollution Control Association
Brevardians for Peace and Justice
Center for Law and Soctal Policy
Christlc Institute
Citizens for Peace In Space
Citizens to Stop Plutonium in Space
Common Cause
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Concern, Inc,
Environmental Policy Institute
Federation of Amerlcan Scientists
Florida Coalition for Peace and Justice
Florida Defenders of the Environment
Friends of the Earth
National Wildlife Federation
Natural Resources Defense Council
Physicians for Soctal Responsibility
Project Censored
Radioactive Waste Campaign
SANE
Sandia National Laboratory
Sierra Club
Sierra Club, Flortda Chapter
The Committee to Bridge the Gap
The Planetary Society
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AFO
AOA
ATO
CCAFS
CELV
Ct
cm
DEIS
DOD
DOE
Eh
EIS
EPA
ESMC
ET
FAST
FC
FEIS
FDER
FRERP
f/s
FSAR
FTS
FWPF
g
Abort-From-Orbit
Abort-Once-Around
Abort-To-Orbit
_T
Cape Canaveral Air Force Station
Complementary Expendable Launch Vehicle, or Titan IV
Curie
centimeter
Draft Environmental Impact Statement
Department of Defense
Department of Energy
Theoretric equilibrium electrical potential
Environmental Impact Statement
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
Eastern Space and Missile Center
External Tank
Failure/Abort Sequence Tree
Fueled clad
Final Environmental Impact Statement
Florida Department of Environmental Regulations
Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan
feet per second
Final Safety Analysis Report
Flight Termination System
fine weave, pierced fabric
gram
A-I
GIS
GPHS
INSRP
IUS
JPL
JSC
KSC
k,m/s
LES 8/9
LWRHU
MECO
MET
MMH
m/s
MSA
NAS
NASA
NEPA
NOAA
NOI
NRC
NSTS
OMS
OSTP
PAM
PAMS
ppm
Graphite impact shell
General Purpose Heat Source
Interagency Nuclear Safety Review Panel
Inertial Upper Stage
Jet Propulsion Laboratory
Johnson Space Center
Kennedy Space Center
kilometers per second
Lincoln Laboratory Experimental Satellite 8 and g
Light Weight Radioisotope Heater Unit
main engine cutoff
Mission elapsed time
Monomethyl hydrazine
meters per second
Metropolitan Statistical Area
National Academy of Sciences
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
National Environmental Policy Act
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
Notice of Intent
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
National Space Transportation System
Orbital Maneuvering System
Office of Science and Technology Policy
Payload Assist Module
Permanent Air Monitoring Station
parts per million
A-2
lira
PSAR
psi
Pu
PuO2
RCRA
RHU
ROD
RPM
RSO
RTG
RTLS
SAR
SER
SNAP
SRB
SRM
SSME
STS
TAL
USFWS
VAFB
VEEGA
VEGA
W
WIND
Preliminary Safety Analysis Report
pounds per square inch
Plutonium
Plutonium dioxide
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (1978)
Radioisotope Heater Unit
Record of Decision
Retropulsion module
Range Safety Officer
Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator
Return to Launch Site (abort)
Safety Analysis Report
Safety Evaluation Report
Space Nuclear Auxiliary Power
Solid Rocket Booster
Solid Rocket Motor
Space Shuttle Main Engine
Space Transportation System
Transoceanic Abort Landing
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
Vandenberg Air Force Base
Venus-Earth-Earth-Gravity-Assist
Venus-Earth-Gravity-Assist
Watt
Weather Information Network Display
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APPENDIX B
LAUNCH VEHICLE ACCIDENT_ANALYSIS AND RTG ACCIDENT
ANALYSIS/CONSEQUENCES ASSESSMENT FOR THE STS
LAUNCH VEHICLE AND PAD DESCRIPTION
B.].] General De_¢rlotion
The Galileo spacecraft is planned for launch by the Space
Transportation System/two-stage Inertial Upper Stage (STS/IUS) combination.
The STS configuration consists of the Shutt_Ie orbiter, its main External
Tank (ET) and two solid propellant rocket boosters (SRBs) (see Figures B-1
and B-2). The main External Tanki(ET) contains liquid oxygen and hydrogen
propellants. The STS configuration produces approximately 6,925,000 pounds
of thrust at sea level.
The Shuttle orbiter is launched from pad 39B, which is located in a
wetlands environment at the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) in Florida. (See
Section 3 fora detailed description Of the launch area environment.) As
shown in Figures B-3 and B-4, the launch pad is bordered by a paved, roughly
circular roadway approximately i,200 feet from the center of the pad. The
surface of the launch pad is constructed of concrete and stands
approximately 48 feet above the ground. An approximately 14,000 square foot
steel launch platform, called the service structure, supports the Shuttle.
This structure consists of a fixed portion (called the launch tower) and a
movable portion which rotates clear of the Shuttle during pre-launch
operations. Two steel structures, the liquid hydrogen and oxygen
facilities, are located northeast and northwest of the pad, respectively.
Inside the ],200-foot radius roadway surrounding the pad are a series of
concrete roads and support buildings that extend radially from the pad. The
remainder and majority of the launch complex area consists of sand.
A flame trench and exhaust channel are located under the launch
platform and terminate at an exhaust deflector structure (see Figure B-4).
To the northeast, approximately 300 feet from the pad, lies an elevated
water tank. This tank supplies water to protect the pad from the high
temperatures generated during main englneand SRB ignitions.
B.1.2 Launch/Fliqht Sequence
The Shuttle orbiter, along with its External Tank and two SRBs, are
launched tn the following sequence. At 6 seconds before launch -- denoted
"T-6" or "T-6 MET" (Mission Elapsed Time) -- the main engines will be
ignited. At T-40 milliseconds, the two SRBs wtll be ignited. At T+7
seconds the Shuttle wtll clear the launch tower. The SRBs will burn out and
separate from the External Tank at T+128 seconds.
The main engines w111_contlnue to provide thrust until T+500 seconds
at which time they will shut down. After the ET is released (at
approximately T+528 seconds), the Shuttle's Orbital Maneuvering System (OMS)
engines will be fired to establish and circularize the Shuttle in orbit.
Approximately g hours after launch and in approximately the sixth orbit of
Earth, the Galileo spacecraft and its IUS will be deployed from the orbiter.
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FIGURE B-3. LAUNCH PAD 39B AT KSC
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FIGURE B-4. LAUNCH PAD PHOTOGRAPH SHOWING SPACE SHUTTLE AND BOTH
...... FIXED AN__;MOVEAB-L£SERVICE STRUCTURES
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Once the orbiter has moved a safe distance away, the IUS will be ignited.
The sequential ignition and burn of the two stages of the IUS will take the
Galileo spacecraft out of Earth orbit and place it on a trajectory for
Venus. Once the Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator (RTG) booms have been
deployed and the spacecraft stabilized, the Galileo spacecraft will separate
from the IUS and continue on its trajectory, ...........................................
Table B-] lists the normal sequence of events that lead to placement of
the Galileo spacecraft on its planned interplanetary trajectory, with
reference to the mission phases used for accident analyses.
TABLE B-]. NOMINAL MISSION SEQUENCE (CONDENSED)
Phase Sequence Time
Start Propellant Loading
Auto Launch Sequence Begins
0 Orbiter Main Engines Ignition
SRBs Ignition
Launch
Orbiter Clears Tower
I Orbiter Over Water
SRBs Burnout
SRBs Separation
L Orbiter Main Engine Cutoff
First OMS Burn (To Orbit)
3 Begin Ascent Coast
Second OMS Burn (Orbit Circularlzation)
Spacecraft/IUS Deployment
4____ Interplanetary Injection
5 2nd Earth Flyby
T-8.S hours
T-3] seconds
T-6.6 seconds
T-40 mi)liseconds
T-O seconds
T+7 seconds
....... T+34se_o_ds_
T+]]g seconds _l'
T+]25 seconds
T+5]4 seconds
T+634 seconds
T+802 seconds
T+E,770 seconds
T+6 hours, 40 minutes
T+7 hours, 28 minutes
T+38 months
B.I.2.1 Trajectory/Flight Characteristics to Orbit
The Shuttle orbiter, containing the Galileo spacecraft and its lUS,
will be launched with an approximate 70-degree azimuth. This means that the
Shuttle's initial ground-track (i.e., the path it flies over the surface of
the Earth) will be 70 degrees from true north. A 70-degree launch azimuth
will give the Shuttle an orbital inclination of approximately 34 degrees as
measured from the equator; in other words, the 70-degree launch azimuth will
allow the Shuttle to fly as far north as points along the 34-degree north
parallel (i.e., Cape Canaveral's latitude) and as far south as points along
they 34-degree south parallel.
B.].3 Ranqe Safety
The primary range safety objective is to preclude the ground impact of
intact launch vehicles or their component parts which could endanger human
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life or cause damage to property. All Shuttle launches carry a flight
termination system which allows the Range Safety Officer, through monitoring
systems, ground transmitters, and tracking systems, to determine whether the
launch vehicle poses an imminent threat to people or property. In the event
that the launch vehicle violates established flight safety criteria, the Range
Safety Officer can control the launch vehicle's flight path by destroying the
vehicle.
B.].3.] Fltght Vehicle Range Safety System
The Space Shuttle Flight Termination System allows the intentional
destruction of the SRBs and ET if the flight deviates too far outside the
nominal or established fltght limits. On radio command from the Range
Safety Officer, linear shaped charges rupture the two tanks in the ET as
well as the cases of the SRBs. The onboard systems for the three elements
(one ET and two SRBs) are all interconnected so that, if either SRB receives
a destruct, all three receive it.
Based on past experience and the combined functioning of the ground and
flight portions of the Safety System, a delay of at least 4 and 1/2 seconds
wtll occur between the time a Shuttle vehicle is determined to require
destruct action and when the destruct event actually occurs.
B.2 MISSION ACCIDENTS
B.2.! Accident Scenario Definition ADDroach
A systematic approach was utilized to identify those credible accident
scenarios that might occur. The Shuttle system was divided into its major
elements: Launch Support Equipment, Payload, Orbiter, ET, SRBs, Space
Shuttle Main Engine (SSME)/Liquid Propellant System, and Range Safety
Destruct System. Each of these elements was further divided into its major
failure components. Credible failure modes refer to those which generally
cause loss of the vehicle and may produce an environment which is a
potential threat to the RTG(s). These are generally single point failures
in systems or subsystems which cannot be mitigated by astronaut intervention
or other pre-planned system overrides. These failure modes represent
exceptions to the program requirement of slngle-failure tolerance. They
have been accepted by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA) technical and program management and by the contractor, after
extensive review indicating that they were impractical or impossible to
eliminate. Representative accident scenarios were defined by grouping
similar vehicle responses which resulted from each of the credible failure
modes for the six major phases of the STS/Galileo mission. The potential
accident scenarios are listed in Table B-2 and described below as summarized
from NASA 1988.
B.2.2 Phase 0 Accident Scenarios (Pre-Launch)
Phase 0 accidents can occur between propellant loading and launch,
typically from T-8 hours to T-O seconds or launch. A pad fire or a pad
explosion are the primary accidents of concern. The causes for either
accident are the same, being linked to failures in launch support equipment,
vehicle structural failures, propellant contamination, and inadvertent
destruct activation. The latter accident could occur only after destruct
arming in the last 20 seconds before launch.
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TABLE B-2. VEHICLE CATASTROPHIC ACCIDENTS EVALUATED IN SAFETY ANALYSIS
IB
II
Phase Description Accident
i
0 Prelaunch to Launch
Ascent
Second Stage
On-orbit
Payload Deploy
Venus-Earth-Earth-
Gravity Assist
Maneuver
Inadvertent Range Safety System destruct
Fire/explosion
Solid Rocket Booster failure
Range Safety System destruct
Aft compartment explosion
Vehicle breakup
Crash landing
Ocean ditching
Orbiter failure
External Tank failure
Space Shuttle main engine failure
Payload failure
Range Safety System destruct
Crash Landing
Ocean ditching
Orbiter failure and reentry
IUS Solid Rocket Motor Case burst
IUS Solid Rocket Motor no ignition,
low impulse
IUS Tumbling from separation or
recontact
IUS misaligned burns due to guidance
failure
IUS erratic burns
High-speed reentry of the spacecraft
!
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B.2.3 Phase ] Accident Scenarios (SRB Burn)
Phase i accident _scenarlos represent the period in which the-SRBsare a
primary fallure threat, and the external environments which may be seen by
the RTG can be affected by ground surface interactions. A fallure of the
left SRB In the first 2 seconds can cause vehicle impact with the launch
tower. Between 0 and 10 seconds, a release of ET propellants can cause a
ground surface pool explosion, which is explalned in the followlng
paragraphs. After about 20 seconds, the trajectory of the launch vehicle,
if thrust were stopped, would lead to water Impact rather than land impact.
In addition to vehicle breakup by |nstantaneous failures of the SRBs
or SSHE's aft compartment exploslons, Range Safety System destruct is an
intentional abort action by the Range Safety Officer in the event the
Shuttle vehicle trajectory could result in endangering populated land areas.
Automatlc shutdown of one of the Space Shuttle Main Engines durlng
Phase ] can lead to a Return to Launch Site (RTLS) Intact abort mode. After
SRB separation, the vehicle reverses the direction of flight till such a
time when main engine cutoff (MECO) polnt Is reached which a11ows acceptable
Orblter/ET separation conditions, acceptable ET impact location, and an
acceptable range for the Shuttle to glide back to the Kennedy Space Center.
If a combination of failures occurs which does not allow the Shuttle to
safely return to KSC, the contingency abort plan of crew bailout will occur,
leading to ocean ditch. A Shuttle failure on touchdown can result In a
crash landing.
B.2.4 Phase 2 Accident Scenarios fSSME Burn to MECO)
This phase of the flight starts when the SRBs separate from the vehicle
and extends untll SSHEcutoff (HECO). The primary vehicle catastrophic
_iCcldents-during this period result in vehicle breakup or in failure to
achieve orbit, ]eadlng to uncontrolled reentry.
At altitudes exceeding ]50,000 feet, explosions and fragment
environments are no longer a threat to the RTGs. The SRBs are no longer
attached and formation of explosive mixtures of liquid oxygen and liquid
hydrogen cannot result in explosion overpressures, considering the rarefied
atmosphere. Ballistic reentry of the spacecraft will result in breakup of
the vehicle and release of the RTGs.
Non-catastrophlc shutdown of one or more SSMEs during this phase can
lead to a varlety of Intact or contingency abort modes. The Transoceanlc
Abort landlng (TAt) abort mode is used if a SSME shutdown places the
vehicle beyond the trajectory limits of a RTLS abort yet prior to attaining
an Abort-Once-Around (AOA) or Abort-to-Orblt (ATO) capability. After
selection of this abort mode, the vehicle will continue to accelerate
downrange to the TAt MECO target. After ET separation, the onboard
computers are loaded wlth the entry flight software and the Orbiter glides
to the designated landing site. TAt sites for NSTS-34 (Galileo) are:
e Primary _- Ben Guerir, Morocco
• Alternate - Moron, Spain.
B-g
If a SSME shutdown occurs after the vehicle exceeds the parameters for
a TAL, the Shuttle will attempt to reach the nominal MECO target. A
combination of OtiS engine burns and propellant dumps can be performed to
tncrease powered flight performance. After MECO, the OMS fuel, vehicle
velocity, and velocity required for orbit are evaluated. If performance
margins do not exist for orbit insertion and a subsequent deorbtt, an AOA
maneuver wtll be performed with the OHS engines. The following AOA landing
sites have been identified for NSTS-34:
• Primary
e Alternate
e Alternate
- Edwards Air Force Base, California
- White Sands Space Harbor, New Hextco
- Kennedy Space Center, Florida.
An ATO generally tnvolves loss of propu!s!on late tnthe ascent where
the vehtcle veloctty is adequate to achieve a safe, yet lower than planned
orbit. Since the Shuttle must achieve a specified orbit to perform the
tnittal conditions for IUS injection, tt ts likely that an ATO will result
in transition to an Abort-from-Orbit.
Contingency abort conditions are defined when two Space Shuttle Main
Engines fail prior to single engine TAL capability, or when three engines
fail prior to achieving an AOA capability. These results in a crew bailout
and subsequent ocean ditch of the Orbiter. There is a possibility of
performing an RTLS abort if two or three main engines fail within 20 seconds
after launch, or a TAL, tf three engines fail during the last 30 seconds of
powered flight. However, during the remainder of the ascent phase, two or
three main engine failures result in a contingency abort scenario.
B.2.5 Phase 3 AcclU_nt Scenarios (MECO to IUS deolownent)
Accidents in this phase would occur after vehicle orbit has been
achieved but prior to deployment of the Galtleo/IUS. The accidents of
primary concern are those associated with the Shuttle failures that would
result in orbital decay and eventual uncontrolled reentry. The entry would
be very shallow at a velocity of 26,000 feet per second.
If problems are found with either orbital parameters, the Galileo
spacecraft, or the IUS, that clearly indicate deployment from the Shuttle:
would not result in a successful Earth escape trajectory insertion, then two
options exist. If safe return of the Shuttle ts threatened,the cargo will
be Jettisoned in low Earth orbit. However, if tt is determined no threat
exists to a safe landing, the Shuttle will return with the cargo. The
primary and alternate landing sites given in the AOA section above may be
employed tn this abort mode.
Although abort landing accidents are theoretically possible from Abort
From Orbit (AFO), the probability was considered to be very small compared
to RTLS, TAL, or AOA related accidents because the SSME does not affect AFO,
and time pressures are much reduced. Because of these considerations, and
since the consequences would be no different, a separate treatment was not
included. ..... :: : :
As pointed out in Section 2.2.5, if a healthy spacecraft is left in
Earth orbit, the spacecraft propulsion system can be used to boost the
spacecraft to a long-life orbit in excess of 2,000 years.
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B.2.6 Phase 4 Accident Scenarios (IUS Deplopyment to Earth Escape)
Accidents in this phase would occur between Gallleo/IUS separation from
the Shuttle and Venus-Earth-Earth-Gravity-Assist (VEEGA) trajectory
insertion. The accidents of primary concern are IUS propulsion or guidance
failures which could result in vehicle breakup and/or in reentry from
orbit.
_!_ Re-entry conditions can range from speeds of 14,000 to 36,000 ft/sec at
angles of -0.5 to -36.0 degrees.
B.2.7 Phase 5 Accident Scenarlp_ (VEEGA)
A detailed Galileo Earth Avoidance Study (JPL 1988) of possible
spacecraft and mission failures has determined only three failure types
which represent even a remote threat of Earth impact: retro-propulston
module penetration by a mlcrometeorold, a small number of lesser probability
spacecraft failures, and multiple serial failures in the ground command
system.
Th) total probability of spacecraft reentry and impact is less than
5 x 10" . In the remote event that any of these accidents resulted in the
spacecraft being placed on an Earth-impacting trajectory and recovery
attempts failed, the spacecraft would break up as it re-entered the
atmosphere at a velocity of 45,600 to 49,300 ft/sec at angles of 0 to 90
degrees. The resulting thermal and dynamic )nvtronment would be very severe
with peak heating rates around 11,000 Btu/ft -sec and peak dynamic loads of
17,700 lb./ft." at decelerations of approximately 600 g's.
B.3 ACCIDENT ENVIRONMENTS
The following paragraphs summarize the key accident environments which
were addressed in the Department of Energy {DOE) safety analysis of Shuttle
accidents and the possible threat to the RTGs and Radioisotope Heater Units
(RHUs).
B.3.1 SRB Fraqment [nvlronment
During operation of a SRB, fragments will be produced upon rupture of
the steel pressure-containment motor case either by random failure or by
range destruct action. These substantial fragments may damage an RTG or
propel it into another structure. The size, velocity, and directional
distributions of SRB fragments are based in part upon analysis of films and
recovered debris of the destructed solid rocket boosters from the Challenger
(STS 51-L) and the Titan 34D-9 accidents. To supplement these empirical
data and to fill gaps not represented by the two accidents, analytical
modeling was performed and calculations were made using a computer code
capable of predicting the very fast structural breakup of the rocket motor
case and the ensuing fragment motion away from the centerltne of the motor.
The characteristic mechanism for fragment formation is a rapid release
of the operating motor pressure through a fracture in the case causing
further extensive breakup of the case and rapid acceleration of the pieces
to velocities of hundreds of feet per second. The peak velocity of case
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wall fragments depends on motor pressure and volume. The mass of propellant
remaining attached to a case wall fragment is also a major determinant of
the ftnal fragment velocity. In addition to velocity, the fragment also
rotates or spins as it travels. Since all these parameters vary with
mission elapsed time, the spectrum of SRB fragment characteristics is highly
dependent upon mission elapsed time (HET) at the time of initial case
fracture.
Typical estimated peak SRB fragment characteristics for SRB random
failure are shown as a function of MET in Table B-3. This table also shows
estimates of the probability of a large fragment hitting a RTG and the
effects of intervening Orbiter structure on fragments flying toward the
Shuttle cargo bay. The peak fragment velocities for range destruct are
comparable to the random values, but the high velocity range destruct
fragments represent a lesser threat to the RTGs because of their location
near the motor destruct charge.
TABLE B-3. PEAK SRB FRAGHENT ENVIRONHENTS:
SRB RANDOH FAILURE
Maximum Fragment
Fragment Spin Hit
HET (s) Velocity (fps) Rate (HZ) Probability
0-20 ]35-370 ]2 -.]7
20-70 135-340 11 -.17
70-105 180-365 13 -.17
105-120 265-765 2] -.17
]nterventng
Structure : _
Velocity
Reduction (%)
10-]9
10-19
10-1g
6-18
B.3.2 ET Prooell_nt [xploston Environments
B.3.2.1 Blast Environments
The hazards imposed by explosions can be characterized for purposes of
safety analysis by specifying, in probabiltstic terms, values for the blast
wave parameters, peak overpressure, overpressure tmpulse, peak dynamic
pressure, dynamic pressure impulse, and peak reflected pressure. The
definition of these blast-loading parameters are provided below.
Static Overoressure: The peak crushing pressure, exceeding the
ambient pressure, which occurs in the blast pulse from an
explosion, The variation of the overpressure with ttme at a fixed
distance from the explosion depends largely on the amount and rate
of the energy release of the explosion. The peak overpressure at
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a fixed distance is the maximum value sensed at that location and
is experienced at the instant the front of the blast pulse just
passes the location.
Static Overoressure Imoulse: The area under the curve of
overpressure versus time over the tnterval between the time of
arrtval of the blast front at the fixed locatton to the time at
which the overpressure returns to zero at the same location.
Peak Reflected Pressure: The magnitude of the reflected blast
wave front that would result upon striking a rigid body placed in
the path of a blast front. Since the peak reflected pressure can
be quite high, |t can deform the body and accelerate it.
Oynamtc Pressure: Measure of the strength of the "wind" follow|ng
the front of the blast pulse. Peak dynamic pressure occurs just
behind the front and decays rapidly with distance behind the front.
Dynamt¢ Pressure Impulse: Defined analogously to static over-
pressure impulse. Peak dynamic pressure and dynamic pressure
impulse control the drag of the blast wind and along with body
shape and weight determine the final velocity of a body if it is
free to move.
m
_iiiilm
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Pre- and Early-Fliqht Ground Pool [xplosions
A significant explosion source for the Shuttle is possible should a
massive spill of the liquid oxygen and hydrogen ET propellants. Spills of
these propellants, as a result of ET structural breakup, Shuttle impact with
the launch tower, early range destruct, SRB case rupture or Orbiter aft-
compartment explosions could lead to collection, mixing, and ignition of
significant portions of the propellants on launch-pad surfaces while the
Shuttle is still essentially at the pad. The resulting blast wave
subsequently sweeps past the Orbiter, acting on the exterior surfaces in a
manner to implode or crush the structure into the RTGs within the Orbiter.
It is also possible that, as the blast wave fatls the structure, the RTGs
will be directly exposed to the blast environment. Thus, not only Orbiter
fragmentation but also blast loading (acceleration) hazards are presented to
the RTGs.
There have been no pad accidents Involving the sptllage of ET .....
propellants from which to base estimates of potential explosion
environments, therefore, environments are based on results from a
hydrodynamic computer code capable of predicting the blast loadtng
parameters of a fast moving planar blast pulse as it travels through the
air above the pad. The behavior of the explosion energy release itself
(source characteristic) is varied over a wide range to tnclude the range
of uncertainty in the initial col]ectton, itxtng and ignition of the
propellants. Since the explosion source characteristic controls the blast
pulse loading parameters, a probabtlisttc computational treatment of the
source characteristic yields a probabtlisttc estimate of blast loading
parameters at specified heights above the pad. Application of these
loading parameters to an analytical fragment acceleration model for the
Orbiter cargo bay door yields a probabilisttc estimate of fragment velocity
for this closest component to the RTGs,
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Typical blast and Orbiter fragmentation environments estimated to
result from these ground-pool exploslons at several distances above the pad
surface are shown In Tables B-4 and B-5, respectively.
TABLE B-4. BLAST ENVIRONMENTS* DUE TO DESTRUCT
OR GROUND-POOL EXPLOSIONS STS/IUS
Pressure (psi) Impulse (psi-s)
Over- .....
Height (ft) Pressure Dynamic Reflected Static Dynamic
In-pool 2,075 810 5,300 0.58 0.058
Just Above
Pool 659 1,720 5,169 2.01 0.33
20 106 123 552 0.7] 0.19
100 21 18 78 0.41 0.20
|1 i rll i i
*Upper ]0 percentile estimates for on-pad explosions of respective liquid
bipropellants (except for In-pool and just above pool).
TABLE B-5. FRAGMENT VELOCITIES* FROM DESTRUCT
OR GROUND-POOL EXPLOSIONS: STS/IUS
Height (ft) Flyer Plate Velocity (fps) Shrapnel Velocity (fps)
In-pool 67g-2,186 I-g2
Oust Above Pool 1,079-2,66I 2-122
20 42g-],og6 0-70
100 184-356 0-58
*Upper ]0 percentile estimates for on-pad explosions of respective liquid
btpropeilants (except for in-pool and just above pool).
m
i |
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|n-Fltah_ Exolostons
A second explosion source involving the ET propellants is possible for
a Short t_me after the Shuttle has cleared the tower. Aerodynamic
conditions through the next 20 seconds (up to an NET of 30 seconds) are such
that failures of the ET structur_¢an]eJd quickly to its breakup and the
consequent airborne dump of liquid hydrogen and oxygen propellants. The
hydrogen quickly vaporizes and mixes with air to form an explosive mixture.
The burning SRBs provide an ignition source to ignite the mixture. A
hydrodynamic computer code is used to compute the blast loading parameters
of a fast-moving, spherically-expanding, blast pulse.
The estimated blast environment from thts explosion is shown in
Table B-6 for the breakup starting at two different times as the Shuttle
accelerates during its early launch trajectory. As the ET breakup,
propellant dump, and mixing require an elapsed time on the order of a
second, the increased speed of the Shuttle between the two initiating times
shown in Table B-6 has allowed an increased distance (Shuttle inertia) to
develop between the Orbiter and the center of explosion for the later
occurring breakup. Hence, the potential blast environment for airborne
explosions rapidly diminishes. Beyond MET 30 seconds, changing atmospheric
and aerodynamic conditions will preclude significant airborne explosions.
The potential Orbiter fragment velocities associated with the airborne
blast environments in Table B-6 are shown in Table B-7.
TABLE B-6. BLAST ENVIRONHENTSDUETO IN-FLIGHT EXPLOSIONS FROMDESTRUCT
OR MASSIVE STRUCTURALFAILURES: STS/IUS
MET (s) Pressure (psll Impulse (psl-s)
Over-pressure Dynamic Reflected Static Dynamic
]0 298 122 ],991 3.23 1.60
30* 14 5 53 1.13 0.48
...... r ........... _ ............ , ,, ,,, ,
*Over-water threshold.
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TABLE B-7. FRAGMENT VELOCITIES FROM IN-FLIGHT EXPLOSIONS DUE TO
DESTRUCT OR MASSIVE STRUCTURAL FAILURES:
MET (s) Flyer Plate Veloclty (fps) Shrapnel Velocity (fps)
]0 958 - 1,949 6 - 354
30* 200 - 285 2 - 83
*Over-water threshold.
B.3.3 Fireball Environment From IT prQpellants
The updrafts and high temperatures within the fireball produced by a
large liquid propellant ground fire are hazards if the exposed RTG fuel
clads have been breached earlier by severe mechanical impact loads. The
released fuel fines in this case can be vaporized and dispersed into the
atmosphere by the fireball environment.
The fireball characteristics and thermal environment that would result
from a massive spill of ET propellants at the launch pad can be specified
by: (1) maximum fireball diameter, (2) fireball lift-off time,
(3) duration of the fireball, (4) temperature inside the fireball, and (S)
total heat flux produced within the fireball.
Using available experimental and analytical information, and assuming a
full ET load of propellant is involved (],5gS,O00 pounds), a maximum
fireball diameter of 1,000 feet is predicted. The fireball is also predicted
to have a total duration of 30 seconds and to lift completely off the ground
after about 10 seconds.
The temperatures to which an RTG could be exposed range from
approximately 4,000 degrees Fahrenheit at fireball inception down to 3,500
degrees Fahrenheit at fireball l_ft off. The total heat flux ranges from
about 300 to ]00 Btu/second/feet _ over the same time span.
B.3.4 _bor_ Crash Environments
During the latter aerodynamic flight portion of a return from a mission
abort, the Orbiter flies without engine thrust and exhibits the same general
flight characteristics as a conventional heavy aircraft during a final
landing approach. Assuming that the orbiter has entered this final phase
of the abort return under normal control, a crash could ensue due to
control error, or mechanical failures of the flight control system or
landing gear.
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Examination of the Orbiter flight profile and flying characteristics
leads to a set of four abort crash accidents that are deemed credible: two
landing scenarios and two ocean ditch scenarios. In each case, crashes with
and without the final landing flare are considered in estimating the
resulting relative-lmpact velocity of the RTG with the surrounding Orbiter
structure. The estimated upper and lower bounds of these impact velocities
are shown in Table B-8.
B.3.5 Environments For Re-entry From Orbit
Aerodynamic and heat transfer analysis of the uncontrolled, accidental
reentry of the Shuttle prior to the deployment of the upper stage and
payload shows that the RTG condition just prior to earth surface impact
varies with the time of launch failure. For the time interval of interest
between SRB separation (MET - 128 seconds) and the achievement of the
parking orbit (MET - 510 seconds), the predictions are:
z) The Orbiter and IUS will always break up during reentry and will not
reach the surface intact.
2) For NET less than 495 seconds, the RTGs or General Purpose Heat Source
(GPHS) modules reach the surface over the Atlantic Ocean.
3) For MET between 128 and 155 seconds, the RTGs reach the surface intact
and without case melting.
4) For MET between 155 and 210 seconds, the RTGs may reach the surface
without case melting, or the GPHSmodules may be released prior to
reaching the surface.
s) For MET greater than ZlO seconds, the GPHSmodules are released prior
to surface impact.
B.3.6 Inertial Upper Staqe and Payload Environments
The IUS vehicle itself does not significantly add to any of the
accident environments produced by the main launch vehicle. The solid
propellant Is not detonable under credible accident conditions for the
Galileo mission. Although IUS propellant impacting the ground as ejecta
from other events may react vigorously as an explosion, these events
produce only localized blast effects. In addition, the propellant does not
contribute significantly to fireball environments, since the burn is
relatively slow and occurs at ambient pressure.
Some IUS failures after the deployment of Galileo/IUS from the Orbiter
result in errant reentry within the design capability of the RTGs. Earth
impact conditions are similar to those for reentry from orbit.
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TABLEB-8.
Crash Scenario
RTG IMPACT VELOCITIES DUE TO ABORT CRASH: STS/IUS
RTG Impact Velocity (fps)
Ditch No Flare
Ditch With Flare
Landing Pre-Flare
Landing Post-Flare
65-125
50-110
60-120
50-65
mm
mm
]
-1
mm
m
|
|
m_i
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The only IUS fatlure that can cause a direct threat to the RTGs is a
motor case rupture during the second firing of the IUS. The dominant threat
from this failure is the production of fragments of solid propellant
estimated to be traveling at velocities in the range of 92 to 728 feet per
second and weighing from 2 to 8 pounds per fragment.
The Galtleo spacecraft also does not significantly add to any of the
accident environments produced by the launch vehicle accident scenarios.
B.4 RADIOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT
The use of plutonium-238 dioxide (l>uO?) fuel, a radioactive material,
in the two General Purpose Heat Source - R_dioisotope Thermoelectric
Generators (RTGs) and the 131 Light Weight Radioisotope Heater Units
(LWRHUs) on the Galileo spacecraft necessitates evaluation of the
radiologtcal risks to persons in the launch site vicinity and the general
population worldwide resulting from postulated accidents occurring during
the mission. The inventory of plutonium dioxide fuel is ]32,200 Ci in each
RTG (264,400 Ci total) and 33.6 Ci in each LWRHU(4334 Ci total). The RTGs
and LWRHUsare described in Section 2.2 of this Environmental Impact
Statement (EIS).
Final Safety Analysis Reports have been prepared by the U.S. Department
of Energy (DOE) addressing the safety aspects of the RTGs (DOE IgBBa,
DOE ]gBBb, DOE IgBga) and the LWRHUs (DOE IgBBd, DOE IgBBe, DOE IgBBf) on the
Galileo mission using the Space Shuttle as a launch vehicle. The Final
Safety Analysis Reports present the results of safety assessments, including
analyses and testing, of launch and deployment of the RTGs and LWRHU for the
Galileo mission. The objective of this section is to summarize the results
of the Final Safety Analysis Reports in terms of potential accidents and the
resulting radiological consequences and risks.
The RTG Final Safety Analysis Report consists of three volumes as
follows:
Volume ]: Reference Design Document
Contains reference design information that provides a basis for Volumes
II and Ill. It contains descriptions of the RTG, the Galileo
spacecraft and mission profile, the Space Shuttle, the Inertial Upper
Stage (IUS), the trajectory and flight characteristics, and the launch
site.
Volume II: Accident Model Document
Summarizes the potential accident environments and associated
probabilities as described by NASA in the Shuttle Data Book (NASA 1988).
Presents a summary of fatlure sequences and any resulting fuel releases
(source terms) based on analyses and test data characterizing the
response of an RTG to different accident environments.
Volume llI: Nuclear Risk Analysis Document
Summarizes the radiological consequences of postulated accident
scenarios by mission phase. Mission risks, by mission phase, are also
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quantified. The radiological consequences and risks are reported in
terms of the radiation dose and health effects incurred by the affected
population, and the levels of deposition of radioactive material on the
ground.
The analysis is supported by a series of appendices which present in
detail the methodology utilized in risk assessment; biomedical aspects of
PuOz; meteorological data; land use, oceanographic, and water characteris-
tics at the Kennedy Space Center; worldwide demographic, land use, and
oceanographic data; partlcle slze considerations; and an uncerta!nty
analysts.
The process of information flow and analyses used in the RTG Final
Safety Analysis Report is summarized in Figure B-5. The LWRHUFinal Safety
Analysis Report consists of an analogous three volume set.
The remainder of this section summarizes the source terms based on the
Accident Model Document (Section B.4.1), the radiological consequences
methodology (Section B.4.2), the accident consequences (Section B.4.3), and
integrated mission risks (Section B.4.4) based on the Nuclear Risk Analysis
Document and its appendices.
B.4.1 Source Terms
This section summarizes the accident scenario and accident environment
that could result in a fuel release from the LWRHUs. The accident scenarios
and accident environments that could result in fuel release from the RTGs
a_e_resen_edln Sections B.2-a6d_3.-_ns_der_io6sa6d co_nci_stons-of -
evaluating the damage to fuel containment structures are summarized.
The fuel release from an accident is called a source term. A Source
term consists of the quantity off'fuelreieas-ed(e£pressedi_ Curiesof
PuO_), the location of the release, the particle size distribution of the
released PuO2, and the probability of release. The methods for developing
the source terms are described. .......
The radiological consequences of an accident are dependent on several
variables. These are the accident scenario, release characterization,
exposure pathway parameters, and meteorological conditions. Each accident
case is a combination of the variables. The total number of combinations is
very large, making analysis of all accident cases impractical. Three cases
for each mission phase are developed and analyzed. The method of selection
and the source term for the selected cases are described.
For the accident scenarios and the associated environments specified by
NASA, the considerations and conclusions of evaluating the damage to fuel
containment are summarized as follows:
I) Explosion of External Tank propellants on or near the launch pad,
with the subsequent implosion of the Orbiter payload bay walls
around the RTGs do not result in breach of the Fueled Clads.
Distortions of the clads generally are less than the threshold for
breach.
-I
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2) In a small percentage of cases, external tank propellant
explosions could result tn release of Fueled Clads. The secondary
impact of the Fueled Clads on the concrete and steel surfaces
around the launch pad could result in breach of some clads.
3)
4)
Based on tests slmulatlng range destruct or Solid Rocket Booster
case rupture, Solid Rocket Booster fragments at velocities up to
695 ft/sec in the face-on Impact attitude wi11 not breach the
Fueled Clads when struck in the full RTG configuration.
The results of Solld Rocket Booster fragment interaction tests
with Orbiter structure indicate that attenuation by passage
through the wlng and payload bay wall can reduce fragment veloclty
up to 46 percent and spln rate up to ]00 percent. Passage through
only the payload bay wall can reduce veloclty up to 20 percent.
These data, coupled with the results of the large Solld Rocket
Booster fragment tests, indicate that Solid Rocket Booster
fragments in the face-on attitude at impact during the first I05
seconds of mission elapsed tlme wi11 not cause a breach of the
Fueled Clads. A range destruct of the vehlcle during the lOS to
128 seconds of mission elapsed time are of the face-on impact
type.
s) Solid Rocket Booster fragments impacting in an edge-on attitude
can breach the fuel clads at velocitles in the range of 130 to 370
ft/sec depending on the fuel and iridium characteristics, and the
location of impact with respect to the clads, and the position of
the Fueled Clads in the stack of modules.
6) If reentry occurs as a result of a spacecraft failure during the
VEEGA Maneuver phase, the aeroshells are expected to fail and
release the Graphite Impact Shell (GIS) with Fueled Clads. The
iridium clads will fail from eutectic formation with the graphite
In the Graphite Impact Shell. Impact on a hard ground surface Is
then assumed to release all the fuel in the Graphite Impact Shell.
7)
8)
Both intact and damaged Fueled Clads and modules may have some
residence ttme tn the fireball from liquid propellant explosions.
The effects o6 the fireball will not result in breach of the
clads; however, the fireball will modify the particle size
distribution or location of any fuel released in the fireball.
Modules released during On-Orbtt or Payload Deploy phase accidents
may release small amounts of fuel upon impact on a rock or other
hard surfaces for cases involving land impact following reentry.
The LWRHUs aboard the Galileo spacecraft can be subjected to a number
of hostile environments. A systematic assessment of the response of LWRHUs
to these environments shows that fuel release would occur only tn certain
instances dur|ng a VEEGA superorbtta_ reentry (DOE I988d, DOE 1988e). The
probability of a release is ].OOXI_ "° for the most probable case, 5,00X10, _
for the maximum case, and 1.50X]0 -° for the expectation case. The value of
]XIO "/ was adopted as the lower ltmtt tn assessing credible accidents. This
value should be compared with values of IX]O "_ and ]XIO "_ often used in
safety design goal analyses for nuclear power. The lower value was used
here because there have been statistically far fewer space launches than
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power plants. Furthermore, all accldents in a mission phase, irrespective
of their probability, were used in calculating the expectation case. In
addition, the Galileo safety analysis conducted by the DOE indicated that
accidents with probabiilties less than IX]O'" did not yield any substantial
increase in overall risk. Since the probabilities of release for the LWRHUs
are less than this cut off llmit they are not considered further.
ShU_tie_related iaunch and ascent source te_s Were Calculated:usIng °
the LASEP-2 program. LASEP-2 uses a Monte Carlo approach to simulate RTG
response to a given accident environment. This is done using a minimum of
10,000 trials for each scenarto or sub-scenario considered, representing
variations on accident environment severity and RTG component responses
determined by probability distributions of conditions based on the accident
environments, hydrocode modeling, and component test results. The LASEP-2
mode1 directs the calculations to arrive ultimately at Fueled Clad
distortion. Correlations based on RTG component test data are then used by
LASEP-2 to determine Fueled Clad crack size, the fuel release quantity, and
particle size distribution of the release (DOE lgBBb).
Theaverage and maximum source terms are calculated for each accident
scenario considered. One most probable and one maximum accident scenario
from each mission phase are analyzed in the Nuclear Risk Assessment Document
(DOE IgBga). In addition, an accident expectation case, which
incorporates all probabilities and source terms, is presented for each
phase. The definitions of these cases are provided below.
Mo_t Probable Case
The Failure/Abort Sequence Trees for each mission phase are examined
and the single release having the highest probability of occurrence is
selected. All associated releases within the selected sequence branch
(e.g., projectile breach and impacts on various media of both breached and
unbreached Fueled Clads) comprise the source term (DOE IgBga). The
radiological consequence of the source term for each of the 42 sets of daily
meteorological data, which represent the 42 days of the launch window, are
then calculated. The results are ranked according to population dose, and
the case that represents the 50th percentile of the ranking is selected as
the most probable case.
Maximum _ase
Within a mission phase, the maximum fuel release and the meteorology
that maximizes population dose through inhalation, ingestion, and external
pathways are selected. The single release and all related releases in the
sequence branch comprise the source term (DOE 1989a).
Expectation Case
The expectation case uses all of the average releases and their
probabilities to define a probability-weighted source term, considering all
of the scenarios postulated in a mission phase. The radiological
consequences of the source term for each of the 42 meteorological sets are
calculated. The results are averaged to develop the expectation case. The
purpose of the expectation case is to develop the components of a risk
analysis considering the whole phase duration. It represents a
probabiltstic combination of all accident scenarios (DOE 1989a).
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The range from zero to most probable and maximum cases present a
representative range of releases that could occur. The most probable is the
release of highest probability, but could be different considering it is
representative of only one set of the variables -- quantity oflreleaSe,
location of release, particle size distribution, probability of accident
occurrence, and meteorological conditions. A change in any one of these,
except probability of occurrence, could result in a different set of
consequences. The maximum case, presenting the highest consequences, is
developed primarily for emergency planning purposes.
The most probable, maximum, and expectatlonsource terms for each
mission phase are presented in Tables B-g through B-l], respectively. Each
case is described by the type of accident, the curies that are estimated to
be released, the probability of release, category of release, and
description of the accident. For example, in the Phase 0 most probable ....
accident, the type is a fire and explosion which results in the release of
44 curies of PuO_. The release has a probability of 5 in ]0 million, and
will occur in the fireball of the explosion while the Shuttle is sitting on
the launch pad. The PuO_ will come from Fueled Clads that are breached by
impact with steel. Each-of the other phases for the most probable and
maximum cases presented in Tables B-g and B-]O can be similarly described.
Additional explanation of the Phase I most probable case is necessary.
The accident type is a Solid Rocket Booster failure resulting in the loss of
thrust. The release of PuOy comes from two categories, 1) Fueled Clads
breached by concrete fragmeBts in the fireball, and 2) Fueled Clads breached
by impact with concrete outside the fireball. The total source term is 921
curies with a probability of occurrence of 3 in lO,O00. The accident occurs
on the launch pad.
The expectation cases (Table B-]I) are presented in terms of accident
type, the category of release, the probability of release, and the amount of
PuO_ released. For example, for Phase 0 only one accident type, a fire and
expTosion, comprises the expectation case. The release occurs in the
fireball with a probability of occurrence of 5 in lO million. The Phase ]
expectation case is made up of seven accident types. All have releases in
the fireball, six also have releases at ground level outside the fireball,
and two also have releases at an altitude but outside the fireball.
The particle size distributions associated with these releases are
based on aeroshell module and Fueled Clad impact tests conducted at Los
Alamos National Laboratory (DOE Ig8ga). For the most probable and
expectation cases, the average of the particle size distributions for the
tests considered was used as a starting point. Based on the Fueled Clad
crack sizes calculated by LASEP-2, the parttcle size distributions were cut-
off at a particle size equal to one-half the maximum crack size, and then
renormalized. A similar approach was taken for the maximum release cases
except that the particle size distribution from the test data that would
maximize radiological consequences was selected as the starting point. The
particle size distributions which are the basis for these cases are
summarized in Figures B-6 and B-7. , _
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A detailed discussion of the particle size considerations is presented
in Appendix D of the Final Safety Analysis Report, Volume III (DOE ]989a).
The results of this analysts _hpw that:
]. Stratification of the particles in an explosion plume is very
rapid, usually occurring within the first kilometer (.6 mi) of
plume movement after an explos!on_ ...................
2. The vaporized PuO_ ts a significant component of dose (86 percent
of the short-term-dose and 6g percent of the long-term dose) ....
3. The p_imary contributor to surface contamination above the 0.2
uCl/m _ screenlng ]evel are particles in the ]0 to 20 micron range.
B.4.2 Radioloqtcal Conseouen_ Methodoloqy
This section summarizes the method used to determine the radiological
consequences resulting from the most probable and maximum cases for each
mission phase. The evaluation of the radiologlcal consequences of fuel
releases from postulated accidents include the following steps:
I, Identification of the postulated accident, fuel release
probability, and release location.
2e Source term characterization in terms of quantity, particle size
distribution, and volume distribution.
e Analysis of the dispersion of the released fuel in the environment
to determine concentrations in environmental media (air, soil, and
water) as functions of time and space.
4, Analysis of the interaction of envlronmental radioactive
concentrations with people through inhalation, ingestion, and
external exposure pathways.
5. Evaluation of resulting radiological consequences In terms of
population doses and contaminated environmental media.
The types of radiologlcal consequences for the most probable and
maximum release cases include:
o The "short-term" radiation dose that results from the initial
exposure, The doses are 70-year dose commitments resulting from
the extended retention of material in the body.
. The "long-term" radiation dose which would result from continuing
exposure to materials In the environment over an extended period
following release. Long-term doses include those to offsite
Kennedy Space Center and worldwide populations due to Inhalation
of resuspended material and ingestion of contaminated food over a
70-year period. In addition, long-term doses to onsite Kennedy
Space Center workers due to inhalation of resuspended material are
calculated for an exposure period of 35 years based on 40 hours
per week.
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3. Estimates of land- and water-surface areas contaminated by
deposition of radioactivity. It should be noted that the
estimates presented here are for illustrative purposes. These
estimates are based on average climatological conditions for the
most probable case, and conditions which maximize population dose
in the maximum case. In the event of an accident, real-time
estimates of advection and deposition would use meteorological
conditions current at that time.
This information ispresentedtn the following terms for each
representative case:
1. Numbers of persons estimated to be subject to _reater than
_;;? specified levels of both short-term doses and long-term doses.
The launch area population data, and worldwide population density
data described in Section 3 are used as the basis.
2. Total short-term and long-term population doses. In presenting
population doses, the concept of de minimis has been used, meaning
a dose level below concern and from which no health effects are
calculated. The de minimis dose was taken to be ! mrem/yr and 50
mrem total dose commitment. Total population doses are reported
both with and without de minimis.
3. The maximum short-term and long-term doses to individuals.
4_ Estimates of land and surface water areas contaminated above
specified levels. The screening level of 0.2 uCi/m_ established
by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), below which no
further consideration need be given, has been used (EPA 1977).
The radiological consequences for each mission phase were calculated
for the most probable, maximum, and expectation cases using the KSC-EMERGE,
LOPAR, and HIPAR computer models. Releases in the troposhere are treated
using KSC-EMERGE, and high altitude releases are treated using LOPAR for
small particles (less than ]0 microns in diameter) and HIPAR for large
particles (greater than 10 microns in diameter). The results for the
maximum and most probable cases clearly identify specific cases intended to
be representative accident scenarios, while the results for the expectation
case are used in the calculation of risk. Key features and assumptions of
the analysis are summarized below. Details of the methodology are presented
in the Final Safety Analysis Report (DOE 1989a).
The source terms with their particle size distributions are Biven an
initial spatial distribution appropriate to the conditions for release.
Releases in the launch area from surface impacts outside a fireball are
given an initial cloud dlameterof ]0 meters at a height of 5 meters.
Material released into a fireball starting out at ground level is given a
distribution in which 80 percent of the material is in an elevated cloud and
20 percent is in a vertical stem reaching toward ground.
The plume configuration resulting from 11quid propellant explosions and
fire has been estimated based on results of high explosive field tests
involving both liquid and solid high explosives. The center release height
B-31
_1
and the diameter of the stabilized cloud resulting from the explosion
fireball are correlated to the TNT equivalent yield of the explosion.
Of the thermal energy associated with the complete combustion of liquid
propellants, it is estimated that 50 percent contributes to the thermal
buoyancy of the initial fireball. The resulting center release height and
diameter of the cloud were assumed to be representative of the most probable
case of launch pad accidents. Since lower release heights and smaller cloud
dimensions result in increased radiological consequences, the cloud
specification for the maximum case are based on a thermal release that is ]0
percent of that used in the most probable case. This falls within the range
of observed variations in vertical plume configurations for a given energy
release (DOE lg89a).
Launch area ground level source terms result when Fueled Clads impact
hard surfaces at speeds above their failure thresholds or when previously
breached Fueled Clads impact any surface outside of the initial fireball.
Impact points would be distributed around the launch pad. All of these
distributed releases have been assumed to be at the launch pad with an
initial height of 5 meters and an initial ]O-meter cloud diameter.
Population doses should not be significantly affected. The atmospheric
dispersion of the source term materlal with the initial cloud specifications
determined as described in the preceding paragraphs is then calculated,
using models described below.
The atmospheric dispersion of postulated releases in the troposphere
(altitudes less than about 10 km) in the vicinity of Kennedy Space Center is
treated using the KSC-EMERGE model. KSC-EMERGE Is a Gausslan puff-
trajectory model that treats meteorology that varies in time and space
(vertically) and accounts for vertical plume configuration; particle-size-
dependent transport, deposition, and plume depletion; and sea-breeze
reclrculatlon.
Meteorology for the launch window (October and November) is treated in
terms of 24-hour historical sequences of meteorological data. lhe launch
window meteorology is represented by 42 such sequential data.
Releases at high altitude are treated by a particle trajectory model
(HIPAR) in the case of large particles (greater than I0 microns) and by an
empirical model (LOPAR) derived from weapons testing data in the case of
small particulates and vapor (less than or equal to 10 microns).
-- L
Radiation doses to populations are calculat'ed based On environmental
concentrations. The dose conversion factors have been derived using a model
developed by the Interagency Nuclear Safety Review Panel-Biomedical and
Environmental Effects Subpanel for the ]g86 Safety Evaluation Report. In
the calculation of radiation dose, the concept of de mtnimts has been used,
representing a dose level below concern (Negligible Individual Risk Level,
or NIRL) (NCRPSM 1987). A de mintmts dose of I mrem per year (50 mrem
lifetime) has been used. Population dose is reported in person-rem, which
is the cumulation of doses to all of the affected population.
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The assumptions and features of the analysesrStgniftcant to the
magnitude of the results reported here are:
l. The fuel remains in the Insoluble PuO2 form tn the environment.
Z. Parttcle size distributions are unchanged following the accident
except for the effects of vaporization tn fireballs.
1 The initial plume configuration of ground level and elevated
releases (cloud size, height) is important to the results.
e Long-term doses contain a C_ponent due to food ingestion. It is
assumed that all vegetables consumed by the population are grown
locally (tn home gardens). This may be true for some individuals,
but ts unlikely to be true for the general population.
The radiologtcal consequences of the PuO2 releases for the most
probable, maximum, and expectation cases are Oependent on the characteristics
of the models utilized and values selected for key model parameters. Due to
the potentially large range of PuO2 releases and environmental conditions
that could affect the results, an uncertainty analysis has been performed to
determine what variation from the estimated radiologtcal consequences and
mission risks might be expected (DOE 1989a).
Important variable parameters or conditions affecting the radiological
consequences and mission risks include the following:
Accident scenario
e
e
Accident environment
Accident probability
Release characterization
e Conditional source term probability
Source term
Modifications to the source term and particle size distribution
because of mechanical, chemical, and physical interaction prior to
deposition
Particle size distrlbutlon
Initial cloud dimensions
Vertical source term distribution
Release location
Meteorological conditions
Atmospheric stability
Wind speed and direction
Mixing height
Sea-breeze reclrculatlon
Fumigation
Space and tlme variation
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Exposure pathway parameters
Population distribution
Resuspension factor
Oeposltlon velocity
Vegetable ingestion
Protective action
Radiation doses and health effects
Internal dose factors : ....
Health effects estimator - Potential variation in these parameters
or conditions and their effect on the radiological consequences
and mission risks are evaluated In the uncertainty analysis.
However, the approach taken is dependent on the type of
radlologlcal consequences under consideration which include the
following:
- Short-tem population dose (with and without de minimis)
- Long-term population dose (with and without de mlnimls)
- Surface contamination levels
- Health effects.
Population dose health effects and risk are the primary types of
results considered in the uncertainty analysis. The other measures are
discussed where appropriate, but are considered as being of secondary
importance from an uncertainty viewpoint.
The detailed description of the uncertainty analysis and the
methodology used are presented in Appendix H of the Final Safety Analysis
Report, Volume Ill (DOE ]g89a). The following paragraphs present a summary
of the uncertainty analysis results.
The uncertainty factors resulting from consideration of accident
probabilities, release characterization, meteorological conditions, and
exposure pathway parameters are summarized. Based on these uncertainty
factors, the overall uncertainty associated with various types of
radtologtcal consequences and mission risk are determined.
_ =. :;=; ;=
The log-normal distributions of each of the individual uncertainty
factor ranges were combined, such that the overall mean uncertainty factor
was taken as the product of the individual mean uncertainty factors
affecting the result type. The standard deviation of the log-normal
distribution representing the overall range was determined.
Based on the methodology outlined above, the resulting overall mean
uncertainty factors and associated ranges are summarized in Table B-12. The
uncertainty factors represent multipliers that could be applied to the
results presented in the following sections In order to describe the r_
potential effects In more precise and realistlc terms. However, in all
cases but one (the Phase I mission phase risk-surface contamination area),
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TABLE B-12. OVERALL UNCERTAINLY ANALYSIS RESULTS
Result Type
Overall Uncertainty Factor
Mean Range b
• Radiologtcal consequences a
- Short-term population dose 0.25
- Long-term population dose 0.22
- Total population dose 0.23
- Health effects 0.23
- Surface contamination area 0.75
Mission phase risk b
0.013 - 4.6
0.0042 - 1.4
0.0067 - 7.9
0.0063 - 8.5
0.051 - 5.2
Phase 1
- Short-term population dose ....
- Long-term population dose
- Total population dose
- Health effects
- Surface contamination area
Phases O, 2-5
- Short-term population dose
- Long-ter_ population dose
- Total population dose
- Health effects
- Surface contamination area mean
0.42 0.061 - 2.9
0.37 0.024 - 5.7
0.39 0.035 - 4.3
0.39 0.032 - 4.8
1.3 0.22 - 7.8
0.25 0.055 - 1.1
0.22 0.019 - 2.5
0.23 0.029 - 1.8
0.23 0.026 - 2.0
].75 0.20 - 2.9
Source: DOE 1989a
a. The mean uncertainty factor for radiologtcal consequences multiplies the
expectationcase results (Table B-IS) to yield a best estimate mean of
the expectation case results. The original expectation case result
should also be multiplied by the uncertainty factor range to yield a
best estimate of the 5- and_95-percenttle values of the range of
radtologtcal consequences that feed into the best estimate for the
expectation case results.
b. The mean uncertainty factor for mission phase risk multiplies the
mission phase risk results (Table B-]6) to yield a best estimate mean of
mission phase risk (defined as total probability times expectation case
results). The original mission phase risk results should also be
multiplied by the uncertainty factor range to yield a best estimate of
the 5- and 95-percentile values of the best estimate for the mission
phase risk.
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Ethe mean overall uncertainty factor will reduce the public health and
environmental consequences. Therefore, it is not as conservative as the
approach used.
B.4.3 Radioloaical Conseouence Results
The results of the radiological consequence analysis for the most
probable and maximum cases are summarized in Tables B-J3 and B-]4.
Reference should be made to Tables B-g and B-]O in relatlng accident fuel
release scenarios and radiological consequences.
Tables B-13 and B-I4 present the release probabiltty,popuiration-dose
in person-rem, total and above de mini_is, and the area with deposition
above the screening level of 0.2 uCi/m _. The deposition areas are further
divided into dry land, swamp, inland water and ocean. For exam_le, for
Phase ! most probable case, the release probability is 3.30X]0 "_. Total
population dose Is 39] person-rem with 0.03 person-rem above de minlmis.
Areas with deposition are 43.3 square kilometers of dry land, I5.9 square
kilometers of swamp, 25.7 square kilometers of inland water, and no ocean
areas.
The results for the most probable case show the populatlon _oses
varying from a total person-rem range of 176 in Phase 2 to 1,010 in Phase 5.
The population dose above de minimis ranges from 0 person-rem in Phase 0 to
581 person-rem in Phase 5. The total person-rem for the maximum case ranges
from 7.3 In Phase 2 to 51,700 in Phase 5. The population dose above de
minimis ranges from o.g person-rem in Phase 2 to 50,600 person-rem in Phase
5.
Individual impacts are expressed in terms of individual dose and the
number of persons exceeding the lifetime dose level. These are presented
for the most probable, maximum, and expectation cases in Figures B-8 through
B-]O.
These figures show, for the most probable, maximum, and expectation,
cases the number of persons who will exceed different levels. For example,
for Phase I most probable case (Figure B-B), approximately ] person will
receive a lifetime dose of 50 mrem.
The mission risks associated with the use of the RTGs and LWRHUs on the
Galtleo mission have been assessed based on the source terms for the
expectation cases. The resulting radiologtcal consequences arising from the
expectation cases are summarized in Table B-15. The overall mission risks
associated with the RTGs are presented in Table B-16.
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These results are based on the average source terms from all the
postulated accidents and their probabilities. The release, dispersion, and
dose calculation conditions for these (many) components of the expectation
source terms were the same as those assumed for the most probable release
cases. Since these are probability weighted conditions, they are
representative of no specific scenarios. Only the "bottom line" risk
results have any significance, ....
Risk, In terms of individual risk of cancer fatality within the
affected population receiving doses, can be compared with other risks due to
natural and man-made hazards, as summarized in Table B-I7.
B.5 ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGIES
The plutonlum dioxide (Pu02) releases for the most probable, maximum,
and expectation cases are described in Section B.4. Since the most probable
and maximum cases are developed to identify population dose impacts, and
therefore do not necessarily represent maximum environmental consequences.
They represent an emphasis on impacts to population areas and tend to
minimize impacts to natural and water areas. The expectation case more
accurately reflects potential environmental impacts because it Is not
designed to emphasize population dose but rather to represent the average of
all releases within a mission phase, combined with the average meteorology
without regard to population dose. In general, this will result in a
decrease in deposition on land areas and increase in deposition in water
areas when compared to the most probable and maximum cases. Areas of
radioactive deposition resulting from the most probable, maximum, and
expectation cases are presented in Section B.4, Tables B-J3 through B-IS.
Accidental releases can occur In the Kennedy Space Center vicinity
during Phases 0 and ] and at unspecified areas worldwide during Phases 2 -
S. Section 3 of the EIS presents a description of the environments that
could be affected by radioactive deposition. Two different impact
assessment methodologies were developed to analyze these releases. Both
methodologies use the most probable, maximum, and expectation cases. One is
for the Kennedy Space Center vicinity during Phases 0 and 1. The other is
global for Phases 2 to 5. Included within the Kennedy Space Center
assessment methodology is a discussion of the relationship of PuO 2 particle
size distribution to the potential areas of radioactive deposition. The
methodology for estimating potential economic costs resulting from the
accidents is also provided.
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LTABLE B-17. INDIVIDUAL RISK OF FATALITY BY VARIOUS
CAUSES FOR THE UNITED STATE@
t__ .
w
L
Accident Type
Number of Approximate
Fatal Accidents Individual Risk
for 1983 Per Year c
TT........
w
w
z _T
Motor Vehicle 44,452
Falls 12,024
Drowning 5,254
Fires and Flames 5,028
Poison 4,633
Water Transport 1,316
Air Travel 1,3J2
Manufacturing 1,200
Railway 1,073
Electrocution B72
Lightning ]60.
Tornadoes 114b
Hurricanes ........ _6 b
All Other Accidents 9,311
All Accidents 77,484
Diseases 1,631,741
2 in 10 thousand
5 in 100 thousand
2 in 100 thousand
2 in ]00 thousand
2 in 100 thousand
5 in I million
5 in I million
5 in ] million
4 in I million
4 in ] million
7 in IO million
5 in 10 million
2 in 10 million
4 in IO0 thousand
3 in ]0 thousand
7 in 1 thousand
¢ ;
u
a Based on 1983 U.S. population.
b 1946 to 1984 average.
c Fatality/Total Population.
Source: USBC ]986
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B.5.] Kennedy Space Center and Vicinity
The method used to assess impacts from Phase 0 and Phase 1 accidents
involves 3 math steps. The first step ts the identification of areas where
there could be deposition above a specified level for each of the three
cases by mission phase (Tables B-13 through B-15). For the purposes of this
EIS, the level chosen is based on EPA guidance (EPA 1977) for contamination
of soil by unspecified transuranic elements, including PuO_, and is expressed
in mifirocuries per square meter (uCi/m=). This EPA screening level is 0.2
uCi/m ¢ at particle sizes less th_n 2 m. The EPA suggests that areas
contaminated above the 0.2 uCi/m ¢ level should be evaluated for possible
mitigation actions. The recommended screening level was selected on the
basis of limiting the additional annual individual risk of a radiation
induced cancer death to less than one chance in one million. Given that
humans are generally considered the species most sensitive to radiation
effects, contamination below the screening level ts conservatively judged to
have minimal impacts on other plant and animal sRecies. Thus, for EIS
purposes, areas that do not exceed the 0.2 uCi/m L screening level are
considered to have negligible potential for significant environmental
impact, and are not analyzed.
The data presented in T_bles B-13 through B-15 identify the area
contaminated above 0.2 uCi/m = for four categories: dry land, swamp, inland
water, and ocean. The dry land category includes all non- wetland inland
land cover classes, such as upland forest, urban, and agricultural areas.
The swamp category includes all wetland types, such as coastal marshes and
mangrove, and freshwater marshes and swamps. The inland water category
includes all estuartne (brackish) and fresh open water. The ocean category
ts any marine waters.
The second step is to adjust the dry land area category to reflect the
types of land uses that occur within this category. For example, potential
impacts to natural habitats, within the dry land category, are likely to be
quite different from potential impacts to urban areas, also within the dry
land category. To estimate environmental resources that could be affected
by deposition, the dry land areas were assumed to be slmllar to the
percentage of urban, agriculture, and natural vegetation land cover types in
Brevard County .........
The percentages for Brevard County are used as an approximation of the
relative amounts of these land cover types in any area contaminated by a
Phase 0 or Phase ] release. A data base obtained from the East Central
Florida Regional Planning Council (ECFRPC 1988b) was used to determine the
percentage of urban area and natural vegetation. Data on the percentage of
agricultural lands were obtained from another study (DOE)gB3), which
included identification and tabulation of land uses within 32 kilometers of
Launch Complex 3g at Kennedy Space Center and overlaid on the East Central
Florida Regional Planning Council data base to determine the relative
percentages of the three cover types. The results of this analysis show
that dry land areas are composed of approximately 74 percent natural
vegetation, 21 percent urban, and S percent agricultural. These
percentages, represented as decimal numbers, are then multiplied with the
dry land total presented in Tables B-13 through B-IS to estimate the area of
these cover types that is affected for each Phase 0 and Phase I accident
case.
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The last step in environmental assessment methodology is the
identification of the nature and magnitude of the impacts in the areas
affected. A brief discussion of how PuOz moves through the ecosystem and
how tt could affect plant and animal species is presented in B.6. Potential
exposure effects are determined through a survey of PuO_ research
literature. In addition to effects caused by exposure Io PuO_ in the
environment, decontamination and mitigation activities employed to reduce
PuO2 exposure could also affect natural habitats and human land uses
Pot_nt!al decontaminat!on and mitigation methods are also presented in B.6,
along with an analysis of the impacts resulting from mitigation activities.
Because Puo) deposltion is partially dependent upon the distribution of
PuO) particles released during an accident, two fundamental assumptions were
made. The first Is that particles of released PuO2 will be distributed such
that themajority of large particles are deposited-closer to the
accident/impact site, with the size of particles decreasing with distance.
The second assumption is that the highest concentrations of released curies
are closer to t_e release point, and that concentrations will tend to
decrease with distance.
B.5.2 Global _ssessment
Because areas of impacts tn the latter Phases (2 to 5) are unknown, the
environmental impacts are discussed in general terms. The relative
percentages of natural vegetation, urban, and agricultural land cover types
elsewhere in the world are unlikely to match the percentage for the KSC
vicinity. Therefore, no distinctions are made within the dry land class
presented in Tables B-]3 through B-J5 for Phases 2 to 5.
B.5.3 Economic Impact
Due to the uncertainty tn defining the exact magnitude of economic
costs associated with the radiologtcal impacts, a range of mitigation costs
were estimated in order to bound the costs which could result from Phase 0
and Phase ] accidents. The minimum economic impact ts based on the estimated
cost of a radiologtcal monitoring program. This estimate represents the
costs of equipment and personnel needed to develop and tm;lement a
comprehensive long-term monitoring program. The maximum economic impact is
defined as comprehensive mitigation actions undertaken on all areas
contaminated above a 25 mrem/yr dose level. The economic costs following a
potential accident could be reasonably expected to fall within this range.
Only economic impacts associated with the effects of radioactive deposition
are estimated tn this analysis.
The post-accldent monitoring program builds on the initial monitoring
effort in place at the time of the launch. Before launch, monltorlng teams
and equlpment from DOE, EPA, NASA, and the state of Florida will be In place
and commence monitorlng as part of the Federal Radlologlcal Emergency
Response Program, Federal Radiologlcal Monltorlng and Assessment Center, and
Radiologlcal Control Center operations. In the event of an accident, these
teams would continue monitoring for at least 30 days, after which EPA
assumes responsibility for long-termmonltorlng. A large percentage of the
costs associated with this program occur In the first year or two when a
program plan must be developed, equipment must be purchased, and personnel
must be hired and trained. After the program has been Inltiated and a
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shakedown period has been completed, costs decrease to a maintenance level
necessary to run the program in the succeeding years. Consultations with
experts in the radtological monitoring field have provided the costs for a
radiologtcal monitoring program. The minimum cost estimates are presented
tn Table B-J8.
A number of factors can affect the cost of radiologtcal decontamination
and mitigation activities, including:
Location - Affecting ease of access to the deposition (e.g., a
steep htllslope could be more expensive to cleanup than a level
fteld), as can access to the site location and necessary
decontamination resources, such as heavy equipment, water, clean
soil, etc.
Land Cover Tvoe - The characteristics of some kinds of land covers
make them more difficult and therefore more expensive to
decontaminate (i.e., plowing and restoration of a natural
vegetation area could be more costly than using the same technique
in an agricultural area).
Initial Contamination Level - Higher levels of initial
contamination can require more sophisticated and more costly
decontamination techniques to meet a particular cleanup standard
than a lower level of initial contamination.
Decontamination Method - More sophisticated methods, such as
wetland restoration, are much more expensive than simple actions,
such as water rinses.
Disposal of Contaminated Materials - Disposal of contaminated
vegetation and soils onsite could be much more cost effective than
transportation and disposal of these same materials to a distant
repository.
Cleanup standard.
In setting the level at which specific mitigation efforts wtll be taken,
the characteristics of the material deposited must be taken into account. As
has been stated, PuO2 has extremely low solubility in water and has a low
btoaccumulatton rate-within the food chain; its alpha emissions are short range,
and the primary concern is inhalation of resptrable fines.
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TABLE B-18.
= : : k °
MONITORING PROGRAM COST ESTIMATES
Period Activity Cost
w
Year one
Year two
Year three
Year four and
each succeeding
year
_Transitlon f_om_!_uncb monltoring
activity, plan development,
supplemental equipment purchases,
hiring of personnel.
Testing and shakedown of program
methods and monitoring network,
monitoring of mitigation actions.
Transition to long term monitoring
of impacts and mitigation actions.
Program maintenance.
$1,000,000
$ 500,000
$ 250,000
$ ]00,000
..,.,
- i : _il ¸ :
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At this time, while contingency planning is actively undenvay, it is
not yet complete. Planning to date includes the following:
e In the event of an accident, the ground monitoring program wi11 be
based upon:
Airborne measurements of the amount and characteristics
of the release
Atmospheric model estimates of the amount and location
of materlal deposited, uslng recent c11matologlcal data.
It should be noted that the cleanup costs estimated for the purposes of
this EI$ are based upon cleanup to a level of 25 mrem/yr. The 25 mrem/yr
level was selected as a reasonable level for illustrative purposes in the
EIS on the basis of adoption of this level by Federal agencies for the
protection of radiation workers, and the publtc, from releases associated
with the land disposal of radioactive wastes (10 CFR 61.41); from
radionuclide emissions from DOE facilities (40 CFR 61.92); and as associated
with the management and disposal of spent nuclear fuel, high level waste,
and transuranic waste (40 CFR Igl.15). In addition, the 25 mrem/yr level is
one-fourth of the 100 mrem/yr continuous exposure level recommended by the
National Council on Radiation Protection and Space Measurement (NCRPSM lg87,
p. 44) as an "acceptable risk" for latent cancer mortality risk to
individual members of the public over their lifetime. Actual cleanup levels
will depend upon a number of factors, such as the location and use of the
specific area contaminated, potential threat to the public, evaluation of
the specific exposure pathways, and the specific particle size distribution
of the contamination. As stated earlier, cleanup actions would be taken in
accordance with the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act through which cleanup levels and actions will be developed in
a publicly available decision document.
Not withstanding this estimate, actual mitigation activities and
cleanup levels will be based upon a separate specific environmental
analysis.
While the actual cost of cleanup associated with a potential Phase 0
and Phase ] accident can not be predicted with great precision due to the
number of factors involved (above), an approximation can be developed from
data provided In an EPA report (EPA Ig/7). That report indicated that in
1g77, cleanup costs could range from approximately $250,000 to $2,500,000
per square kilometer ($1,000 to $10,000 per acre) if removal and disposal of
contamination is not required. Removal and disposal of contaminated soil at
a near-surface facility could cost from approximately $36,000,000 to
$47,500,000 per square kilometer ($145,000 to $190,000 per acre). In terms
of IgB8 dollars, these costs should be doubled. (Cleanup without removal
and disposal would range from $500,000 to $5,000,000; and with disposal,
from $72,000,000 to $g5,000,000.)
1
l
1
J
I
_J
i
m
!
"I
|
1
B-SO
i
== =
u
r
L
.L
L
In addition, there are significant secondary costs associated with the
decontamination and mitigation activities, such as:
Temporary or longer term relocation of residents
Temporary or longer term loss of employment
Destruction or quarantine of agricultural products, including
citrus crops
Restriction or bans on commercial fishing
Land use restrictions (which could effect real estate values and
tourism activity)
Public health effects and medical care.
In order to determine the magnitude of these secondary effects, results
from a nuclear reactor risk assessment model were used. A U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory document (NRC 1975) presents results from a probabilistic risk
assessment and an economic cost distribution for accidents at commercial
nuclear power plants. Although the kinds of radioactive contamination
resulting from a potential nuclear reactor accident are quite different than
the contamination resulting from an RTG accident, the decontamination and
mitigation activities wouldbe very similar. Therefore, the NRC findings
are considered applicable In this study. The cost distribution study found
that decontamination costs account for approximately 20 percent of the total
economic cost of an accident. In other words, the total cost of a
radioactive contamination accident could be as much as five times the direct
decontamination costs. This multiplier of 5, however, applies only to those
types of areas that would incur secondary costs, namely the urban and
agricultural land cover types described in Section B.5.1.
Using the two sources of informatlon above, in conjunction with the
surface areas contaminated at 25 mrem/yr or greater (from DOE IgBga), a
range of economic costs resulting from the decontamination and mitigation of
Phase 0 and Phase I most probable, maximum, expectation cases can be
estimated (see Section B.6.2.3). The amount of area within each of the six
major cover types in the KSC region (natural vegetation, urban, agriculture,
etc.) that could be subject to cleanup action was estimated by overlaying
the "25 mrem/yr or greater" area for two years after a Phase 0 and a Phase I
accident (DOE 1989a) on the KSC regional land use data base. The amount of
area in each of the six major cover types that could be encompassed, then
formed the basis for the cleanup cost estimates discussed In Section
B.6.2.3_ The choice of the WYear)" area is consistent with draft EPA
guidance (EPA 1908) which indicates that Cleanup actions would occur over
the period of I to 50 years following the accident. "Year I" Is the period
where monltor)ng, remedial action planning, and population relocation (if
needed) occurs. At the lower end of this range are decontamination and
mitigation activities that stabilize the deposition in place, with no
removal of vegetation or soils and a lesser degree of environmental and
secondary impacts. At the high end of the range, vegetation and soil are
removed, the most highly contaminated structures are demolished, and all of
these material are placed in a geological repository. These actions would
have significant environmental and secondary impacts. Table B-Ig presents
hypothetical decontamination and mitigation actions represented in the low
and high range of cleanup costs.
In order to determine the estimated dollar cost of the range of cleanup
options for Phase 0 and Phase I accidents, the area of deposition for each
i B-5!
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land cover type is multiplied by the lowest and highest unit cost for
cleanup discussed above, $500,000 and $95,000,000 per square kilometer,
respectively. For urban and agricultural areas, this value is then
increased by a factor of five, representing the input of the secondary costs
mentioned above. For Phase 2 through 5 accidents, economic costs of cleanup
actions were not estimated. Given the uncertainties involved in defining
the-specific types of land uses that could be affected if contaminated, it
was concluded that no reasonable basis exists for developing such estimates.
It should be noted, however, that should deposition occur from an accident
in areas outside the United States, the Federal government will respond with
the technical assistance and support needed to clean up and remediate
affected areas and populations, as well as to recover the plutonium fuel.
_ _i -_- ....
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B.6 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES
This section presents the environmental consequences of an accident in
which plutonium dioxide Is released to the environment. A brief_iscu_6n
of how PuO_ behaves In the environment precedes the impact analysis. The
impact anaTysls Is divided into two major categories: ]) the potential
impacts of the representative most probable, maximum and expectation cases
during Phases 0 and 1; and 2) the potential impacts of the representative
most probable, maximum, and expectation cases during Phases 2, 3, 4, andS.
These cases are described in Section B.4. The description of the affected
environment In Section 3 of thls EIS is also used ........
Results are presented for exposure impacts and mitigation impacts.
Exposure impacts are those that result from the deposition of PuO 2 on
various environmental media and subsequent movement of PuO 2 in the
environment. They include impacts to natural environmentsT water resources,
man-used resources, and agricultural resources. Mitigation impacts are
those impacts caused by decontamination and mitigation activities undertaken
to reduce radioactive contamination levels in the environment. The economic
cost estimates associated with the impact analyses are also presented. The
methods described in Section B.5 are used in this assessment.
It should be emphasized that the following discussions are provided for
illustrative purposes and are not intended to reflect a definitive statement
regarding specific areas that would be contaminated in the event of an
accident involving a release of plutonium. In the unlikely event such an
accident occurred, the amount of contamination and the specific affected
areas would be determined and appropriate actions taken in accordance with
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act.
This would include evaluation of alternatives in accordance with the
National Contingency Plan and development of appropriate cleanup levels for
contaminated sites in a publicly available decision document.
B.6.] Plutonium Dioxide in the Environment
The extent and magnitude of potential environmental impacts caused by
PuO_ releases resulting from STS/IUS accidents are dependent on the mobility
and'availability of PuO 2 in the environment. The mobility and availability
of PuO 2 In turn, is directly controlled by a number of physical and chemical
parameIers, including: particle size, potential for suspension and resus-
pension, solubility, and oxidation state of any dissolved PuO 2. It is
these factors, in conjunction with the three potential exposure pathways
(surface contact, ingestion, and inhalation), that determine the impacts on
aquatic and terrestrial ecosystems.
The stze of PuO2 particles ts an important factor tn assessing impacts
to environmental resources resulting from an accidental release. Particle
size can affect the rate of dissolution of PuO 2 In water and the initial
suspension and subsequent resuspenslon of partlcles in air and water. The
dissolution and the suspension/resuspension potential ultimately control the
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mobility and availability of PuO) to plant and animal species, including
man. Generally speaking, larger-particles have less potential for suspen-
slon and resuspenslon; as particle size decreases, particles are more easily
kept in suspension. Depending upon the surface area per unit mass of these
particles, the effect of gravity may be counter-balanced by a resulting air
resistance. Consequently, turbulence from air currents can cause these
particles to remain suspended for long periods of time.
Parttcle sizes have been predicted for the Phase 0 fireball accident.
Distribution of the PuOz aerosol is shown as a function of particle size and
is also shown as a corresponding percentage of the total source term of the
accident (the source term value can vary for each accident).
Particle size is correlated with deposition range. For a fireball
accident, approximately 94.5 percent of the released curies will be depos-
ited as particles greater than 44 microns, and the greatest number of these
particles will fall in an area from 0 to 10 km from the accident.
Approximately 1.5 percent of the released curies will be deposited as
particles in the range of 30 to 44 microns, and the greatest number of these
particles will fall in an area from 10 to 20 ks from the accident. Approxi-
mately 2.5 percent of the release curies will be deposited as 10 to
30 microns particles, and the majority will fall within the range of 20 to
50ks from the accident. The smallest particles, those less than ]0 microns,
account for approximately 1.5 percent of released curies, and the majority
will travel greate_ than 50 ks.
Forboth the fire)all and groundlevel accidents, larger particles will
tend to settle quickly out of the air close to the accident location.
Smaller particles will remain in the air longer and may be transported some
distance by winds. These finer particles could also be more easily
resuspended by subsequent wind action.
In aquatic systems, larger partlcies will quickly settle to the bottom
sediments, while smaller, silt-size particles may remain in suspension
within the water column indefinitely. Smaller particles may not even break
the water surface due to surface tenslon, instead forming a thin layer on
the water surface and subsequently being transported to the shoreline
(Bartram 1983). Resuspenslon of smaller particles from the bottom Can occur
due to p_'slcal disturbance of the sediments by wave action, recreational
use of t) _ater bodies (such as swimming, boating, and fishing), as well as
by the fe_ )ng activity of aquatic specles. Plutonium dioxide particles, as
a componen_ _f the bottom sediments, may also be transported toward and
alongthe shurellne by wave action and currents In near-shore environments.
A number of factors can affect the solubility of PuO) in water.
Physlochemlcal parameters most important to the solubilit) of plutonium
dioxide are the reactive surface area and oxldatlon state of PuOz, and the
solute (water) Chemistry including pH, Eh, and temperature. Mass to surface
area ratios of particles affect reactivity and solubility, with solubility
being inversely related to particle size. The solubility of plutonium in
water has been measured at I0 to 13 moles/L (Looney et al. 1987). Although
this measurement was made under mildly oxidizing conditions at a pH of 5.0,
it serves to illustrate the low solubility of plutonium in aqueous systems.
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It is also important to note that dissolved plutonium concentrations in
water can increase under the following conditions (Bartram 1983):
• Increasing pH ....... _..... _ --- ....
e Increasing dissolved organic carbon (DOC) concentrations
• Increasing oxidizing conditions
• Increasing carbonate concentrations
• Increasing nitrate concentrations
• Increasing sulfate concentrations.
Plutonium also tends to dissolve more readily in fresh water, and at
cooler temperatures. Once in solution, this plutonium can coexist in
multiple oxidation states that can affect its availability to organisms.
The solid/@olute _tstributton coefficient (K_) for plutonium has been
estimated at 10" to 10 _ (Looney et al. 1987, BartPam et al. 1983). This
means that plutonium entering into a water/sediment system would be
preferentially taken out of solution and bound in saturated sedimehts in
amounts 10 to 100,000 times greater than the amounts that would remain in
the associated water column.
The K_ for plutonium varies based on the oxidation state of the
element. Onder the oxidizing.conditions similar to those encountered in
most surface water bodies, Pub+ would tend to b_ the dominant species of
plutonium,, and the KHwwould be approximately lO . Under the reductng
conditions encountered in most bottom sediments and groundwater.bodies. Pu4_
would tend to be dominant, and the Kd would be approximately 10 b (Bartram
lgs3).
Plutonium dioxide may be carried into the soil by a number of routes,
including percolation of rainfall and subsequent leaching of particles into
the soil, animal burrowing activity, and plowing or other disturbance of the
soil by man. Migration of the PuO) particles into the soil column is of
concern, primarily because of the _otentlal for PuO) to reach groundwater
aquifers used as drinking water supplies. The opportunity would most likely
occur where surface contamination is deposited on primary aquifer recharge
zones. Plutonium appears to be extremely stable, however, once deposited on
soils. Soil profile studies have shown that generally more than g5 percent
of the plutonium from fallout remained in the top S cm of surface soil after
10 to 20 years of residence time in undisturbed areas (DOE 1987).
Direct contamination of an aquifer where it reaches the surface is
possible, although it would be expected that clays, organics, and other
anionic constituents would btnd most of the PuO2. The binding of PuO2 would
occur in the first few meters of sediment, therefore greatly reducing the
concentration of this constituent with depth. This natural filtering of
PuO2 would probably reduce concentrations to levels that would be below the
Prtiary Drinking Water Standard of 4 mrem for exposure due to drinking
water.
It is also possible that surface water runoff containing PuO2 could
directly contaminate drinking water supplies from surface water bodies (DOE
lgSga). The danger from this type of contamination Is greatest due to
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suspended PuO) and not from dissolved Pu02. Bec_us_of this, filtering of
the surface w_ter before chemtcal treatmefit may be enough to reduce the
concentration of total plutonium to an exposure level of less than 4 mrem.
The availability of PuO 2 to biota in aquatic and terrestrial
environments depends on the route of PuO 2 exposure to the biota and the
physical and chemical interaction of PuO 2 with the water and soil of the
affected area. These interactions determine whether PuO) is available for
root uptake by plants and for ingestion and inhalation b) aquatic and
terrestrial fauna. The route of PuO) exposure differs between the two basic
categories of biota, flora_and faun_. Flora, in both aquatic and
terrestrial environments, can be exposed to PuO2 contamination via surface
contamination, root uptake, and leaf absorptlonT Fauna can be exposed via
skin contact, ingestion, and inhalation of PuO2 particles.
Surface contamination and skin contact does not pose a significant
danger to the biota. The alpha radiation emitted by plutonium has very
little penetration power (Hobbs et al. 1980). Therefore, little penetration
can occur through the skin of fauna. In addition, several studies on root
uptake and ieaf absorption of PuO2 indicate that very little, if any, PuO2
is absorbed by plants when PuO2 t) in an insoluble form (Bartram et al
1983, Cataldo et al. 1976, SchOltz et al. 1976).
The significance of ingesting PuO2 can vary between terrestrial and
aquatic fauna. Host plants have limited uptake and retention of PuO2, and
the digestive tracts of the animals studied tend to discriminate against
transurantc elements (Bartram et al. ]983, Cataldo et al. ]976, Schultz et
al. 1976). However, ingestion may be significant for small fauna in terms
of total exposure. These fauna, especially those that burrow, ingest soil
along with food material ]f the soil is contamionated, ingestion of PuO2
could result. Although the transfer factor from the intestinal tract to-the
blood and other organs Is small, total activity passing through the tract
could be large.
_:_i_i ii_i_i_ i_'_ '" _; * _: _ .... ; ;=
The impact of ingest!ng PuO2 by aquatic fauna can be significant
depending on PuO2 availability. For example, studies have found that
btoaccumulatton of PuO2 does occur tn benthic organisms that ingest
sediments contaminated with PuO2 (Thompson et al. lg80). However, most of
these studies also indicated that the bioaccumulatlon of PuO2 was not
critical to the upper trophtc levels, including man.
Inhalation ts considered to be the most critical exposure route for
terrestrial fauna (Wicker ]980). However, inhalation impact depends on
several factors, including the frequency of resuspension of PuO2, the
concentration and size of resuspended particles, and the amount actually
inhaled (Schmel 1980, Ptnder et al. undated). Smaller particles have a
greater chance than larger particles for being resuspended and inhaled.
Although many of the particles may be subsequently exhaled, the smallest
particles have the greatest likelihood of being retained deep in the lung
(Hobbs et al. 1980, Thompson et al. 1980). Howevgr, resuspended material
available for )nhalatton ts on the order of lx]O" v of the ground deposition,
thus high levels of ground concentration would be required to constitute a
risk to animals through this route.
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1No definitive research has been conducted that defines the spectfic
effects of PuO2 on plant and antmal spectes, particularly at the relatively
low contamination levels resulting from potent|a1STS/IUS accidents.
Generally speaking, however, radiation can cause three main types of
physical effects on organisms: ]) somatic injury, that is damage to the
normal morphology and functioning of the exposed organism; 2) carcinogenic
injury, that is an increase in the Incidence of cancers; and 3) genettc
Injury, affecting reproductive cells and causing deleterious genetic changes
in organism's offspring. Any of these three physical effects could cause
Increased mortality to exposed organisms. Although maximally exposed
Individual organisms could die as a result of these effects, overall
ecosystem structure ts not expected to change, and therefore no significant
ecological consequences are anticipated.
B.6.2 Assessment of Impacts to Kennedy_Space Center and Vicinity
This section presents the environmental consequences of Phase 0,
Prelaunch/Launch and Phase 1, First Stage Ascent accidents. Phase 0
includes the time period of 8 hours before launch until launch. Included in
this period ts the loading of the liquid propellants, firing of the Orbiter
main engines, and firing of the solid rocket boosters. Phase ], First Stage
Ascent tncludes the period from launch to ]28 seconds of mission elapsed
time. ]ncluded in this phase are lift off, clearing of the tower, clearing
of ]and, and burnout and jettison of the solid rocket boosters.
B.6.2.] Surface Areas Contaminated by Representative Accidents
The ]and areas contaminated from the most probable, maximum, and
expectation accidents tn Phases 0 and ] are presented in Table B-20. These
estimates |ndicate that natural areas, wetlands, and inland waters would
comprise the bulk of the affected areas.
The source tem ranges tndicate that most radioactive material (94.5
percent) will remain within 10 km of the acctdent location (within the
controlled area).
Surface contamination resulting from the Phase 0 most probable case
produces a total area of 18.70 km_ that will receive deposition above 0.2
uCt/m c. The Phase ] most probable accident produces a total deposition area
of 84.90 km_ above the 0.2 uCi/m c screening level. The breakdown of these
totals by the six land cover types (i.e., natural vegetation, urban,
agricultural, wetlands, inland water, and ocean) is shown on Table B-20.
Ocean impacts do not occur for either the Phase 0 or Phase 1 accident
scenarios.
The _hase 0 maximum case produces a total surface area deposition above
_ uCt/m _ of 6.94 km=. The Phase 1 maximum case produces an area of 5.43
• In both phases, natural vegetation, followed by tnland water, receives
the greatest amount of contamination (Table B-20).
The Phas_ 0 and Phase 1 expectation cases produce total areas of 57.43
and 155.03 kmL, respectively, above the deposition screening level of
0.2 uCt/m _. In both cases, natural vegetation is the land cover receiving
the greatest contamination.
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Areas of deposition for the expectation and most probable cases are
greater than the area of deposition for the maximum case because the maximum
case maximizes dose to persons. Hence, the meteorology tends to be more
concentrated.
In all cases, 94.5 percent of released radioactive matertal is
contained in particles greater than 44 um and wt11 be deposited within ]0 km
of the accident/Impact stte. The extra energy imparted to the released
material by the explosion and fireball may scatter smaller particles beyond
10 km. Particles 10 um and smaller could travel 50 km and more.
B.6.2.2 Exposure Effects
Deposition of PuO_ from Phase 0 and Phase I most probable, maximum, and
expectation cases will-have ltttle direct effect on land cover. The
matertal will not physically alter land cover unless a particle provides
enough heat to start a fire. Although PuO_ can affect the human use of
these land covers, there is no tnttial tmp_ct on soil chemistry, and most of
the PuO_ contamination deposited on the water bodies is not expected to
react cEemically with the water column. No significant consequences to
flora and fauna are expected from surface contamination and skin contact
with the PuO2, except where parttcle concentration and/or size is great
enough to overheat the contaminated surface.
Plutonium dioxide deposition from the most probable, maximum, and
expectation cases do not have any direct effects on historical or
archaeological resources. It will not physically alter nor chemically
degrade historical or archaeological resources.
B.6.2.3 Long-Term and Mitigation Effects
Long-term effects from the deposition of PuO_ on the Kennedy Space
Center and vicinity are discussed for the six lan_ covers: natural
vegetation, urban agriculture, wetlands, inland, water, and ocean. A
description of potential mitigation measures and related consequences is
also presented. It is assumed that any area with surface contamination will
be monitored to determine the specific degree of impact.
NBtvrBI Veqetatlon and wetlands
Plutonium dioxide deposited on the soil will interact with inorganic
and organic ligands to form primarily Insoluble compounds. It is expected
that over 95 percent of the plutonium w111 remain in the top 5 cm (2 in) of
surface sot1 for at least lO to 20 years. No mitigation is necessary because
of long-term impacts to soil. Mitigation required for other reasons may
result in significant sot] impacts.
As discussed in Section B.6.], surface contamination and skin contact
do not pose significant dangers to biota. No significant consequences to
flora are expected from root uptake and leaf absorption. Ingestion by
terrestrial fauna is negligible except for small fauna due to ingestion of
contaminated soil. This could result in a large total activity passing
through the general intestine track. Inhalation due to resuspended material
is small (]X)O -U of ground deposition). No significant impacts to biota
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would be expected in any of the areas receiving surface contamination.
Areas of highest concentration are the result of deposition of larger
particles or chunks, which are noninhalable.
The particulate Pu02 on the surface of the water bodies is not likely
to be readtly available for consumption by pelagic aquatic fauna. The
amount of PuO2 to be suspended oF dissolved in the water column is predicted
to be slightly higher than ]XlO "_ of the concentration if PuO2 deposited
in thebottom sediment. Thus, for _ny wetland area contamlnateo at z.u
uCt/m L of PuO_, approximately 2X10 "_ uCt/m of PuO2 will be d!ssp]ved or.
suspended in fhe water column. This small amount of Puu2 ava_aome _n tne
water column is not considered to have significant tmpacfs to the aquatic
fauna that may thgest the dissolved or suspended PuO_. In addition, studies
have indicated that higher trophic level organisms, _uch as fish, that are
likely to live within the water column have a lo, accumulation factor (DOE
1987, DOE lgsga).
Overall, the major potential impacts to the natural vegetation and
wetland biotic resources of the KSC and vicinity resulting from Phases 0 and
] most probable andmaximUm-reiease Case accidents include btoaccumulatton
of PuO2 by benthic organisms and btoaccumulatton of PuO2 by the aquatic
vegetation. Because of the potential for bioaccumulation to occur in
aquatic vegetation and benthic organisms, there is a potential for the PuO2
to travel up.both the terrestrial and aquatic food chains. However,
bioaccumulat_on of plutonium decreases with higher trophic levels. Impacts
to the biological diversity are not expected to occur. Redistribution of
PuO2ts°_possible occurrence, especially when contaminated terrestrial
fauna, including birds, move from one place to another. However, it is
unlikely that they will create any additional impacts that have not already
been described. Recycling of PuO2 will predominantly occur with vegetation
and fauna having short-life spans. The bacteria that decomposes the organic
matter may accumulate PuO2. However, most of the PuO2 should return to the
sediments. In the aquati_ environment this may promote the continuance of
bioaccumulation of PuO2 by the benthic organisms and aquatic vegetation.
Mitigation of the impacts to flora and fauna in natural vegetation and
wetland areas could be accomplished through a combination of monitoring and
remedial action based on monitoring. The amount ofPuO 2 resuspended in the
air in natural areas determines if PuO_ concentrations may pose inhalation
health hazards to man. If levels are aetermined to pose inhalation health
hazards, then access to the area could be restricted until monitoring
indicates that PuO2 concentrations will no longer pose a potential health
hazard.
Aqrt cultural
L:'_it_u_s"grdv_s"O_'t_eKennedy_$pace Center will be contaminated with
PuO2 at or above 0.2 uCi/m _ from Phase 1 most probable, maximum, and
expectation cases. A study on PuO_ contaminated citrus groves indicated
that the plutonium d_oxtde on the Trutt surfaces was not readily washable
with water. The PuO_ could enter the human food chain through transfer to
internal tissues during peeling or in reconstituted Juices, flavorings, or
other products made from orange skins. Approximately 1 percent of the PuO2
deposited on the orange groves would be harvested in the year following
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deposition. Almost all would be from fruit surface contamination. In
contrast with the fruit, plutonium was readily washed away from leaf
surfaces (Pinder et al. undated). Thus, if the leaf surfaces were washed,
recontamination of the fruit should not occur. Resuspension of plutonium
from the soll vla splash up was also studied. Very little, if any, reached
the fruit or leaf surfaces. This was thought to occur because splash up
generally does not reach a height greater than I m (3 ft) above the ground.
Most orange tree leaves are over ] m (3 ft) above the ground.
Mitigation of contaminated citrus fruit could include collection and
dlsposal of the contaminated fruit according to Federal and State
regulations. To prevent future contamlnatlonoFcTtr_ropS and protect
the safety of workers, the trees could be washed down to remove PuO 2 from
the leaves, and the soll around the trees could be covered with new-soil to
reduce resuspension. Future citrus crops could be monitored for PuO2
contamination before sold on the market.
Other crops grown In areas off the Kennedy Space Center site may be
contaminated by surface deposition. These crops would be examined and
washed to ensure no contamination. Those crops that can not be
decontaminated may be destroyed. The land on which the crops have been
grown would be monitored and scraping implemented if the monitoring shows
significant PuO 2 concentrations.
Urban
The areas of land cover used by man (e.g., buildings, ro_ds, ornamental
vegetation, and grass areas) contaminated above the 0.2 uCi/m _ level would
be monitored to determine if decontamination or mitigation actions might be
necessary. It is possible that monitoring would indicate no cleanup is
necessary. If mitigation actions are necessary, temporary relocation of the
population from their homes and workplaces may be required. Cleanup actions
could last from several days to several months. Rainfall could wash paved
surfaces and exteriors of buildings and move Pu0 2 into the surface soll and
surface waters.
There are several archaeological sites on the Kennedy Space Center site
and vicinity that may receive deposition by Phase 0 and Phase 1 accidents.
In addition, Kennedy Space Center facilities that have historical
significance, and are not damaged In the blast, could also have PuO 2 .
deposited on them. Presently unknown archaeological sites could be withln
the area of deposition, and might be affected by the cleanup actions
undertaken In those areas.
The deposition also has a long-term effect on future investigations at
any archaeological site. Archaeological digs, by their very nature, disturb
the soil surface with digging and sifting operations, which could expose
workers and others to the PuO_. Radiological safety measures would need to
be taken to prevent potentlal-health effects to the workers and could
greatly increase the cost of investigating these sites. If investigation of
archaeological sites that have PuO 2 deposited on them is proposed, a safety
analysis would be completed and approval given to proceed from appropriate
Federal and/or state authorities.
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Inland Water and 0_n
The waters surrounding Herritt Island are classified by the State of
Florida as Class II and Class III waters, with radlonucllde contamination
threshold limits of IS pCl/l. Host of the PuO) deposition is not expected
to be dissolved in the water column, therefore_ PuO2 Is deposited in these
waters, and this threshold level is not expected to-be exceeded.
L
Some of the waters surrounding Herrltt Island are considered
Outstanding Florida Waters. These waters are designated to receive
protection which supercedes any other water classifications and standards,
and as such prohibits any activity which reduces water quality parameters
below existing ambient water quality conditions. A Phase 0 or Phase I
accident could deposit sufficient amounts of PuO2 to result in violation of
this protection standard.
Although Shellflshharvestlng Is prohibited or unapproveU in some
waters surrounding Merritt Island, deposition above 0.2 uCl/mc could impact
an )tea of conditionally approved shellfish harvesting.
Mitigation of PuO2 impacts to inland water bodies may include any of
the following.
All ditches and borrow pits with shallow depths and in close
proxlmity_to human activity receiving surface concentrations of
0.2 uCi/m_ or greater may need to be monitored. If the monitoring
results provide evidence of contamination, the ditches and borrow
pits may need to be drained and any contaminated sediment removed
and disposed of within Federal and State requirements. Larger
areas of ponded water in close proximity to human activity can
also be monitored. Hltlgatlon could include skimming to remove
the surflcial film of Pu0). Monitoring after skimming will
determine the need for water and/or sediment removal. Measures
should be employed to reduce surflclal runoff and sediment from
entering water bodies used by man.
Recreational water activities (e.g., swimming, boating), as well as
sport and commercial fishing, may need to be restricted in larger
water bodies until monitoring results indicate that if is safe for
them to be resumed.
Monitoring the amount of PuO2 suspended and/or dissolved in the water
columns of!mpacted water bodies will determine if PuO2 has been deposited
in the sediments. Benthic organisms, such as clams, scallops, and crabs,
should be monitored for btoaccumulatton of PuO). I6 bloaccumulation of PuO2
tn benthico_ganisms is significant, thenit sKould be determined if
consumption of such organisms would pose a human health hazard. If it is
determined that consumption of such organisms will pose a human health
hazard, harvesting of such or9antsms should be banned until concentration
levels within ihe organisms no longer pose a threat.
If it is determlned that PuO2 concentrations are significant in either
the water or sedlment of impacted water bodies, then Pu0) bloaccumulation in
aquatic vegetation should be monitored. If bioaccumulatTon of PuO2 in
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aquatic vegetation is found to be significant, then organisms that feed off
of these aquatic plants should also be monitored for PuOZ bioaccumulation
and the levels of bioaccumulation determined that could pose a human health
threat if such organisms are consumed.
Surface contamination levels may also impact the recharge areas of the
surflclal aquifer. The surflclal aquifer serves as the potable water source
for the cities of Titusville, Mims, and Palm Bay. In addition, many wells on
private land in the area use the surficial aquifer as a source of water.
Plutonium dioxide may have the potential to contaminate this aquifer, but
given the fact that PuO) Is essentially insoluble, it is unlikely for any
contamination to reach fhe wellheads of municipal water supplies. It is
also highly unlikely that any contamination on the Kennedy Space Center will
reach offsite wells, including municipal water supply wells. Transport
through the underlying aquatard to the lower Floridan aquifer Is considered
very unlikely.
Mitigation could Include assessment of the amount of contamination in
the different soil horizons in aquifer recharge areas to determine if the
plutonium dioxide is migrating to the water table. If the potential for
migration of PuO2 to the aquifer is high, these areas could be scraped to
below the contamlnation depth and the spoil disposed of properly. Private
wells in the area of contamination could be monitored and alternative water
supplies developed if contamination occurs.
B.6.2.3 Economic Impacts
The bounding economic cost-of each accident for Phases-O and ] are
presented using the methods described in Section B.5.3. In all cases, the
minimum cost will be the cost of the monitoring program. This program is
estimated to cost $! million in the first year, $500,000 in the second year,
$250,000 in the third year, and $]00,000 per year after the third year.
These numbers may be somewhat less for Phase 0 and somewhat more for Phase ]
since the areas contaminated in the Phase ] accidents are greater.
It should be noted that the cleanup costs estimated for the purposes of
this EIS are based upon cleanup to a level of 25 mrem/yr. The 25 mrem/yr
level was selected as a reasonable level for illustrative purposes in the
EIS on the basis of adoption of this level by Federal agencies for the
protection of radiation workers, and the public, from releases associated
with the land disposal of radioactive wastes (10 CFR 6].4]); from
radionuclide emissions from DOE facilitles (40 CFR 61.92); and as associated
with the management and disposal of spent nuclear fuel, high-level waste,
and transuranic waste (40 CFR 19].15). In addition, the 25 mrem/yr level is
one-fourth of the 100 mrem/yr continuous exposure level recommended by the
National Council on Radiation Protection and Space Measurement (NCRPSM 1987)
as an "acceptable risk" for latent cancer mortality risk to individual
members of the public over their lifetime. Actual cleanup levels will
depend upon a number of factors, such as the location and use of the
specific area contaminated, potential threat to the public, evaluation of
the specific exposure pathways, and the specific particle size distribut!on
of the contamination. As stated earlier, cleanup actions would be taken in
accordance wtth the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act through which cleanup levels and actions will be developed in
a publtcly available decision document.
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The majority of contamination resulting from Phase 0 most probable and
maximum case accidents tsconftned to the Kennedy Space Center stte. The
economic impacts from these accidents wtll therefore be confined to Kennedy
Space Center facilities and operations. Cleanup, as a mitigation measure,
applies to areas contaminated at 25 mrem/yr or above at "Year 2" as modelled
in the FSAR (DOE 1989a). The model ytelded no areas contaminated at this
level in Phase O, thus cleanup costs are noted as zero.
The Phase 1 most probable case accidents have the highest potential
level of impacts on the Kennedy Space Center and vicinity. Table B-2I
provides a breakdown of economic cost associated with the Phase 1 cases.
Neither the most probable nor the expectation case showed contamination at
the cleanup ]evel in "Year 2", thus no cleanup costs have been estimated.
The maximum case has total costs ranging from $0.19 million to $35.63
million.
Since the majority of the deposition is estimated to occur on Kennedy
Space Center property, the costs are estimated to be toward the low end of
the cost range. Secondary costs for agricultural and urban uses on the
Kennedy Space Center probably will not be 5 times the cleanup costs. All
agriculture on the Kennedy Space Center is citrus production on leased land
and the urban areas are industrial areas. Impacts to natural areas on the
Kennedy Space Center could be isolated by controlling access rather than
removal and restoration.
B.6.3 Assessment of Global ImDacts
This section presents the environmental consequences of Phases 2, 3, 4,
and 5 as described in Section B.2. The methodology of impact assessment
presented in Section B.5.2 is used to determine and describe impacts.
Mitigation techniques that may be used are described along with the impacts
that may result from mitigation.
The contamination from Phases 2 through 4 will result from accidents in
which modules impact a hard surface. For Phase 5, the contamination will
come from the impact of Graphite Impact Shells. The number of modules or
shells is presented in Tables B-g and B-tO.
Each of the modules or Graphite Impact Shells involved tn the accidents
will release PuO_ at a different location separated by a few kilometers ._
hundreds or thousands of kilometers. Each release point is independent of
the other.
Deposition from Phases 2, 3, and 4 cases did not exceed the cleanup
level at "Year 2" (DOE ]gSga), so no costs have been estimated.
The deposition that exceeds the screening level in Phase 5 occurs on
dry land and tnland water STables B-13, B-14, and B-15). The la_d areas
impacted vary from 13.2 _m_ for the most probable case to 8.9 km_ for the
maximum case, to |4.7 km_ in the expectation case. The areas estimated to
exceed the cleanup level at "Year 2" (DOE ]98ga) consisted of 0.64 kmL tn
the most probable and expectation cases and zero in the maximum case.
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As noted in Subsection B.5.3, cleanup costs were not estimated for
Phase 2-5 accidents given the uncertainties involved in determining the
specific land cover types potentially affected. However, should an accident
occur in Phases 2 through 5, resulting in deposition outside the United
States, the-Federal government-will respond with the technical assistance
and support needed to clean up and remediate affected areas, and to recover
the plutonium fuel.
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APPENDIX C
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION TO SUPPORT THE CHARACTERIZATION OF
THE AFFECTED ENVIRONMENT
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APPENDIX C-1
HISTORICAL CLIMATOLOGICAL DATA
AND
LAUNCH WINDOW-SPECIFIC METEOROLOGICAL DATA*
FOR KSC
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*Meteorological data from DOE 1989a.
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LAUNCH WINDOW-SPECIFIC METEOROLOGICAL DATA
SURFACE DATA
releases from an accident involving the National Space Transportation
System/Inertial Upper Stage (STS/IUS) launch vehicle were taken from the
1980-1984 records for the October 7 to November 25 "launch window." Data were
obtained from meteorological Tower 313 of the Weather Information Network
Display System (WINDS) at Cape Canaveral (see Figure C-]). This SO0 foot high
tower is located about 3 miles west of Launch Complex 3g and the Atlantic
Ocean. While the tower is instrumented at six different heights, data from
the 54-, 204-, and 4g2-foot levels were utilized for the radiological
assessments in the Tier 2 Galileo mission final Environmental Impact
Statement (EIS).
Figures C-2, C-3 and C-4 illustrate the distributions of wind speed and
direction for the three tower levels noted above. The figures utilize
standard meteorological convention in that each set of bars illustrates the
wind speed and frequency from the indicated direction. The figures show
that winds from the north through east sectors typically dominate the
surface winds at all three tower levels during the 1989 launch window. Peak
winds are from the north at the S4-foot level, and from the east at the 204-
and 4g2-foot levels. At all levels, the dominant winds represent onshore
flow in the vicinity of the launch pads.
The average wind speeds for the 5-year period examined were IO.O, ]4.3,
and 17.2 mph for the 54-, 204-, and 4g2-foot levels, respectively. Calm
periods (i.e., zero wind speeds) in the Tower 313 data were treated as
missing. Previous analyses of data collected at the Cape Canaveral Air
Force Weather Station showed an average 4.4 percent calms during the fall
season (September to November) based on 8 years of data (196] to 1968).
Figure C-S presents the maximum wind direction persistence periods by
direction sector for each of the three tower levels as determined from the
S-year WINDS data set. It can be seen that the longer persistence periods
at all levels are generally associated with onshore flows. The maximum
persistence perio_ for each level and its year/month of occurrence are
listed in Table C-_.
The probability of onshore winds persisting for periods of I through 44
hours were calculated for the launch window using 4g2'foot wind data.
These probabilities are presented in Figure C-6 which illustrates that
persistence periods greater than 3 hours have less than a 50 percent
probability of occurrence. Furthermore, the figure shows that the maximum
persistence period (44 hours) has only a 0.03 percent probability of
occurrence.
Fe_deta11_d studies have been accomplished to determine the specific
characteristics of the sea breeze at Cape Canaveral. A true sea breeze
condition is characterized by the followi_g:
1. _Verylight synoptic (e.g., gradient) winds usually associated with
a high-pressure system over the region
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2. Strong insolation
3. Daytime air temperatures rising above sea-surface temperatures
4. A shift of surface winds from offshore (perhaps due to a land
breeze) to onshore during the day
5. The presence of a definite front or convergence zone with
corresponding rising air separating surface air flows with oversea
and overland trajectories
6. The presence of an unstable thermal internal boundary layer, that
begins at the shoreline and increases in depth with increasing
distance inland
7. A discernible, though sometimes weak, return flow layer aloft
(i.e., offshore wind flows)
8. The combination of onshore surface winds, an inland convergence
zone, offshore winds aloft, and subsiding air over the sea
completes the sea breeze circulation cell.
The Kennedy Space Center (KSC) WINDS data were reviewed to identify
those days during the launch window when sufficient land-sea temperatures
differential existed to support the potential for a sea breeze. A total of
47 such days were identified in the 5-year data set. Further analysis of
wind data showed that IO of these cases had the potential to be sea-breeze
occurrences.
Onshore flows can also occur during gradient wind conditions. In this
case, the characteristic sea breeze c{rculation cell does not occur and
significant shears of wind speed or direction in the vertical are normally
not present. Of the eight characteristics of the sea breeze noted above,
only the occurrence of the thermal internal boundary layer induced by
insolation and/or increasing mechanical turbulence may be present.
Therefore, the effects on transport and diffusion induced by the thermal
internal boundary layer may be present, but the effects of the circulation
cell will not occur.
UPPER AIR DATA
Three years of KSC launch window rawinsonde data (1982 to 1984) were used
to develop the distributions of wind direction and wind speed for the
pressure levels of 850, 500, and 350 mb (millibars) (approximately 4,750,
18,Z50 and 27,500 feet, respectively, in the standard atmosphere). These
distributions are presented in Figures C-7 through C-9. These figures
demonstrate a significant change in wind direction with height. The 4,750-
foot level, which approximates the gradient wind level, continues to exhibit
a high frequency of onshore flows with winds from the northeast clockwise
through east dominating. The minimum value at this level is also noteworthy
since, within the 3-year data period, there were no occurrences of a
northwest wind. The 18,250- and 27,500-foot levels show westerly winds to be
highly dominant with easterly winds occurring very infrequently.
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The average wind speeds for the 3-year data period are also seen to
change with. height. At 4,'750 feet, average wind speed is ]5.7 mph,
increasing to 25.5 and 37.2 mph at ]8,250 feet and 27,500 feet, respectively.
There were no reports of calm winds within the 3-year data period at any of
the levels analyzed.
CLIMATOLOGICAL DATA
Historical climatological data for KSC can be found in Table C-2.
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APPENDIX C-2
AQUIFER RECHARGE AREAS A_D
POTABLE WATER FACILITIES IN
THE VICINITY OF KSC
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TABLE C-3. POTABLE WATER FACILITIES
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Pinesood Mobile Villa|o
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Vayfara Restaurant
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'RESTRICTED'
UNITS UNIC. SERVICE
OWNERSHIP CR_A_ITY AREA AREA
_ab_BNHNe qHeaNe rJa_e_ _W _o_e m_
PUBLIC 40.0 H60 BOTH NO
PUBLIC 4.0 HOD BOTH NO
PUBLIC 16.0 _60 BOTH NO
PRIVATE 1_.0 HOD BOT_ NO
PRIVATE ].0 HBD [NC HO
PRIVATE 0.052 _D UNINC YES
PRIVATE 0.043 HGO UNINC YES
PRIVATE 0.289 HOB UHIMC YES
PRIVATE 1.1 NOD UWINC NO
PRIVATE 0.052 _60 UNINC YES
PRIVATE 0.144 HOD UHINC YES
PRIVATE 0.036 HBB UNINC YES
PRIVATE O.Ob4HOB UNINC YES
PRIVATE 0,065 H60 INC YES
PRIVATE 0.066 MSD INC Y£S
PRIVATE O.OOOnGO IWC YES
PRIVATE 0.12_ HOD UN]NC YES
PRIVAIE 0.050 _SO UNINC YES
PRIVATE 0.337 nBO USlHC YES
PRIVATE 1.0 H60 iJNIHC YES
PRIVATE 0.072 H69 UNINC YES
PRIVATE 0.072 flSD UNINC YES
PRIVATE 0.030 _60 UNINC YES
PRIVATE 0.050 HBO UNINC YES
PRIVATE 0.030 BSD UNIHC YES
PRIVATE 0.020 _BO UHINC YES
PRIVATE 0.040 KSO UNINC YES
CO-OP O.OOOnOD UNINC YES
PRIVATE 0.020 HSO UNINC YES
PRIVATE 0.020 HOD UWINC YES
PRIVATE 0.030 n60 _INC YES
PRIVATE O.OOINO0 UNINC YES
PRIVATE - 0.001 HOG UNINC YES
PRIVATE O.O|O_6D IMC YES
PRIVATE O.05B_D UNINC YES
PUBLIC 0.0_6 BB_ UNINC Y(S
PUBLIC 0.040 n60 UWINC YES
PRIVATE 0.045 HBO UHINC YES
PRIVATE 0.20 _D UNIN_ YE_
PRIVATE 0. I_ _S5 WINC NO
PRIVATE 0.040 HOB UN1NC YE|
PRIVATE 0.500 ROD UNINC YES
PRIVATE 0,040 flED UNINC YES
PUBLIC 0.216 nBD UNINC YES
PUBLIC 0.00_ B60 UNIKC YES
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C-19
(Blank Page)
m
|
,,,i
m
|
C-20
"I
I
i ,
_m
APPENDIX C-3
ADDITIONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF
BREVARD COUNTY
NEAR KSC
_=_
=
w
|:
=
i
f
II
I
i
._
i
I
I
ORIG/NAL PAGE IS
OF POOR QUALITY
ll" _ll_" mime ° d
q
FOII¢ I[ ST&T_
.\
C.dd_V[ndd.
b---
_ k
w
m
I
|
I
;
*
!
i
!
!
j ",
r"
.L
I
s
i
I
i
I
i
;
I
i
I
I
I
I
i
!
I
!
I
;
i_._._.
'O¢I[I.[DG(
NTlllCE
Am FORCE liA$[
|aTl
_ONm ICAmlKN._I
KACN
WOUd._T¢
ur.LDOun_[
K_r.N
" " """"*"1 CANAVERAl. NATIONALSEASHORE
HE|RITT ZSLJ_D NATZOI_4J,WZ LDL2 FIE REFUGE
_\\\_ sT.._. ,,,o,o.,.WILDLIFE I_FUGE
ST. JOHNS RIVER MATERKANAG£._h'T DZSTRZCT LANDS
"A"
II
O
SEBASTZAN ZNLET STATE
R£CREATIOH AREA
UL.JU4AY WILDLIFE REFUGE
ERNA NZXON KJU'g4OCX PARK
TURKEY CP._l[ WILDLII_
SANCTUARY
Source: Brevard County 1988b
.I [ llAST*_*
_l[T
FIGURE C-14. BREVARD COUNTY CONSERVATION AREAS
C-21
ORIGINAL PAGE ISQUALll_ T L A
_ OF POOR E N D S
/
I I I I.%'_
rAID( CattY( lU¢
Idl IroII(( III"ATIO_\
i
t 4
i
#
!
I
lie4
I
i
!
|
!
I
;
i
J
(
(
FIGURE C-15.
_[ ¢.,I_W( la, i.
:0¢04
ill&ON
PSTIIICK
ad4 FOaCK I_l(
LOWER WATER'S EDGE
UPLAND WATER'S EDGE
PERCHED WETLANDS
MTEI.IJI'|
_N
IwO_N IMAIKUI
IKJCX
WTI¢
uCl, lOun_
:aCN
Source: Brevard County 1988b
I 1114111rm_
U_.IT
WETLANDS IN BREVARD COUNTY
C-22
1
I
w
I
"11
i
!ORIGINAL PAGE I.S_
@F POOR QUALITY
TABLE C-17.
City
BREVARD
POPULATION OF BREVARD CITIES
1980
272,959
1987
371,735
#Change %Change
98,776 36.2
CapeCanaveral• -: _
Cocoa....
Cocoa Beach
IndiaJantic ........
IndianHarbour Beach _,
Malabar ..... -----
Melbourne .....
Melbourne Beach
Melbourne V_llage
Palm Bay .....
Palm Shore _
Rocldedg¢ -.
Satellite Beach
Titusville ..... .... I l
West Melbourne---_-
UNINCORPORATED L
5,733 7,744 2,011 35.1
16.096 17,908 1,8i2 11.2
10,926 12,638 1,712 15.7
2,883 3,029 146 5.1
5,967 7,329 1,362 22.9
1,118 1,589 471 42.1
46,536 58,116 11,580 24.9
2,713 3,094 381 14.0
1,004 1,042 38 3.8
18,560 47,096 28,536 153.8
77 90 13 16.9
11,877 14,260 - 2,383 20.0
9,163 10.167 1,004 11.0
31,910 40,213 3,303 26.0
5,078 8,067 2,989 58.9
103,318 139,353 36,035 34.9
Source: Brevard County 1988a
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T_C-_-3080
Pa_e Scientific _ame
TABLE C-5.
_-7 Acr_stid_um d_naelfolium
D-O _ halt.end fera
D-10 Aspleni __n _atY_._ron
D-I1 *Avicennia _er_i_anm
D-12 kzoll____ar_roliniana
D-13 Ca] wnovilfa ¢uctissii
_'14 Ca 1c_ocj0n tuberous
D-IS Cereus eriopho_s vat.
D-16 Cereu....._scIracilis
D-17 *Chryso=hyll_ Qlivaeforme
D-18 Cocos r_cife_a
I>-19 Conradina grandiflcra
D-20 Dic_r_ena flori_is
D-21 _s iL_oviciana
D-22 _
D-23 _1_.__1_1_1_1_1_1_i a alta
D-24 Habenaria odontopet_la
D-2S Habenaria
D-26 Rarri_ella _x_rrec_
D-27 Hexalec_ris i._
D-28 [_v__nocallis lati£olia
FLORA AND FAUNA PROTECTED AT KSC
Common
_29 IIex *mbi_
D-30 Lech_
D-31 Lycop=diun alovecuroldes
D-32 Lycopcdium _ress_
b-)] " Lycc_dium _.rolinianum
D-35 _,N_rolepi S biserrata
D-_ *_Qph!_lossu_ l_lmat=n
D-37
1)-38
Giant leather fern
Balsam to_
C_rtis n_
Ebony sploen_r_
Black mangrove
Mo_Nlt_ fer_
Curtims rN_/rasS
Grass pink {_)
Fragrant _l-burLn_
_reu|
West (_ast
Prlcklle-apple
Satinleaf
Cooonut psl=
Lard-flea.red
rotary
Florida white-top
ud_e
Florida shield fern
Butterfly orchid
Rein orchid (un_n_)
Water spider orchid
or creeping orch_
Or_id (or_tnL_)
Crested cor_Iro_
Broad-leaved spider
lily
Carolina holly or
_oddin_ pin,_d
Poxtail club sou
Southern club sou
Sler_er club Joss
Florida smlaxis
O_io_loss_ petiolat_m
O_xm_a ccr_ressa
Boston fern (unnamed)
Adder's tongue fern
(_u_)
Adder's tongue fern
(unr_)
Prickly pear cactus
(unnam_)
_esig_sted s_ ._.a
T
SP
T T SP
T
SP
T
Ua SP
_I T
E lI E SP
UR II E T Sp
E
T
UR
T
II T
II T
II T
ZI T
lI T
lI T
t_
t_
T
T
T
T
II T
T
SP
UR E SP
II T
!
oo
m
I
m
|
J
|
.|
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mTABLE C-5 (continued).
P_e Scl_tific
D.-39 _ strJcta
D.-40
D-41
D..-42
D-43
I)-44
osm_ _ vat.
spec_bilis
Peperomi8 _mllim
*Peper_a obtusifolta
Pere_ki8
Per_ _rbo.ia var.
Phlebodi_ _re_
Poqonia ol_ioqlossoid%,s
l_nthi_a rac_sa
D-45
D-4G
D-47
D-48 Psilotc_.
D-49 "P_iz_ra
D-S0 P_y_c_sia
D-S1 Sa]vlnlj _unSifolia
D-52 Scae_ola plu_ieri
D-S3 Sela_ineila arenicola
D--SS SpirantJ_es lacinial:a
D-S6 _riana msritima
D-S7 9hel_pterls interr_pta
D-SB Thelypteris palustris
D-S9 Thell_terl s _adranqularis
D-60 Tillandsia $_ula_
0-61 _rnefor_ia _na;_halodes
,-- D--G2 Verbena mritims
D-_) Verbena _sis
D-64 V/ttaria li_sta
D-G5 I_o_ardia aerolata
D--66 *Zanda _brosa
D-67 Zeuxl ne $tJvateur_tica
ORIGINAL PR,GE IS
OF POOR QUALITY
KSC-_-3080
common &_me
Desiccated St.atus -
.osm_c_ roA ro_-_Ar_u
P_rickly pear c_c'cu8
II T
_o_1 fern
Pepper(u..a.ea)
Florida pmp_$omia
Lem_ vine
rsdbay or
r_ay perma
_olde. p_yp_
no_e ixx3o_*
Shadow witch
_isk fern or
fork tern
Red m_grove
Brom_aired
_ter _1_
Scaevola
Sand 8pikem_ss
_ec_l_e pod
Lace-lip ladies'-
taems or lace-lip
spiral orchid
Bay cedar
kspidi_ fern (_)
f_rsh fern
kspidiu_ fern (unnamed)
wild pim_ or lie
plant (u_anud)
Sea laver_er
Coastal vervain
T_ vervain
Shoestrlng fern
_ett_d chain _
East ,,_-st: ooont.te
Oz'_i_ fun_uaed)
UR
OR
Zl
Zl
ZI
C
E
E
T
T
T
Y
T
SP
SP
SP
T
T S_
T
SP
II T
E SP
T
T
T
T
T SP
SP
SP
T
T
iI C T
II-l! _-37 54
C-35
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Pa_e Scientific
C-8
C-9
C-10
C-If
C-12
C-13
C-14
C-15
C-16
C-17
Cectrc_c_us unSecimalis
IHDI_ OP _ FJ_ (11
Rk_)N(PRIBIARS
Cx_cnliC)n
Deal_orated Status
*klllqator I_lssissll_iensl ,,s
_Caretta aaretta csretta
Coenc_ shock
•Chelonlm _s
Der_cbelys coriacea
• Drlm_rcbon corals c_u_rl
-Co_e_s poly_s
Eretlw_ely$ J_bri cata
,ln_rtcata
• Lepidochelys kee_i
• Ner_dia Iaseiata taenista
C-18 Pltuophis melanoleucus
C-19 Rana areolata
C-20 Sc_1opo_s _ooSi.__._i
BIRDS
C-21 accipiter
C-22 Ainophila sestivalis
c-23 _
C-24 *_m_splza marltima
nigrisc_ns
C-25 *Aphr,] oco_ eoer_,,,lescens
ooerulescqms
C-26 Aranu_____s
C-2"7 At,he____cun/cular,,/a
C-25 Buteo swalnsoci
C-29 Casmer_ius albu.._!s
C-30 C_aradrius melo_us
_erican alligator T{S/k) II _ _q_
Atlantic loggerhead
turtle T I T T
Atl_ti¢ gr_ turtle E l E E
L_ather_ack turtle E 1 E R
Eastern indigo snake T T
Go_er turtle OR XX r_ T
Atlantic ha_krbill
turtle E l E E
Atlant|c rl_Ltey turtle E X E E
Atlantic salt _r_h
water snake T T E
Florida pine snake UR
C._er fro_ t_ SSC
Florida scrub lizard
C-32 Dendroim discolor
paludicola
0.-33 ]_r_t_s c:nerulea
C-34 _ rufo_s
(:-35 _ title
Cooper'! ha_
l_chnan' a _rr_
Roseate spoonbill
Dusk_ e_aside _parr_
Florl_ scrub Jay
Li_n
_rrc_Ing o_I
_b_Inson' e ha_k
Gre_t _ret
Piping plover
kmarican harrier _r
_ar_ bnk
Florida prairie v_bler
Little blue heron
_dd_ah e_ rot.
_o_ egret
E
UR
T
Ua
E
T
_SC
SSC
T
1I
SSC
_C
_C
T
_C
SSC
R
_C
C-36
L-
L_
L
u
[i:
KSC-_F-3080
TABLE C-5 (continued).
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_J_ntlflc Name Ccmron _
Designated Status
C-36
0-3?
C-)8
C-39
C-40
C-41
C-42
C043
C-44
tricolor
l_6ocim_s albus
lealco colur_arlus
*Falco pere_rinus tundrius
•nlco _rt_ri.= _.lus
Yricolored hercc or
lauisiana heron
_.-allo_t.8 i lod kite IJR
_ite ibis
Merlin or pigeon hawk
_rctie peregrine
falcon T
Southeastern kestrel UR
hlco _arverius _r_.t|ui hst.ern keKsll
*_ mq_ificens Roth_ild' • mngnLficsr_
rothschlldi frigat_ bird
Cru..j eanade:_is prsumsis _ - _-lel-o-rida sandh/li
*..-L,3ma
C-45 _4aen_topus palliatus _ican oyster-
e-t.chet
C-46 *lqaliaeet_Js leuccce_lus _tld bgle
C-47 Hel_ithems ve_Lv_r_s Wom-uting vart_er
C-48 ' l'x_r_,chus exills exili.....__s Least bittern
C-49 I_terallus _ar_icen_s Black rail
C-S0 "_eria americana Wood stork
C-51 _c_anassa v/olaoea Yellow-crowed night
h_
C-52 _c_Lcoraz n.yc_.Lcorax Black_ night
_ heron
C-53 "Par_ion haliaet_s Osprey
C-54 *Pelecanus occident_lis
C-55
carolinensis
PJc_i_es borealis
Eastern brown pelican
I_5-cc_.sd_
u_dpec_er E
C-57 Pleoadi8 falclnellus
falci_ellus Glossy £bl_
C-58 Rec_rvirostra americana American avooe_
C-59 _ _ nl_ck skl_wer
C-60 _ rotaeilla Louisiana _atet_htush
C-61 _aon rutic/,ll_
rut/c/lies
*Sterna sntillar_n
C-56
American redstart
C-62 Least tern
C-63 Sterna _ Caspian tern
C-64 *_term doooallii Roseate tern
C-_5 Stez_ fus_ta Sooty tern
C-66 Sten_a m_xx'm Royal tern
C-_? _ ,undvioensis Sl_bdch tern
_-68 Vireo _lt_o_s Bl_ck-_hiskered vireo
E
UR
Z E
ll T
II
SSC
SSC
SUD
T
T
ZI T T
SS_ T
I T T
SSC
_C
gJD
E E
II
SSC
SSC
T
SSC
T E
SSC
SSC
SSC
R
T T
SSC
T T
SSC
SSC
SSC
R
C-37
TABLE C-5 (continued).
]KSC-I_-30 BO
Scientific _s_e
Desi_ated Status
n_s crr_ r_c _
C-69 Fells concolor eor_ Florida panther
C-?O Lutra cansdensis Bivtr otter
C-71 Lynx rufu_.._,, _t_t
C-72 Nustela fr_ata pe_llul_e Florida
C-73 F_ela vison lutensis Florida link
C-74 14eotiber alleni ILo_d-tallod nut.at
C-75 .Perc:w/scu$ floridanus Florida _ae
C-76 _Yri d_echus manatus
latircstris West lndfen manatee
C-77 Urns an_rlcanus florL_ianuS Florida black bear
l l Z !
ll
IX
I
B
ESC
OR SSC T
E l E T
___ T T
E-10 I- 9 T- 9 Z- 9
Y- S II-10 T-12 T-15
T(S/A)- 1 _ SSC-lS $S¢-2S
gdl_- 2
- t_ted S_ates Fish and Wildlife Service: List of-_ngar,_ and
_'nreat_ned Wildlife and Plants, SO _ 17.11-12 (o£fLcial Un_tsd
States List).
C_ - Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wil_
Faurm and Flora.
o Plorida Game _ Fresh Water Fish Ccnmission: secLim
F_ (official State c_ Florida animal list).
I'_A = Florida Com_ttee on Pare and _dan_ere_ Plants and An/ms1_.
• listed /n KSC Final _nvirom_tal Impact Statement (1979)
_- _r_langer_; q_ threatened; _ r_w_cies of Special Conoez_; OR= Under
Review (for possible limits); I= inclu_ in Appe_lix I; lI- included in
Iq_ix II (o_ CITES} ; it- Rare, SUB- Status Un_ertermfr_, T(S/_)=
Threatened due to stml_rity of appearance.
(1) Sc:uroe: BreinLnge_ et .1, 1984.
39-27.03-0S,
m |
q
w
e
Source: NASA 1986 |
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APPENDIX C-5
SPECIAL DESIGNATION LAND USES
IN THE KSC REGION
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STATE PARKS AND
RECREATION AREAS
1985
_ource: State of Florida 1987b
FIGURE C-25. STATE PARKS AND RECREATION AREAS
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FIGURE C-26. STATE SPECIAL FEATURE SITES AND PRESERVE
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FIGURE C-27. STATE RESERVESAND AQUATIC PRESERVES
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FIGURE C-28. ACQUISITIONS UNDER SAVE OUR COAST PROGRAM
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FIGURE C-29. FLORIDA RECREATIONAL TRAILS SYSTEM
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FIGURE C-30. ACQUISITIONS UNDER CONSERVATION AND RECREATION LANDS PROGRAM m
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FIGURE C-31. WILDLIFE MANAGEMENT AREAS
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FIGURE C-32. FISH MANAGEMENT AREAS
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SAVE-OUR RIVERS PROGRAM
AS OF 1987
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SOUTH FLORIDA WATER MANAGEMENT DISTRICT
Source: State of Florida 1987b
L_ FIGURE C-33. ACQUISITIONS UNDER SAVE OUR RIVERS PROGRAM
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FIGURE C-34. NATIONAL PARK SYSTEM IN FLORIDA
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FIGURE C-35. WILD AND SCENIC RIVERS
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FIGURE C-37. NATIONAL WILDERNESS AREAS
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OVERVIEW OF KSC
RADIOLOGICAL CONTROLS
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RADIOLOGICAL CONTROLS
The use of radioactive materials at KSC requires appropriate licenses,
special permits, and/or use authorizations. All activities involving the
use, handling or decommissioning of radioactive sources, apparatus, or work
areas are strictly controlled, monitored, and inspected by health physics
personnel. Numerous controls enforced at KSC area include: (I)
establishment of time, distance, and shielding requirements, as well as
personnel protection devices, equipment, and measures to restrict personnel
exposures to below regulatory limits and to as low as reasonably achievable
(ALARA) levels; (2) leak test, contamination surveys, personnel, and work
area monitoring; (3) training and orientation of all personnel engaged in
activities involving potential exposure to radlological sources; (4)
certification and training of all personnel directly working with sources,
including training In emergency procedures; and (S) strict control over
visitors and other non-radiological personnel and workers entering
radiologlcal control areas.
Incidents or accidents during routine ground operations resulting in
damage, rupture, or breach of major radiological sources or associated minor
radioactive sources require immediate actions to protect operational
personnel, the general public, and the environment. In the event of such an
incident or accident, the KSC radiation protection officer would be notified
immediately and radiological emergency response elements would be initiated.
A number of precautions and requirements applicable to emergency
response activities include the following. Radiation air monitoring
equipment and instrumentation with an audible alarm will be available in any
storage or use area established for major sources. Portable radiation
monitoring instruments and communications equipment will be available during
transport of major sources on KSC. All workers and personnel engaged in
activities involving major sources and entering radiologically controlled
areas, or in areas immediately adjacent to areas controlled due to presence
of major sources will be oriented regarding potential radiological hazards,
characteristics of immediate evacuation warning signals, fire and radiation
alarms, and of the appropriate response to such warnings or alarms. Tests
of radiation detection equipment alarms will be conducted prior to
commencement of operations involving major radiological sources and daily
during such operations to ensure that systems are operable and reliable.
Radiological equipment, instrumentation and monitoring devices, protective
clothlng/equipment, and associated supplies and materials will be available
at locations of storage or use of major sources. Emergency response
personnel will be trained and certified in the use of emergency kits and
equipment. The Radiological Control Center (RADCC) will be activated for
dealing with any ground processing emergency involving major radiological
sources.
In addition, written emergency response procedures will be posted and
wlll include procedures to warn, instruct, and evacuate individuals in
endangered areas, provisions for shutdown of work areas, facilitieS, and
associated ventilation and air conditioning intake systems upon verification
of a radiological release, and requirements for associated response
activities and re-establishment of radiation controls and recovery from the
emergency condition.
C-53
In the event of an accident involving a potential release, the
Radiologtcal Control Center is the onsite focal point for Contingency
operations and is the point from which direction is provided to the
radiologtcal field teams. For accidents involving offsite areas, a Federal
Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center has been established by the
U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) to coordinate Federal offsite monitoring and
assessment activities. Key personnel will be predeployed at various
specified sites in the field prior to launch activities, and will be in
communication with the RADCC. All emergency response personnel will receive
training and orientation to familiarize them with the physical, chemical,
and radiologtcal hazards, as well as radiation protection equipment and
techniques.
Three classification levels will be used to indicate the degree of
severity relattve to radioactive matertal releases expected in a giVeh _
incident or accident situation. An "Alert" wtll be declared if an
incident/accident has occurred or is in progress and no release of
radioactive matertal has occurred or is expected to occur. An "Emergency"
status is assigned if an incident/accident has occurred and a release of
radioactive material onsite has occurred or is expected to occur, but release
of radioactive matertal offsite has not occurred and is not expected to
occur. A "General Emergency" will be declared if an incident/accident has
occurred and a release of radioactive material onsite and offslte has
occurred or is expected to occur.
Upon notification of any abnormal situation that could result in a
release of radioactive material, the following immediate actions will be
taken. The RADCC will coordinate appropriate notifications regarding
potential or real radiological incidents. Surveillance aircraft will make
an assessment of airborne and ground level radlological conditions. Onsite
radiation monitoring teams and the on-scene commander will be deployed to
assist in a preliminary assessment of the situation. Fire; rescue, _
security, and damage measures will be implemented as necessary. Health
physics representatives will define access points to the affected area and
control the passage of response personnel through these access points. All
personnel not directly engaged in damage control will be prevented from
entering the controlled area. Emergency crews and evacuees leaving
radiation controlled areas will be monitored by radiological field teams at
appropriately located access points.
In coordination with, or subsequent to, the immediate actions described
above, the following actions will be taken dependent upon the consequences
of the incident. If there is no breach of the encapsulated radioactive
material, a search will be initiated and the intact devices will be removed
and placed in temporary storage containers. Radiation monitoring teamswill
conduct thorough area contamination surveys as directed by the RADCC. The
State and offsite support elements wtll perform confirmatory surveys in the
offstte areas to verify no reiease or contamination, and the following
actions will be taken. The onslte and offsite radiation monitoring teams
will monitor the cloud path and identify contaminated areas. Radiological
assessment aircraft will track airborne radioactive material, identify the
cloud path, and assess airborne radioactive material concentrations: _°_T :
Because of the many possible variations In incidents and circumstances,
additional actions to be performed by onsite radiation monitoring teams will
be at the direction of the RADCC. Procedures will be determined by the
health physics staff.
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APPENDIX D
RESPONSES TO PUBLIC REVIEW COMMENTS

APPENDIX D
RESPONSES TO PUBLIC REVIEW COMMENTS
D.] INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency published a Notice of
Availability for the Galileo mission (Tier 2) Draft Environmental Impact
Statement in the Federal Register on January 6, ]989, and the 4S-day public
review and comment period closed on February 2], 1989. Timely comments were
received from the Federal, state and local agencies, organizations and
individuals listed below. :Copies of these comments are presented in the
follow pages; the comments are marked and numbered for identification along
with NASA's treatment of each-cOUnt: Where changes in the text were
appropriate, such changes are noted.
D.2 RESPONSES TO COMMENTS
This Appendix provides specific responses to comments received from:
e
o
e
e
e
e
e
U.S. Envlronmental Protection Agency
U.S. Department of State
U.S. Department of the Air Force
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
State of F1orlda, Office of the Governor
Committee to Bridge the Gap/Steven Aftergood
Horst A. Poehler, Ph.D.
The comments from Dr. Poehler, although received after the close of the
comment period, are nevertheless reprinted in this Appendix and addressed in
detail because he requested and received an extension of the comment period
in order to consider specific technical issues of this EIS.
It is NASA policy that, where no extension of the comment period is
requested and granted, untimely comments will still be considered if
possible, but the comments will not be printed In the comment Appendix.
This policy applied to all untimely comments. Comments from the U.S.
Department of Energy (DOE) fell into this category. The DOE comments, and
NASA's treatment of these comments, may both be made available upon proper
request. _ _
_ L ._-_ -_-_ .....
Ftnally, tn addition to all of the above, NASA received seven letters
generally protesting the launch of the Galtleo mission. Since the letters
either did not address spectftc points tn the EIS or were untimely, or both,
NASA will respond to each letter as publtc information correspondence, but
has not reprinted the letters here in the Appendix. Nevertheless, the
letters and their responses may bothbe made available upon proper request..pa
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